Predicting an Outcome Less Probable yet More Desirable than the Other.

Two experiments serve to examine how people make metacognitive judgments about the effects of task-irrelevant sounds on cognitive performance. According to the direct-access account, people have direct access to the processes causing auditory distraction. According to the processing-fluency account, people rely on the feeling of processing fluency to make heuristic metacognitive judgments about the distracting effects of sounds. To manipulate the processing fluency of simple piano melodies and segments of Mozart’s sonata K. 448, the audio files of the music were either left in their original forward direction or reversed. The results favor the processing-fluency account over the direct-access account: Even though, objectively, forward and backward music had the same distracting effect on serial recall, stimulus-specific prospective metacognitive judgments showed that participants incorrectly predicted only backward music but not forward music to be distracting. The difference between forward and backward music was reduced but not eliminated in global retrospective metacognitive judgments that participants provided after having experienced the distracting effect of the music first-hand. The results thus provide evidence of a metacognitive illusion in people’s judgments about the effects of music on cognitive performance.

Like humans, monkeys can make accurate judgements about their own memory by reporting their confidence during cognitive tasks. Some have suggested that animals use associative learning to make accurate confidence judgements, while others have suggested animals directly access and estimate the strength of their memories. Here we test a third, non-exclusive possibility: perhaps monkeys, like humans, base metacognitive inferences on heuristic cues. Humans are known to use cues like perceptual fluency (e.g. how easy something is to see) when making metacognitive judgements. We tested monkeys using a match-to-sample task in which the perceptual fluency of the stimuli was manipulated. The monkeys made confidence wagers on their accuracy before or after each trial. We found that monkeys' wagers were affected by perceptual fluency even when their accuracy was not. This is novel evidence that animals are susceptible to metacognitive illusions similar to those experienced by humans.

The positivity effect for metacognitive judgments (judgments of learning, JOLs) of emotional words in recognition memory was shown in older adults, in contrast to younger adults, who typically displayed the emotional salience effect. This is compatible with the socioemotional selection theory, which suggests the presence of a positive stimulus bias in older adults’ cognitive processes. This study examined whether the positivity effect and age-related differences could be extended to a picture study to determine whether the positivity effect in older adults is robust in the metacognitive domain. Younger and older adults studied negative, positive, and neutral pictures, followed by JOLs and then a recognition test that asked participants to judge whether the picture was shown in the studying stage or not. Age-related differences were found not only in recognition memory performance for emotional pictures but also in JOLs and their accuracy. Younger adults showed an emotional salience effect for both memory performance and JOLs. Older adults’ JOLs showed a positivity effect, but their actual memory performance was influenced by emotion, and this inconsistency between metacognitive judgments and memory performance is a metacognitive illusion. These findings support the cross-material replicability of a positivity bias in older adults in the metacognitive domain and suggest that we should be cautioned about the detrimental effects of this metacognitive illusion in older adults. It illustrates an age difference in the effect of emotion on individual metacognitive monitoring ability.

Prior work has shown that judgments of learning (JOLs) are prone to an auditory metacognitive illusion such that loud words are given higher predictions than quiet words despite no differences in recall as a function of auditory intensity. The current study investigated whether judgments of remembering and knowing (JORKs)—judgments that focus participants on whether or not recollective details will be remembered—are less susceptible to such an illusion. In Experiment 1, participants studied single words, making item-by-item JOLs or JORKs immediately after study. Indeed, although increased volume elevated judgement magnitude for both JOLs and JORKs, the effect was significantly attenuated when JORKs were elicited. Experiment 2 replicated this finding and additionally demonstrated that participants making JORKs were less likely than participants making JOLs to choose to restudy quiet words relative to loud words. Taken together, these results suggest that JORKs are impacted less—in terms of both metacognitive monitoring and control—by irrelevant perceptual information than JOLs. More generally, these data support the contention that metacognitive illusions can be attenuated by simply changing the way metacognitive judgments are solicited, an important finding given that subjective experiences guide self-regulated learning.

Perceptual fluency affects judgments of learning: The font size effect

We investigated the event-related potential (ERP) correlates of two metacognitive judgments, namely judgment of learning (JOL) and feeling of knowing (FOK) induced by a face-name recognition (FNR) task in 60 participants. The FNR produced N170 and P100 components at posterior, and an N100 component at anterior electrodes. Posterior P200, anterior N200 components were recorded during JOL and FOK judgments. Our data showed that ERP correlates of JOL and FOK emerge as rapidly as 200 ms following stimulus presentation, and these two metacognitive judgments are based on both perceptual fluency and conflict processes. However, these ERP components affected by the degree of JOL and FOK judgments. Thus, we concluded that even though JOL and FOK judgments produced similar ERP wave forms temporal dynamics of these two judgments are different. Also, our results support the hypothesis that metacognitive judgments are linked to distributed neural substrates rather than strictly to frontal lobe function.

