Abstract
If an agent introduces triadic relationships through a threat, when relations are dyadic without this threat, and if by such a threat this agent reduces the welfare of others, then this agent may be said to exercise power. We construct a minimal model with three agents (landlord, laborer, and merchant) and three commodities, and demonstrate that in the subgame perfect equilibrium of a finite-move, extensive-form game of complete and perfect information there is no powerful individual. We show next that in the infinitely repeated game, there exists a subgame perfect equilibrium in which the landlord wields power.
Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
