Practice, Reason, and the Good: Human Nature and MacIntyrean Business Ethics

Grotius's notion of natural law is, as he himself makes clear, founded upon two demands of nature, which are to be connected with what is now known as the Stoic doctrine of appropriation. However, Grotius's understanding of the notion of natural law as a set of rules is not Stoic, but rather goes back to an interpretation that can be ascribed to Antiochus of Ascalon. By moving away from the Stoics Grotius could not only easily accommodate the Aristotelian doctrine of equity, otherwise rejected by the Stoics, but he could also formulate a minimalistic interpretation of human dispositions or 'rights', in contrast to the Stoics' maximalistic understanding of these dispositions as virtues.

The chief reason for the lack of intelligibility in a course in the history of political thought is the absence of any standard by which the great writers in the field may justly be compared. The usual course in the history of political thought is thoroughly historical and scrupulously indifferent to philosophical analysis; at best, a semblance of comparative analysis is achieved by simply telling the student that different needs of different periods suggest different and equally valid theoretical constructions. The question of natural law, for example, is handled in something like the following fashion. The Aristotelian notion of natural law is no sooner inadequately in the mind of the student than it fails to survive the downfall of the Greek city states. The student is told that Aristotle's notion of natural law restricted his vision and blinded him to the inevitable growth of the empire of Philip, his own student. The Stoics, whose views were perfected by Cicero, held to a notion of natural law much more in keeping with the needs of a world civilization. The Church adopted the Stoic conception of natural law. Subsequently, after the writings of Aristotle had been discovered, St. Thomas Aquinas wedded natural law to the law of the Church. The Renaissance and Reformation liberated men's minds from the shackles of Mediaeval Scholasticism. The concept of natural law came gradually to be abandoned; it is already repudiated in the writings of William of Occam and Marsilius of Padua, and its disappearance is complete in Machiavelli. Accustomed to the tradition of 1066 and All That, the student gathers that this disappearance was “a good thing.” In the eighteenth century, there is a revival of natural law.

The notion of natural law was to a great extent discovered by the
 Greeks. Although formulated for the first time by the Stoics, there
 are important precedents in previous philosophers and tragic writers.
 Nevertheless, the coming of Christianity, by virtue of its concept
 of creation, brought along a different notion of God and nature.
 This meant a decisive change in the notion of the natural law,
 which we will highlight in these pages.

Teaching & Learning Guide for Business Ethics: An Overview

Is it possible for Aquinas’s moral theology to engage constructively with contemporary moral naturalism? The proposed question has already been a subject of scholarly interest, eliciting various responses. Some authors emphasize the difficulties and contradictions, while others identify potential affinities. This paper explores the extent to which Aquinas’s concept of Natural Law might align, albeit partially, with a form of moral non-reductive, non-non-cognitivist ethical naturalism. Specifically, it aims to assess how his view of Natural Law, rooted in practical reason and natural inclinations, incorporates a teleological understanding of nature, which provides a foundational basis for this consonance. Within this framework, moral virtue emerges as central in bridging bio-psychological facts with ethical principles. Aquinas’s assertion that gratia non tollit naturam, sed perficit “grace does not destroy nature but perfects it” (ST I. q1. a8) further underscores the continuity between nature and normativity, suggesting that while grace and revelation introduce true novelty, they enhance rather than supplant the natural moral order.

A tanulmány nem az alkotmányos ellenállás (ius resistendi) magyar, angol vagy lengyel ősi fogalmával foglalkozik, hanem az engedetlenség – ami nem politikai vagy erkölcsi lehetőség, hanem kötelesség – képzetének kialakulásával. A háború utáni politikai és erkölcsi gondolkodás hangsúlyozta, a természet törvény fogalmával együtt, az engedetlenség, parancsmegtagadás erkölcsi, sőt jogi kötelességét az igazságtalan törvény vagy parancs esetében. Noha a politikai gondolkodásban hagyományosan a fő probléma az volt, hogyan kerüljék el a lázadást, amely a politikai közösséget örökké fenyegeti, a lelkiismeret fogalma köré épülő keresztény erkölcsi gondolkodás története ezzel ellentétes fogalmat eredményezett, az engedetlenség kötelességének a fogalmát. A skolasztikában a tévedékeny lelkiismeret problémája vezetett a Szent Tamás és Szent Bonaventura közti vitához, amelyben az első amellett érvelt, hogy a lelkiismeretet minden esetben követni kell, akár az autoritással szemben is, míg a második azt írta, hogy a lelkiismeret és az autoritás ütközése esetén a lelkiismeretet félre kell tenni, mivel tévedhet. Az engedetlenség erkölcsi kötelességének képzete nyilvánvalóan Szent Tamásnak az ebben a vitában kifejtett érveléséből ered.

