Abstract
Children (N = 278, 34-71 months, 54% girls) were told which of two figurines turned on a music box and also observed empirical evidence either confirming or conflicting with that testimony. Children were then asked to sort novel figurines according to whether they could make the music box work or not. To see whether children would explore which figurine turned on the music box, especially when the observed and testimonial evidence conflicted, children were given access to the music box during their sorting. However, children rarely explored. Indeed, they struggled to disregard the misleading testimony both when sorting the figurines and when asked about a future attempt. In contrast, children who explored the effectiveness of the figurines dismissed the misleading testimony.
Highlights
Whether children are learning from what other people tell them or by tracking statistical regularities through observation, children are sensitive to the strength of the evidence that those two sources of information provide
Children relied on what they saw when taught by the na€ıve experimenter, but did not show a preference for what they saw when taught by the knowledgeable experimenter
We examine whether, in the inconsistent information condition, children who gathered enough evidence to assess which figurines worked by placing both types of figurines on the music box were more likely to sort in a manner consistent with their prior observations with the na€ıve informant—as compared to children who did not have enough evidence, that is, children who had placed only one type of figurine on the music box or who did not place any figurine on the music box
Summary
Whether children are learning from what other people tell them or by tracking statistical regularities through observation, children are sensitive to the strength of the evidence that those two sources of information provide. When making inferences based on observed statistical patterns, 4-year-old children distinguish between deterministic and probabilistic patterns (Bridgers et al, 2016) These prior studies demonstrate that children are able to appropriately weigh testimonial and observational evidence when these two sources of information are presented individually. When subsequently asked which block made the machine go, children appropriately discarded the testimony from both the na€ıve and knowledgeable experimenter when they observed data clearly contradicting their testimony (i.e., the deterministic data). When they observed less conclusive data (i.e., the probabilistic data), their inferences differed based on the reliability of the experimenter. Children relied on what they saw when taught by the na€ıve experimenter, but did not show a preference for what they saw when taught by the knowledgeable experimenter
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