Post-Orientalist “Pluriverses”: Transmodern Revenants in the Fiction of Rabisankar Bal and Salman Rushdie

Ibn Rushd’s Heritage in Western PhilosophyrnIbn Rushd grew up in Andalusia as a versatile Islamic thinker. Ibn Rushd’s knowledge of both religious and theoretical sciences made him unique in later periods. Although it has never received the recognition it deserves in the Islamic world, it has been one of the leading drivers of change, transformation and intellectual revolution for Western civilization. Ibn Rushd’s sudden fall from grace in Andalusia and the burning of his works, which he had written with hard work and which also built his commitment to Islam, limited his influence in the Islamic world. On the other hand, the demographics of the place of exile, the presence of Jews among his students, and the strong recommendation of Moses Maimonides, the so-called “Second Moses”, gave Ibn Rushd a tremendous reputation within the Jewish community. For this reason, Ibn Rushd attracted the attention of Jewish scholars while he was still alive. Shortly after his death, almost all of his works were translated into Hebrew. These studies, which started with the Tibbon family, gained momentum and continued for years. Moreover, his works have not only been translated, but also extensively commented upon. In this context, what Ibn Rushd did to Aristotle’s acquis, Jewish thinkers did to Ibn Rushd’s works. He replaced Aristotle in Jewish thought. Ibn Rushd became one of the most important figures read, discussed and commented upon among Jews. Thus, schools of thought were formed around his views and thoughts. Ibn Rushd shaped the thought of Jewish thinkers in many areas such as ontology, epistemology, ethics and politics, the relationship between religion and philosophy, and logic.rnAnother civilization that Ibn Rushd influenced was the Christian Western society. The Christian West, which generally preferred to resist Muslims, underwent a paradigm shift after the 12th century. Although Westerners continued to clash politically and militarily, they acted with an intellectual consciousness in transferring the acquis of Islamic civilization to their own societies in intellectual and scientific developments. Frederick II and Alfonso X, the so-called “Wise King”, played a major role here. In this process of transmission, it is seen that Ibn Rushd is mostly utilized. Because reading Ibn Rushd is a necessary way to understand Aristotle in the West. In this context, Ibn Rushd was discussed early on and for a long time in many universities such as Paris, Oxford, Bologna, Padua, Salerno, etc. He pioneered the formation of a school called the Latin Averroists. For this reason, Ibn Rushd was subjected to harsh criticism for some of the ideas of this school, even though they did not belong to him. On the other hand, on many philosophical problems, he shaped the thought of dozens of Christian thinkers, most notably Albert the Great and his student Thomas Aquinas. For this reason, Ibn Rushd played a decisive role in the Renaissance, which heralded a great change in the West.rnKeywords: Islamic Philosophy, Jewish Philosophy, Christian Philosophy, Andalusia, Ibn Rushd, Influence

Reviewed by: Renaissance Averroism and Its Aftermath: Arabic Philosophy in Early Modern Europe ed. by Anna Akasoy and Guido Giglioni Steven Harvey Anna Akasoy and Guido Giglioni, editors. Renaissance Averroism and Its Aftermath: Arabic Philosophy in Early Modern Europe. International Archives of the History of Ideas, 211. Dordrecht: Springer, 2013. Pp. viii + 405. Cloth, $179.00. This rich volume of fifteen papers comprises the proceedings of a conference held at the Warburg Institute in 2008, with three additional papers. It begins with a learned introduction by one of the two editors, Guido Giglioni, that maps out the volume, outlines its main themes, and points to the care the editors have taken “in this volume” to distinguish Ibn Rushd, the twelfth-century historical figure, from Averroes, his literary incarnation in the Latin West, and to distinguish “between ‘Averroan’ [‘any philosophical view that belongs directly to Ibn Rushd’], ‘Averroist’ [any opinion held by a follower of Ibn Rushd in the medieval Latin West] and ‘Averroistic’ [‘the general cultural label denoting a pronounced [End Page 612] (vaguely Aristotelian) rationalistic attitude’]” (1–2). While scholars have long recognized the need to distinguish between Ibn Rushd’s teachings and those attributed to him by later thinkers, the pedantic distinction between Ibn Rushd’s teachings and those of Averroes seems misplaced and even misleading (and is not followed consistently in this book). Scholars of Ibn Rushd today who read him in the Arabic original do not always agree on his personal views (see, on this point, Anna Akasoy’s essay), particularly regarding philosophical problems such as God’s knowledge of particulars and the creation/eternity of the world. On the other hand, those who seek to understand Ibn Rushd through reading the medieval Latin translations are often able to do so. The key questions here concerning the medieval Latin readers are not semantic, but rather simply, did X read Averroes? Does he cite him approvingly? Does he seem to understand him? To what purpose does he use him? All too often in this volume, we are left to wonder in what ways Averroes parts from Ibn Rushd (and an Averroist teaching from an Averroan one), for example, Averroes’s view of supreme happiness (although curiously there is no reference in this volume to his commentary on Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics). The opening paper, one of my favorites, is Amos Bertolacci’s account of the critique of Averroes (=Ibn Rushd) against Avicenna on human spontaneous generation. For Bertolacci, who elsewhere has surveyed such criticisms by Ibn Rushd, Avicenna, “albeit negatively … is one of the most important sources of Averroes’s system”(39). Here he deftly traces Ibn Rushd’s various critiques in different places of Avicenna’s position on this topic—most interestingly, that it violates the principle of the necessary inherence of complex forms, like that of man, in specific matters; argues they are “representative of Averroes’s overall anti-Avicennian position” (41); and shows they do not present Avicenna’s views accurately. It may be noted that the highlighted inconsistencies here between Averroes’s Tahāfut and his long commentaries may be attributed to their different intentions and his considering only the latter demonstrative books. Charles Burnett’s short but sweet paper on the mid-sixteenth-century Latin editions of Aristotle’s corpus with Averroes’s commentaries spells out what is little known about the editors of these editions and their editorial policies and interests. Notwithstanding, his conclusion that the changes from edition to edition reflect “the developments in the academic circles in Padua and can hint at not only the academic discussions going on there, but also at the tensions, loyalties, and passions of the personalities involved” (64)seems a bit grandiose for the paper. Craig Martin’s suggestive chapter on the Latin commentaries on Averroes and, in particular, the sixteenth-century Latin supercommentaries on his Aristotelian commentaries, points to reasons for Averroes’s growing popularity during that century. The Latins turned to Averroes not only for his remarkably reliable philosophical expositions, but also because of his agreement with the Greek commentators, and his being a reliable source for their teachings (Dag Hasse would add for his philosophically attractive unicity of the intellect thesis...