In this paper, I contrast the notion of natural law on a secularist scientific picture with the notion of natural law in the thought of Thomas Aquinas. I show the way in which the highly various metaphysics of the two worldviews give rise to such divergent notions. In this connection, I look at contemporary arguments against reductionism in the sciences and in recent metaphysics. I argue that this new antireductionist approach sits more easily with the Thomistic worldview than with the secularist scientific view.

Reviewed by: Aquinas’s Theory of Natural Law: An Analytic Reconstruction by Anthony J. Lisska V. Bradley Lewis Anthony J. Lisska. Aquinas’s Theory of Natural Law: An Analytic Reconstruction. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996. Pp. xv + 320. Paper, $24.95. This volume aims to provide an explication of the natural law theory of St. Thomas Aquinas “consistent with the expectation of philosophers in the analytic tradition” (10–11, 17). Accordingly, the author begins, in the first three chapters, by reviewing the recent history of Anglo-American metaethics, aligning himself broadly with those critics of analytic ethics like G. E. M. Anscombe, Alasdair MacIntyre, John Finnis, Martha Nussbaum, and Henry Veatch, who have argued for a recovery of Aristotelian moral theory, against varieties of intuitionism, non-cognitivism, and neo-Kantianism. Lisska’s principal objective is to present a reconstructed natural law theory based primarily on Aquinas’s discussion in questions 90–97 of the prima secundae of the Summa theologiae (a translation of these questions is appended to the book). This he offers mostly in the fourth, fifth and eighth chapters of the book. The sixth chapter is a critique of John Finnis’s account of natural law and the seventh is an exposition of the views of Henry [End Page 526] Veatch. The ninth chapter presents some suggestions on how the author’s account can illuminate controversies over the grounding of human rights, and the tenth is a brief conclusion. The three introductory chapters consist mainly of a review and endorsement of the critics of academic ethics since Moore’s Prıncipia Ethıca. Having accepted arguments for the inadequacy of modern ethics, Lisska argues for the recovery of Aquinas’s views which he sees as in fundamental continuity with Aristotelian ethics (84, 89, 100, 102–105, 108, 134–36). His central thesis is that natural law is a “second-order inquiry” based on a realist metaphysics of the human person as defined by a set of dispositional properties, the realization of which constitutes Aristotelian eudaimonia and Thomistic beatitudo (17, 104–106, 131–37, 152–55, 186, 195–201). Moreover, Lisska contends that Aristotelian “eudaimonism” constitutes an adequate account of moral obligation: what he calls, after Veatch, “obligatory teleology” (107–109, 121, 202–205, 235). At the core of Lisska’s account, then, is a metaphysical dispute that pits Aristotelian essentialism against modern reductionist ontology. This metaphysical core is separated from any theological implications in the fifth chapter (especially 119–23, 137) and Lisska reinforces his metaphysical thesis by appealing to Saul Kripke’s discussion of natural kinds and the early work of Hilary Putnam (97–99, 125, 206–209). Given the centrality of metaphysical argument, a critique of Finnis’s theory goes without saying, and Lisska devotes a chapter to it, adding another to expound Henry Veatch’s contrary view. While this book undertakes an important effort to recover a workable natural law theory—especially in its commendable stress on metaphysical questions—it is, as a whole, less satisfactory than it might have been. A good part of this owes to the book’s abstraction from historical questions. No sustained attention is devoted to the problems that accompanied the reception of Aristotle by Christian theologians, nor to the place of natural law in Aquinas’s overall understanding of morality. The former point is not so surprising, given the book’s analytic concerns; the latter, however, carries more serious theoretical implications. Why is it, for example, that natural law takes up so little space compared to the questions on happiness, human acts, and the habits and virtues in the prima secundae, not to mention the detailed treatments of the virtues and vices in the secunda secundae? Similarly, where Aquinas stresses that natural law as law is directed to the common good (Iallae 90.2), Lisska treats it mostly as a guide to “self-realization.” This issue suggests the tensions between Aristotle and Aquinas, tensions that seem to show themselves precisely in Aquinas’s discussion of the very notion of natural law, a notion that has no equivalent in Aristotle. This question hangs over Lisska’s brief treatment of obligation, in particular, since that concept is also lacking explicit treatment in...

