Pricing of private charge sharing service based on bilateral bargaining game

Abstract

As a new charging service for electric vehicles (EVs), private charge pile sharing can effectively alleviate the charging demand-supply imbalance, reduce the unnecessary construction of public charging facilities, and promote the sustainable development of cities. Based on Rubin’s rotating bargaining game, this paper constructs a bilateral bargaining game model with a private charge pile owner, electricity retailer, and EV user as agents under the condition of information asymmetry. In the bargaining game model with the private charge pile owner and the electricity retailer, the electricity retailer bids first, and the private charge pile owner chooses to accept or reject it, according to the situation. In the bargaining game model with the private charge pile owner and the EV user, the private charge pile owner prefers to bid, and the EV user chooses to accept or reject it. The results indicate that because the final price reached with the EV user (electricity retailer) is unknown, only the theoretically optimal quote for the electricity retailer (EV user) can be obtained, but the specific reported value cannot be determined. Finally, two models of BYD E6 and Toyota RAV4 are selected to estimate the cost limit of EV as perceived by EV users.