President Bush Deviates from Core American Principles in Middle East Policies

The direct link between United States' energy security policy and its military policy in Persian Gulf can be traced back to formulation of Carter doctrine in late 19705 and subsequent creation of rapid deployment force (RDF)-ancestor to US central command (CENTCOM)-in early igSos.' The threat has evolved with strategic context-from a Soviet incursion into Gulf after invasion of Afghanistan, to an Iranian attack against Gulf monarchies after 1979, to regional security implications of Iraq-1 ran to threat posed by Saddam Hussein after end of with Iran-but objective has remained same: to sanctuarize petro-monarchies of Gulf, and especially Saudi Arabia, against any external threat; in other words, to prevent heart of world oil system from being caught up into regional political instability.FROM POLICEMAN TO POLITICAL ENGINEERTo use a term from political philosophy, US involvement in Persian Gulf under Carter doctrine amounted to applying a negative power: it was meant to prevent people from doing certain things more than it aimed at shaping region. The US has made it impossible for Iran and Iraq, successively, to threaten security of production and export facilities of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and United Arab Emirates, as well as sea-lanes of Gulf and Strait of Hormuz. But from late 1970s until 11 September 2001, US had never seriously tried to change regimes of Iran, Iraq, or Syria, to prevent Iraq and Iran from fighting, or to push for political reforms in monarchies of Gulf. The type of power that United States has applied in Middle East under Carter doctrine is that of a policeman, not that of a planner.After terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, Bush administration undertook a complete reorientation of US policy in Middle East. At core of new approach is idea that to win war on terrorism United States must take advantage of its unprecedented power to freedom-promote democracy and market economy-throughout world, and especially across Arab-Muslim world. The second aspect of Bush doctrine-as new policy has come to be called-is concept of preemptive war, which actually means preventive war: nature of threat confronting United States-a combination of transnational terrorist networks, evil regimes, failed states, and proliferation of unconventional weapons-requires that US be ready to act preventively. This second pillar of Bush doctrine contributes to its revolutionary character but is of less importance for purpose of this article than policy of democracy promotion in Middle East.The first comprehensive policy document presenting Bush doctrine was national security strategy of United States of America (NSS) released by White House in September 2002. was also conveyed to American people and to world in a series of speeches by President Bush in 2002 and 2003.2 The latest NSS document, published in March 2006, tones down doctrine of preemption-though it formally maintains it-but strongly reaffirms strategic commitment to advancement of liberty. In his introductory letter, Bush reaffirms that fighting and winning on terror and promoting freedom as alternative to tyranny and despair are two inseparable priorities of US foreign policy, and that the advance of liberty will make America more secure. The first sentence of NSS itself states: It is policy of United States to seek and support democratic movements and institutions in every nation and culture, with ultimate goal of ending tyranny in our world.1 The Bush doctrine has evoked an intense debate among foreign policy experts but, more than three years after launch of in Iraq, promotion of political freedom is still guiding principle of Bush administration's Middle East policy. …

This study attempts to diagnose the changes witnessed by the American foreign policy in the Middle East, in both of Presidents George W. Bush and Barack Obama administrations, this phase witnessed shift at the level of the visions, beliefs and attitudes. which reflected on the nature of the of dealing with the issues of the region , and embodied the most prominent features of change to adopt the U.S. policy toward the countries of the region in a general principle encapsulates policies , texture pressure in order to establish the values of democracy and human rights as a philosophy and a general principle , and inwardly save its interests in the Middle East , the United States sought for six decades in middle east countries to achieve stability on the expense of democracy , and through the support of totalitarian existing regimes , and cracking down on the opposition .but the events of September 11 forced them to change the approach to foreign policy encouraging democracy and claim to impose reforms. the study exposed to the George W. Bush hard doctrine, unilateral, military tool that give superiority to the implementation of the objectives of its foreign policy, on the contrast of president Obama doctrine with its realistic approach, which sees the need to combine all the tools of foreign policy to implement its objectives, Also this study return to realistic policy in its alliances and legitimacy, as well as dealt approach U.S. political discourse towards the Muslim world, and seek the main topics like, the war on Iraq in 2003and its impact on reformation in the Middle East .And the U.S. position on the Arab Spring, specifically the Syrian revolution. Also this study deals with U.S policy towards Iran Nuclear file, and The Arab-Israeli conflict .The study concluded that foreign policy changes occurred in George W. Bush second presidency is differ from his first presidency, and this transformation take a wider dimension and more comprehensive in Barack Obama's presidency.

One of the most important phenomena in US politics is Christian Zionism. The term Christian Zionism is related to unity of a large part of Protestant beliefs and the Zionists movement. The religious motives of US Protestants have coincided with the Jewish intention to go back to Palestine. In this way, Protestant religious motives could only be achieved by using political pressure on the US government. The goal of this pressure is to turn the foreign policy of Washington into a struggle for reconstruction and maintenance of the state of Israel. That is why many people wrongly believe that the US policy in Middle East is a product of the Jewish lobby. However, the US foreign policy in Middle East is a product of religious beliefs of Christian Zionists and the Jewish lobby is just using this fact for its own purposes.