500 BOOK REVIEWS ethical criterion" (212). The notion of natural law, then, is necessarily based upon the interplay between nature and the will of God. There can be no natural law without God because the obligatory character of the natural law-what makes the natural law to be law-is the fact that the natural order that is discoverable by human reason is also known to be created by God and subject to his will. Although there has been a broad revival of interest in natural-law thinking in recent years, the theonomic character of St. Thomas's doctrine has largely been obscured or forgotten. God and the Natural Law can help us recover the theological foundation ofAquinas's natural-law doctrine and thereby appreciate its deeper meaning. The argument of the book is at times hard to follow, perhaps because the book is translated into English from the Italian original, but it is well worth the effort for any serious student of Thomistic natural law. Thomas Aquinas College Santa Paula, California JOHN GOYETTE Engrafted into Christ: A Critique of the Joint Declaration. By CHRISTOPHER J. MALLOY. New York: Peter Lang, 2005. Pp. 408. $39.95 (paper). ISBN 08204 -7408-8. In Engrafted into Christ, Christopher Malloy offers a deep, honest, and critical view of the 1999 JointDeclaration on Justification between the Catholic Church and the Lutheran World Federation GD). As the Preface says, this book is the result of five years of work. The book has four parts: (1) The teachings of the Reformation Era: historical view of Protestant and Catholics positions in the 16th Cent. (17-122); (2) Contemporary attempts at rapprochement: Hans Kiing, the Finnish School (Tuomo Mannermaa, Risto Saarinen), Wolfhart Pannenberg (123-92); (3) Critical analysis of the Joint Declaration (193-313); (4) Evaluating the divide (315-87). This review will concentrate on parts 3 and 4, which are obviously the heart of the book. Malloy studies the history of successive drafts ofthe JD, and comments on the evolution, "No one can doubt that the editorial changes to the various drafts witness a trajectory towards vaguer expressions. The reason for the trajectory seems to have been appeasement of ongoing Lutheran concerns" (277). On top of that, the author warns the English-speaking readers of the JD: "The German text frequently enjoys a more pronouncedly Lutheran ring than does the standard English translation" (222). BOOK REVIEWS 501 One of the points on which the JD does not dissolve the disagreements is the understanding of concupiscence: "First, Catholicism teaches that concupiscence is not a willful act but only a tendency towards sin. It can be called 'desire' only in the sense of a spuriously spontaneous, non-willed inclination. Second, Catholics believe that concupiscence incurs absolutely no punishment and that venial sins incur only temporal punishment" (280). Another delicate point is the possibility or not of an increase of grace and of degrees of participation in grace: "Trent is clear: The just can merit an increase in justifying grace, the attainment of eternal life, and an increase in eternal glory. This teaching rests upon the acknowledgment of only one formal cause of justification, the infused justice of God, by which the justified is bound to Jesus Christ, empowered by him to act as God's child, and entitled to receive the inheritance of a child" (306). This new creation, by grace, far from diminishing God's glory, shows divine power. On that point, the author considers that "The contents of the Joint Declaration .. . are not merely flawed in isolated cases; they are in organic fashion contrary to the integrity of Catholic faith" (306-7). A typical question that has been at the very heart of debates ever since the beginning of the Reformation is the possibility of human cooperation. Malloy (cf. 294-95) sees a contradiction between paragraphs 20 (cooperation is possible as an effect of grace) and 24 ("God's gift of grace in justification remains independent of human cooperation") ofthe JD. Such an ambiguity in the JD will be reflected in different interpretations. In his last part, Malloy identifies five crucial issues: "First, I investigate the eschatological implications of divergent understandings of the formal cause. Second, in...

<p>Although South Africa committed itself to the achievement of the United Nations (UN) sustainable development goals, progress in education has been hampered by controversies about equity and excellence. Although some believe that the equity vs. excellence tension will and should never be resolved, this paper’s point of departure is that learner achievement will be made less difficult when equity and excellence are prioritized correctly. The paper proposes that prioritization is possible through the natural law theory, yet few if any studies have explored that perspective in South Africa. Four research questions then shape the arguments. Following a dialectical approach, the paper shows that since Aristotle’s time, the notion of natural law has been accepted as one of the most fundamental concepts of our civilization. Through the natural law theory, equity is not only viewed as the highest form of law but is also the highest form of any good or pleasure, hence excellence. This implies that in education, without actualizing learners’ potential or excellence of their nature, equity has not been achieved for them. Through the theory, the paper shows South Africa’s behaviors that violate natural law. However, this is not sustainable as it only provides the nation with temporary happiness instead of true happiness in accordance with nature. This according to Aristotle’s natural law theory is hedonic happiness instead of eudemonic happiness. Contrary to beliefs that violators of natural law go scot-free, nature is red in tooth and claw and its punishment is evident in the vicious cycles, such as a low happiness index, high crime rates, high unemployment rates and poor service deliveries that plague South Africa. In terms of theory, the natural law theory allows for more precise definitions of equity and sustainable development which are currently lacking in all the previous debates. In terms of practice, both the natural law theory and sustainable development converge in the capability approach to education. The relation between the capability perspective and education is acknowledged in the 2002 UNESCO Report “Education for all”, and its distinctive feature, the human capability approach is its assessment of policies not on the basis of their impact on incomes, but on whether or not they expand the real freedoms that people value. This approach and its conversion argument say that these internal converting capabilities are highly diverse among people, which weakens the supporting argument for a resource-based equality. The conversion argument says that the importance of primary goods or resources [external conversion factors] is derivative of the individual capability [internal conversion factors] to convert them into valued functionings. A recommendation coming from such observations is that our future depends crucially on how we educate the next generation of gifted people, especially in the mathematical sciences. The paper concludes by providing an example of how a critical mass of gifted people or excellence could create equity as knowledge cascades down in an organization or society. Singapore is an example that achieves equity through its gifted education programs. The paper recommends a similar approach if South Africa were to achieve the equitable and sustainable education it aspires for its learners.</p>

