Power is not rights: Economic versus legal property rights in neo-institutional economics

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As a novel contribution to the application of economic concepts of property rights to resource management as a fundamental planning issue, this paper analyses the dichotomy (the Barzel thesis) between “economic property rights” and “legal property rights”. In lieu of Barzel’s dichotomous distinction, an alternative account of “de facto property rights” as a fraction of “ de jure property rights” is presented. The paper uses three case studies on squatting to show the untenability of the Barzel thesis. It offers an application of the thesis as a distinction along two dimensions, namely de jure rights (as legitimate and commonly-accepted rules on access) to and de facto access/control of a resource or property. …property rights are indispensable constraints for any decision involving more than one individual ( Cheung 1978 : 42).

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Decision letter for "Power is not rights: economic versus legal property rights in neo-institutional economics"

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