Abstract
In this study, we investigated idiosyncratic preinvestment process characteristics that influence the dismissal of management team members of venture capital‐backed firms in the postinvestment phase by analyzing sixty‐three portfolio firms. We considered two salient perspectives within the literature on governance of interfirm relationships: contractual and relational governance, which are related to positional and collaborative negotiation styles. Our findings indicate that positional bargaining in the preinvestment phase may be a reliable indicator that there is a greater risk that new venture team members will be dismissed when things get tough in the post‐investment period.
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