It is a common assumption in the international media that the fundamentalist Christian Right suddenly appeared on the US political scene following the 11 September 2001 tragedy, and that it became a major force in shaping US policy in the Middle East. While it is true that fundamentalist Christians have exercised considerable influence during the George W. Bush administration, their ascendance is neither new nor surprising. The movement has demonstrated political influence in the US and England intermittently for more than a hundred years, particularly in the formation of Middle East policy. This article focuses on the unique theology and historical development of Christian Zionism, noting its essential beliefs, its emergence in England during the nineteenth century, and how it grew to gain prominence in the US. The alliance of the pro-Israel lobby, the neo-conservative movement, and several Christian Zionist organizations in the US represents a formidable source of support for the more maximalist views of Israel's Likud Party. In the run-up to the 2004 US presidential elections this alliance could potentially thwart any progress on an Israeli–Palestinian peace plan in the near future. Moreover, Likud ideology is increasingly evident in US Middle East policy as a result of this alliance.

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The interstate diplomacy between China and the GCC states (Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates) has grown tremendously in the last five decades. When China initiated her radical, capitalistic economic reforms in 1978, the subsequent economic growth has necessitated large energy consumption. The GCC states have been attainable to China’s rising energy demand, stirring strategic multilateral cooperation. Economic interests are evidently at the core of China’s Middle East policy that is expectedly to grow even further considering the “Belt and Road” (BRI) initiative, along with other nascent sectors of the Gulf’s overall economy. The Five Principles of Chinese Foreign Policy, which has primarily involved maintaining peaceful coexistence and mutual benefit with her trading partners and balancing conflicting interests, necessitates a constant review as the geopolitical situation changes regionally and globally. If its strategic economic interests are threatened, China could struggle to adhere to non-interference in other states’ domestic affairs. This chapter analyses Chinese foreign policy goals and diplomatic cooperation involving the GCC states and presents an evaluation of the energy and non-energy factor, the position of the GCC states and Iran, the use of soft power and cultural interactions, the Sino–American rivalry and influence, and the cooperation on non-oil investments.

After World War II, successive U.S. presidents have steadily advanced the U.S. strategic presence in the Middle East, but such efforts were challenged under the Carter administration. At the time of the Carter presidency, he actively promoted the Egyptian-Israeli reconciliation and further reaffirmed his support for Israel, while focusing on addressing the potential risks of oil supply and prices in the Middle East, but many of his Middle East policies did not fundamentally achieve the expected results. Despite the Egyptian-Israeli reconciliation, the Arab-Israeli conflict remains unsettled; the re-emergence of the oil crisis had once again triggered a crisis in the Western world, and the failure of the Iranian Hostage Crisis and the Islamic Revolution has destroyed a pillar of the U.S. Middle East strategy. Consequently, Carter’s foreign policy is not without impediments but settles the basis for subsequent U.S. Middle East policy with inveterate impacts and the concepts of peace and democracy.

United States, as the dominant geopolitical power in the Middle East, has been struggling to stabilize the region to achieve its geopolitical objectives and interests. Especially since the Second World War, the US has rioritized, enacted and represented Middle East policies as vital to securing its till terrorist attacks on the twin towers in New York City. As it is understood, the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, marked a dramatic change not only in US policy, but in US rhetoric and international discourses as well. Following the terror attacks, US Middle East policy shifted from being the matter of security, which primarily puts more emphases on responsive securitization, to the preventive securitization of national interests, particularly under the neo-conservative Bush Administrations. Consequently, US launched two direct military engagements in Afghanistan (2001) and Iraq (2003), and involved in unilateral regime change in those states ostensibly, to secure its national interests and provide world peace in the long run. It is important to highlight here that US cleared the full support (rhetorically, at least) of the United Nations to disarm the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. This study, therefore, attempts to revisit and conceptualize the contemporary US and EU Middle East foreign policy —though they are not identical— before and after the September 11 terror attack. The argument here is that the Middle East policy objectives of the US and the EU primarily agglomerate around two main headings: security of oil and protecting the state of Israel in an Arab-dominated region. Closely related, but not equivalent, both the US and EU have a stake in establishing good relations with the Arab states and promoting democracy and liberal market economies in the Middle East. This study also reviews the President Barack Obama's Middle Eastern foreign policy initiatives and attempts to suggest several key points.

