Abstract

AbstractStrong emergentism is the position that certain higher-level properties display a kind of metaphysical autonomy from the lower-level properties in which they are grounded. The prospect of collapse is a problem for strong emergentism. According to those who press the collapse problem any purportedly strongly emergent feature inheres in the emergence base and so is not genuinely autonomous from that base. Umut Baysan and Jessica Wilson (2017) argue that power emergentism avoids the collapse problem. In this paper, I challenge the claim that power emergentism avoids the collapse problem and argue for explanatory emergentism in its place.

Highlights

  • When philosophers face apparently higher-level phenomena that are intriguing and hard to explain, such as free will, consciousness or entanglement, they often reach for some version of strong emergentism

  • Strong emergentism appears across different areas of philosophy, but fundamentally, debates over the viability of strong emergentism are about the metaphysical interpretation of science - about whether, and how, we can take scientific results to deliver metaphysical verdicts

  • The threat of collapse is a problem for strong emergentism

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Summary

Introduction

When philosophers face apparently higher-level phenomena that are intriguing and hard to explain, such as free will, consciousness or entanglement, they often reach for some version of strong emergentism. This is the position that certain higher-level properties display a kind of metaphysical autonomy from the lower-level properties in which they are grounded.. I have argued that the correct response to the collapse problem is to abandon strong emergentism and embrace a metaphysically neutral, explanatory account of emergence in its place. Umut Baysan and Jessica Wilson have defended a different approach, arguing that a powers-based version of strong emergentism can avoid the collapse problem, and so that a genuinely metaphysical approach to emergence is viable.. I suggest that, combined with a metaphysics of explanation, explanatory emergentism can play a useful role in interlevel metaphysics

Strong Emergentism and the Collapse Problem
The Powers View of Emergence
Lightweight and Substantial Dispositions
Powers Relativized to Fundamental Interactions
Strongly Emergent Objects
Metaphysically Interpreting Explanatory Emergence
Conclusion
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