Abstract
AbstractNon-malleable codes (NMC) are introduced as a relaxation of error correcting codes to protect message against tampering attacks. It is guaranteed that a message encoded with non-malleable codes, if tampered by some classes of tampering functions, produces either completely unrelated message or the original message, when tampering has no effect. Kiayias et al. [19] have proposed a NMC construction based on leakage resilient authenticated encryption (AE) and 1-more extractable hash function. They obtain a codeword of length \(|m|+18n\) in common reference string (CRS) model. In this paper, we propose a construction of computationally secure non-malleable code in 2-split-state model from an authenticated encryption scheme with close to optimal codeword length \(|m|+2n\). Specifically we use an AE based on triple M-DES and CBC-MAC. The security of our NMC reduces to related-key and pseudorandom permutation security of the underlying block cipher under leakage, and also to the unforgeability of the CBC-MAC under leakage.KeywordsAuthenticated encryptionBlock cipherLeakage resilient CBC-MACNon-malleable code2-split-state model
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