The Implicit Association Test (IAT) is the most popular indirect measure of attitudes in social psychology. Rothermund and Wentura (2001, 2004) suggested that artifacts such as salience asymmetries are a source of compatibility effects in the IAT, and, therefore, the IAT does not necessarily measure attitude. They claim that salience asymmetries correspond with visual search asymmetries, such that the stimulus categories that are more quickly detected in a visual search task are also compatible in the IAT. We propose that processing fluency is a more reliable indicator of salience asymmetries in the IAT than are visual search asymmetries. To test this hypothesis, we set processing fluency in opposition to visual search asymmetry to see which variable better predicted IAT effects. In one pair of categories, the category that was more quickly detected in visual search was also more fluently processed in a binary classification task. In a second pair of categories, the category that was more quickly detected in visual search was the less fluently processed category. Across four experiments, we demonstrated that compatibility effects in the IAT corresponded with differences in processing fluency between categories, rather than with visual search asymmetries.

Experience-based cues, such as perceptual fluency, have long been thought to influence metacognitive judgments (Kelley & Jacoby, 1996; Koriat, 1997). Studies found that manipulations of perceptual fluency via changes in font and volume alter Judgments of Learning (JOLs) without influencing memory performance (Rhodes & Castel, 2008, 2009). Nonetheless, recent research (Mueller, Tauber, & Dunlosky, 2013; Mueller, Dunlosky, Tauber, & Rhodes, 2014, 2016) has challenged the notion that experience-based cues such as fluency are the primary basis for item-level JOLs, arguing instead that preexisting beliefs about these manipulations are responsible for these effects. For the first time, we compared global metacognitive judgments to item-level JOLs made during study to independently assess the contribution of beliefs and experience to volume-effects on JOLs. In 3 experiments, we found evidence for strong beliefs about volume-effects on memory, both before and after a study-test phase. However, these beliefs either did not account for the volume effect on JOLs (Experiment 3) or only partially accounted for the volume effect on JOLs (Experiments 1 and 2). Further, in Experiments 2 and 3 global performance estimates (before and after study) did not differ with respect to the volume dose whereas item-level JOLs generally varied with dose strength. Taken together, our findings suggest that both beliefs and experience-based cues contribute independently to the effects of volume on item-level JOLs, but that beliefs alone cannot fully account for the effects of volume on item-level JOLs. (PsycINFO Database Record

The insight phenomenon is thought to comprise two components: cognitive and affective (the Aha! experience). The exact nature of the Aha! experience remains unclear; however, several explanations have been put forward. Based on the processing fluency account, the source of the Aha! experience is a sudden increase in processing fluency, associated with emerging of a solution. We hypothesized that in a situation which the Aha! experience accompanies the solution in, the problem would be judged as less difficult, regardless of the objective difficulty. We also planned to confirm previously discovered associations between the Aha! experience and accuracy, confidence, and pleasure. To test the proposed hypothesis, during the preliminary stage of the study, we developed a set of 100 remote associate problems in Russian (RAT-RUS) and asked 125 participants to solve problems and indicate the Aha! moment (after solution generation or solution presentation), confidence, difficulty, and likability of each problem. As expected, the Aha! experience often accompanied correct solutions and correlated with confidence judgments. We also found a positive correlation between the Aha! experience and problem likability. As for the main hypothesis, we confirmed that the Aha! experience after the presentation of the solution was associated with a decrease in subjective difficulty. When participants could not solve a problem but experienced the Aha! moment after the solution was presented to them, the problem was perceived as easier than one without the Aha! experience. We didn’t find the same effect for the Aha! after solution generation. Thus, our study partially supports the processing fluency account and demonstrates the association between the Aha! experience and metacognitive judgments about the accuracy and difficulty of problems.

The factors that influence metacognitive judgments often appear in combination, rather than in isolation. The multi-cue utilization model proposes that individuals often make use of multiple cues when making judgments. Previous studies have focused on the integration of intrinsic and extrinsic cues, while the current investigation examines the integration and influence of intrinsic cues and mnemonic cues. Judgment of confidence is a common form of metacognitive judgment. In this study, 37 college students completed Raven's Progressive Matrices and made judgments of confidence. We used the cross-level moderated mediation model to explore the impact of item difficulty on confidence judgments. Our results indicated that item difficulty negatively predicts the level of confidence. Item difficulty has an impact on the confidence evaluation by altering the processing fluency of intermediate variables. The joint effect of intrinsic cue item difficulty and mnemonic cue processing fluency influences confidence judgments. Additionally, we found that intelligence moderates the effect of difficulty on processing fluency across levels. Specifically, individuals with higher intelligence exhibited lower fluency on difficult tasks and higher fluency on simple tasks than individuals with lower intelligence. These findings expand on the multi-cue utilization model and integrate the influence mechanism of intrinsic and mnemonic cues on confidence judgments. Finally, we propose and verify a cross-level moderated mediation model that explains how item difficulty affects confidence judgments.

