Preventing Nuclear Entrepreneurship in Russia's Nuclear Cities

Abstract

Since September 11, 2001, concern about an attack on the United States by terrorists using a stolen nuclear warhead or an improvised radiological weapon—a “dirty bomb”—has risen dramatically. In discussions about this threat, Russia is frequently mentioned as the most likely source of black-market nuclear skills and materials. In its 2002 report to Congress, for example, the National Intelligence Council noted that Russia’s nuclear security measures are still primarily oriented toward external threats and “are not designed to counter the pre-eminent threat faced today—an insider who attempts unauthorized actions.”1 Reports of Russian weapons experts sharing their knowledge with other countries have also proliferated.2 Whether through scientiac exchange visits, conferences, or email, Russian nuclear experts may be sharing sensitive information with others. Although many of these reports are anecdotal and few have been rigorously documented since the early 1990s, the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency has consistently reported to Congress its suspicions that Russian scientists are helping foreign countries pursue nuclear weapons development programs.3 Preventing Nuclear Entrepreneurship in Russia