Natural law appears in a singular way in Hobbes' philosophy as the same way as it happens to the relation which the natural law establishes with the civil law. In this paper we will defend that the notion of natural law, in the hobbesian philosophy, is empty of content. Thus its content is determined by the will of the sovereign expressed in the civil laws.

For centuries in Catholic theology there is a hidden or open struggle between the tendencies of Augustinian and Tomistic. Augustinovtsi - optimists in epistemology and pessimism in anthropology and social science. Tomies, on the contrary, consider the possibilities of cognition to be limited, but they are cautious optimists in anthropology and social science. The social doctrine of the Catholic Church has long relied on the notion of natural law and the common good, as they are developed in the teachings of Thomas Aquinas. Pope Benedict XVI in his encyclicals returned to the Augustinian theology of love as the only force that can help humanity today, at a time when all the negative aspects of human nature, which were so well known by Augustine, were revealed.

This paper will provide a comprehensive understanding of the notion sunnatullāh and natural law, both in terms of science and the Qur’ān. Then it will also see the similarities and differences between the two. In this respect, the writer questions whether the sunnatullāh mentioned in the Qur’ān is similar to what meant by the laws of nature? Are the natural and all applicable laws inherently absolute and static?, and consequently they do not change gradually, and do not allow or support the development of science? Above questions need answers from the writers of theology, especially Indonesian, to discuss theology of nature in line with the discussion of nature itself which is done by scientists. So far there are indications these two terms have different purposes and meanings. This difference in the reformulation and reconstruction ultimately requires an understanding of theology, especially about the notion of natural law and sunnatullāh which has been the understanding of elementary students of theology and author in Indonesia.

The article analyzes the emergence and development of human rights in ancient Greece as a socio-historical phenomenon. The author finds that the term «human rights» originated relatively recently and finally became established after the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights by the UN General Assembly on December 10, 1948, but the ideas of equality and justice were traced in such ancient collections as Hammurabi's Laws, Moses' Laws, Old Testament, Laws of Manu, etc. It is established that the protection of individual rights in ancient times became widespread in ancient Greece, where human rights became a natural consequence of the polis form of democracy and were associated mainly with the concept of citizenship, which provided the equality of all members of the policy in the exercise of rights and freedoms, especially political. Consequently, the existence of human rights, recognized by most ancient Greek thinkers, in particular the principles of equality, justice, freedom and protection of individual rights are traced in the works of Homer, Hesiod, Pythagoreans, Democritus, Sophists (especially Protagoras, Antiphon, Lycophron, Alcidamas of Elaea), Socrates, Plato, Aristotle and Epicurus. Certain human rights provisions were included in the Draconian laws, which restricted the over-interpretation of the law by the archons, as well as Solon's reforms, regarding to, inter alia, the cancellation of the debts of the poor and the granting them of certain rights, including political ones. For ancient Greece, the notion of natural law, founded by Hesiod as a law by nature (feses), is fundamental. The Pythagoreans formulated the concepts of «appropriate measure» and «proportionality» as justice in human relations, which played an important role in shaping the ideas of legal equality of people. Democritus first raised the problem of individual human freedom, arguing that wise and good people, because they are able to comprehend the laws of nature and the highest justice, must live freely. The Sophists established the postulate of the fundamentality of natural law, contrasting it with positive law. Protagoras formulated the maxim: «Man is the measure of all things», which is in fact decisive in the modern concept of human rights and freedoms, where man is proclaimed the highest value. Protagoras and Antiphon substantiated the idea of equality of all people by nature. Alcidamas of Elaea, and later the Stoics developed the idea of equality of all people, including slaves. Lycophron declared personal rights an inalienable natural right. Socrates recognized political freedom, in accordance with the requirements of reason and justice, a beautiful and majestic property for both man and the state. Plato, like Socrates, identified legality (law) and justice. He proclaimed the principle of equality of all before the state, regardless of origin and gender. Aristotle distinguished between distributive and equalizing justice, which is the basis of modern legal understanding. He argued that natural law personifies political justice, which is possible only between free and equal people. Epicurus believed that justice, which comes from nature, is also a socially contractual phenomenon. He substantiated the ethical autonomy of man.

Do business ethics really matter?