Abstract

ABSTRACT Many see the advent of lethal autonomous weapon systems as the next revolution in military affairs. Currently, some 30 countries share the view that these weapons should be preemptively banned, but we know relatively little about their motivations. This study contributes to the growing literature on “killer robots” by theorizing preventive arms control as an anticipatory response to military innovation. I suggest that states prefer preventive arms control when they lack capacities or incentives to pursue innovation in the first place. I analyze a cross-sectional dataset on national positions toward the ban on autonomous weapons and demonstrate that the probability of support for preventive prohibition decreases with increasing financial and technological capacities. Both democracies and autocracies are less likely to support the ban than mixed regimes. Conversely, states with strong humanitarian orientation and high socialization within specific arms control regimes are more likely to support the ban.

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