Abstract
Immediately after the accident at Fukushima Daiichi, Innovative Systems Software and other members of the international SCDAP Development and Training Program started an assessment of the possible core/vessel damage states of the Fukushima Daiichi Units 1–3. The assessment included a brief review of relevant severe accident experiments and a series of detailed calculations using RELAP/SCDAPSIM. The calculations used a detailed RELAP/SCDAPSIM model of the Laguna Verde BWR vessel and related reactor cooling systems. The Laguna Verde models were provided by the Comision Nacional de Seguridad Nuclear y Salvaguardias, the Mexican nuclear regulatory authority. The initial assessment was originally presented to the International Atomic Energy Agency on March 21 to support their emergency response team and later to our Japanese members to support their Fukushima Daiichi specific analysis and model development.
Highlights
After the accident at Fukushima Daiichi, Innovative Systems Software (ISS) and other members of the international SCDAP Development and Training Program (SDTP) [1, 2] started an assessment of the possible core/vessel damage states of the Fukushima Daiichi Units 1– 3
What were the conclusions for the core/vessel damage expected in Units 1–3 of Fukushima Daiichi? These conclusions are based on the results and information reported for Fukushima in later
March and early April, the general information published to date appears to be consistent with the assessment presented in March to support the IAEA emergency response team and later to our Japanese colleagues
Summary
After the accident at Fukushima Daiichi, Innovative Systems Software (ISS) and other members of the international SCDAP Development and Training Program (SDTP) [1, 2] started an assessment of the possible core/vessel damage states of the Fukushima Daiichi Units 1– 3. Additional calculations performed between March 21st and 25th to support the IAEA emergency response team included a variety of scenarios with loss of emergency core cooling ranging from 0 to 70 hours after scram As discussed, these calculations which showed the core uncovery, fuel melting, and relocation of the fuel and other molten materials into the lower plenum can occur rather quickly once emergency cooling is no longer available. The conclusions for severe accident management strategies are presented
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