Abstract
This paper presents a Game Theoretic framework for the analysis of distributed spectrum sharing in a Cognitive Radio Network (CRN) prone to jamming attacks. We consider competitive interactions between a selfish secondary user (SU) transmitter-receiver pair and a jammer under realistic physical interference constraints. Assuming incomplete knowledge of the jammer's location in the network, the SU chooses its transmission power strategy, subject to a total power budget, with the objective of satisfying a minimum signal-to-interference plus noise ratio (SINR) constraint at the intended receiver.We model the strategic power allocation problem as an incomplete and imperfect information game and investigate self-enforcing strategies of the SU and the jammer. The solution of the game corresponds to Nash Equilibria (NE) points. We carry out the equilibrium analysis for this game by considering the mixed strategy solution space and provide closed form expressions of the equilibria points. Numerical examples are presented for illustration.
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