Democrat Party (DP) era is one of the contested periods in terms of politics, economy, society and foreign policy in Turkey. Particularly, the government-press relations and Turkey’s Middle East policy especially in the late 1950s consist serious challenges and crises. Initially, the DP government conducted a liberal press policy, but in the second half of the decade government-press relations strained. Similarly, Turkey’s Middle East policy can be regarded as a success story in the first half of the decade, while Turkey faced serious crises and challenges in the region in the second half. Despite several studies on government-press relations in the 1950sin the literature, there is a shortage of specific studies analyzing positions of the press towards DP’s Middle East policy. As a result, this paper aims to fill this gap and analyze the positions of the press regarding Turkey's Middle East policy throughout the decade in order to show divergence and convergence between the government and the press. Selected newspapers and journals published in this period will be used as primary sources. This paper concludes that the press in Turkey, regardless of their positions towards the government, supported DP's pro-Western and anti-communist Middle East policy despite some exceptions.

This paper focuses on China’s policy in the Middle East and the rivalry with the U.S. The question is that what are the main factors on China’s Middle East policy and its competition with the U.S? The hypothesis regards to three effective factors: “China’s energy dependency” on the Middle East, “economy” and support for “stability” in the Middle East. What is important in China’s competition with the U.S. regarding to its Middle East policy is the substantial difference in ways of treating the countries of the region; China is committed to Westphalia model based on noninterference in internal affairs of the countries and respect the sovereignty of the governments. However, after 9/11, the U.S is seeking a balance between stability and change through intervention in the international affairs and in some cases is looking for a regime change. From the other hand, China, due to its dependency on the region’s energy welcomes America’s military presence in the region for providing stability. The authors by using a descriptive analytical method try to explain the situation of rivalry between China and the United States in Middle East. China is an “emerging power” with high economic growth and in demand of more energy supply. The problem is that a rising power in the region is often a source of concern for hegemony.

In this article, I analyze the Japan-Middle East-U.S. triangle relationship. Japan’s Middle East policies, the author contends, have been influenced by its energy needs and relationship with the United States. Fully aware of its status as a country with hardly any energy resources, Japan has engaged in energy diplomacy and investment in oil fields in the Middle East. This article describes how, despite pursuing an energy strategy largely independent of the United States, Japan has constantly needed to take into account its relationship with the Americans, and Japan has slowly shifted toward more frequent support for American policy especially after the Gulf War in 1990. At the same time, Japan’s Middle East policies have been influenced by its domestic politics. For example, former Prime Minister Koizumi’s post-September 11 plan to let Japan’s military forces play a more prominent role in the War on Terror was crushed by his Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). This article explains that LDP politicians were afraid that supporting the war would undermine Japan’s economic interests in the Muslim world and how the Democratic Party of Japan which took office this September has attempted to pursue a more independent position in its relations with the United States. This article also explores the shifts in Japan’s Middle East policies under the new administration and their implications on US-Japan relations.

The Politics of Trade and Turkish Foreign Policy

Exposed to the threat of the Soviet Union after the Second World War, Turkey has addressed the Western alliance. Turkey began to receive aid from the United States with the Truman Doctrine that was announced in 1947. Turkey, who got closer to the Western alliance, shaped its Middle East Policy according to this alliance. In the process of Cold War Turkey felt the threat from the northern neighbor USSR and did not understand that the Arab states felt the threat from the West and this factor inhibit Turkey from following an efficient policy in the Middle East. This study aims to explain Turkey’s Middle East policy from the end of the Second World War to the Baghdad Pact, which was established under the leadership of The United States.

Russia's Middle East policy has undergone a significant change following the occurrence of the Arab Spring. The main reason for this change was the new strategic realities created by the Arab Spring in the region. Russia first considered the Arab Spring as a regional domestic issue, but this perspective changed as outside influences became involved in the events. The Western powers viewing the Arab Spring as a new regional political configuration influenced the overall framework of this change. The development that had the greatest impact on Russia's approach to the Arab Spring was the events in Libya. NATO's military intervention in Libya has led to the disruption of Russia's gains in the region. In this context, the Libyan issue has provided an opportunity for Russia to radically reconsider its Middle East policy. Unlike the reluctant and cautious attitude in Libya, Russia's regional policy on Syria has taken a more concrete form. Russia’s military operation in Syria can be considered in this context. It is impossible to consider the military operation in 2015 in isolation from the developments that emerged after the annexation of Crimea, which led to Russia's relative international isolation. The paradigm shifts and differences in approach in Russian foreign policy after 2014 should not be ignored within this context.

Turkey’s Middle East policy has taken a realist turn in recent years. This article explores this phenomenon in a critical case, i.e., Turkey’s abandonment of a policy of engagement vis-à-vis the Kurdish revisionist actors in Iraq and Syria, and tilt towards a coercive approach including military posturing. In order to explain the drivers of this realist turn, it utilizes a neo-classical realist framework that combines regional and domestic variables. It traces how the fragmentation of the regional order, combined with the rise of new security culture and power bloc domestically, undergirded the reversal in Ankara’s Middle East policy. It concludes with a discussion on the policy implications of this new phase.