A recent study has established that thinkers reliably engage in epistemic appraisals of concepts of natural categories. Here, five studies are reported which investigated the effects of different manipulations of category learning context on appraisal of the concepts learnt. It was predicted that dimensions of concept appraisal could be affected by manipulating either procedural factors (spacing of learning, perceptual fluency) or declarative factors (causal knowledge about categories). While known effects of these manipulations on metacognitive judgements such as category learning judgements and confidence at test were replicated, procedural factors had no reliable effects on the dimensions of concept appraisal. Effects of declarative manipulations on some forms of concept appraisal were observed.

Despite research showing that perceptually fluent stimuli (i.e., stimuli that are easier to process) are given higher judgment of learning (JOL) ratings than perceptually disfluent stimuli, it remains unknown whether the influence of perceptual fluency on JOLs is driven by the fluent or disfluent items. Moreover, it is unclear whether this difference hinges on relative differences in fluency. The current study addressed these unanswered questions by employing (Fiacconi et al., Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition 46:926-944, 2020), Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 46[5], 926-944) letter set priming procedure. In this procedure, participants are first exposed to words containing only a subset of letters. Following this exposure, JOLs to new words composed of the same letters (i.e., fluent), and new words composed of nonexposed letters (i.e., disfluent) are compared with isolate the contribution of perceptual fluency. Because this procedure does not rely on parametric variations in perceptual features, we can directly assess the potential benefit and/or cost of fluent and disfluent items, respectively, by including neutral baseline conditions. Moreover, implementing both a mixed- and pure-list design allowed us to assess the comparative nature of perceptual fluency on JOLs. Counter to previous assumptions, our results are the first to demonstrate that perceptual disfluency decreases JOLs. Moreover, we found that the influence of perceptual disfluency on JOLs hinges on the relative differences in fluency between items even in the absence of a belief about the mnemonic impact of the fluency manipulation. These findings have important implications as they provide evidence that the difficulty, rather than ease, of information form the basis of individuals metacognitive judgments.

Previous research shows that participants are overconfident in their ability to learn foreign language vocabulary from pictures compared with English translations. The current study explored whether this tendency is due to processing fluency or beliefs about learning. Using self-paced study of Swahili words paired with either picture cues or English translation cues, picture cues garnered higher confidence judgements but not faster study times, and this was true whether judgements of learning were made after a delay (Experiment 1) or immediately (Experiment 2). In Experiment 3, when participants learned Swahili words with only one type of cue (pictures or English translations) and then estimated which one would be more effective for learning, the majority of participants believed pictures would be more effective regardless of whether they had experienced those cues during learning. Experiment 4 showed the same results when participants had experienced neither type of cue during a learning phase. These results suggest that metacognitive judgements in foreign language vocabulary learning are driven more by students' beliefs about learning than by processing fluency as reflected in self-paced study times.

The authors examined effects of aesthetic emotions in art appreciation. Subjects were presented three groups of slides of cubistic paintings that differed in their processing fluency. In an explicit classification procedure, subjects were asked to indicate by button press the moment when they recognized any depicted object in the painting. The time to recognize a depicted object was shortest for high processing fluency paintings, which were also rated higher in their preference. This is in accordance with the “hedonic fluency model” that predicts higher processing fluency being associated with positive aesthetic emotions in art appreciation (Reber, Schwartz, & Winkielman, 2004). In addition, higher processing fluency was associated with increased pupil dilations following the point of explicit classification. The finding of higher pupil dilation associated with easy-to-process stimuli is interpreted as reflecting aspects of aesthetic emotions that follow explicit classification of art stimuli as proposed in the “model of aesthetic appreciation and aesthetic judgments” (Leder, Belke, Oeberst, & Augustin, 2004).

Judgments of learning (JOLs) are sometimes influenced by factors that do not impact actual memory performance. One recent proposal is that perceptual fluency during encoding affects metamemory and is a basis of metacognitive illusions. In the present experiments, participants identified aurally presented words that contained inter-spliced silences (the generate condition) or that were intact, a manipulation analogous to visual generation manipulations. The generate condition produced lower perceptual fluency as assessed by both accuracy and identification latency. Consistent with the perceptual fluency hypothesis, the less fluent, generate condition produced lower JOLs than the intact condition. However, actual memory performance was greater in the generation than intact condition in free recall (Experiment 1) and recognition (Experiment 3). The negative effect of generation on JOLs occurred for both aggregate and item-by-item JOLs, but in the latter case, the positive generation effect in actual memory performance was reduced or eliminated (as also occurs with visual generation tasks; Experiments 2 and 4). Furthermore, the decrease in perceptual fluency produced by the generation manipulation was correlated with the decrease in JOLs for this condition (Experiment 5). The negative effect of generation on JOLs persisted even when participants were warned that the generation condition produces equal or greater memory performance compared to the intact condition (Experiment 6). The results are in accord with the perceptual fluency hypothesis and show that this metamemory illusion is related to objective measures of perceptual difficulty. With regard to actual memory performance, this novel auditory generation manipulation produces results consistent with those produced in the visual modality.