Abstract
Chapters 9 and 10 explore some applications of the pluralist framework, and show how responses can be given to two different threats from primitivist approaches to truth. Primitivism distinguishes itself from deflationism by holding that truth has important explanatory roles to play, but denies that there is any informative theory of truth to be given. The first threat comes from Trenton Merricks’s claim that there are truths for which there are no truth-makers. This implies that we should be primitivists about truth, as there are truths for which there are no explanations of why they are true, threatening both theories of truth and truth-maker theories. In this chapter this threat is addressed by showing how a pluralist theory can respond to it, including discussions of modal truth, truths about the past, and negative existentials. In the process, pluralism is shown to offer useful resources to those tempted by truth-maker theory.
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