This article examines the claim that Ibn Rushd of Cordoba (“Averroës,” 12th century B.C.) is a precursor of the Enlightenment and a source of inspiration for the emancipation of contemporary Islamic societies. The paper critically discusses the fascination that Ibn Rushd has exercised on several thinkers, from Ernest Renan to Salman Rushdie, and highlights the problem of literalism in Qur’anic interpretation. Based on Ibn Rushd’s Decisive Treatise (Fasl al-maqāl), the paper investigates Ibn Rushd’s proposed division of (Muslim) society into three distinct classes. The main question here is whether there is a substantial link between the people of the Muslim community, given the three distinct kinds of assent (tasdīq) introduced by Ibn Rushd. I argue that if such a link cannot be supplied, then it is hard to see in Ibn Rushd an enlightened social model for today’s Muslim societies. Furthermore, that the great majority of people are prevented from having any contact with non-literal interpretation of the Scripture and non-revealed ways of thinking. The latter position, though, does not seem to bring Ibn Rushd close to the Enlightenment. My analysis of religious language is inspired by Wittgenstein’s position that the meaning of a term cannot be detached from its use. I suggest that given the different lives of people belonging to Ibn Rushd’s different classes, the terms they use can mean quite different things. This argument in fact weakens Ibn Rushd’s association with the Enlightenment.

formula of 1,001 nights, Salman Rushdie tells a story in which jinn and jinnia turn the earth into a battleground in a war between the forces of reason and faith. Set in our own time, the novel is told from a period one thousand years in the future, a time so removed from the twenty-first century, the narrators say, that “we argue, sometimes, about whether we should call it history or mythology. Some of us call it a fairy tale. But on this we agree: that to tell a story about the past is to tell a story about the present.” At the core of this novel, Rushdie revives the spirits of the medieval thinkers al-Ghazali and Ibn Rushd to conduct an inquiry into the influence of faith and reason in the contemporary world. For Rushdie , Ghazali is the forefather of extremist fundamentalism. “I have found,” says Ghazali, “that the application of a degree of ferocity to the person usually brings his thinking into line with my own.” Rushdie brilliantly reimagines the atrocities of al-Qaeda and ISIS (“crazy white-eyed trance-killers from hell”) as the workings of the dark jinn, who take to heart Ghazali ’s admonition that “Fear leads [man] towards faith, not as a cure for fear, but as an acceptance that the fear of God is the natural and proper condition of man’s lot.” Rushdie turns to Ibn Rushd to wage the counterargument. Extolling the necessity of reason, Ibn Rushd says, “It is not that God does not exist but that like any proud parent he awaits the day when his child can stand on its own two feet, make its own way in the world, and be free of its dependence upon him.” In the end, despite “a wild international spree of decapitations, crucifixions, and stonings” perpetrated by the dark jinn and their entranced followers, reason prevails. As the narrators note, “the use of religion as a justification for repression, horror, tyranny , and even barbarism . . . led in the end to the terminal disillusion of the human race with the idea of faith.” The result is one thousand years of peace. And yet Rushdie doesn’t end his novel on this utopian note. The narrators observe that, with the death of god and the permanent closing of the passages that allowed such entities as jinn and gods to descend to earth, people have lost the ability to dream. “We read of you in ancient books, O dreams, but the dream factories are closed. This is the price we pay for peace, prosperity, tolerance , understanding, wisdom, goodness, and truth: that the wildness in us . . . has been tamed, and the darkness in us, which drove the theater of the night, is soothed.” The condition that the atheist Salman Rushdie presumably looks forward to—a world in which the clash between reason and faith has been settle in favor of reason—appears to bother the novelist Salman Rushdie. As Rushdie’s narrators say, “Mostly we are glad. Our lives are good. But sometimes we wish for the dreams to return. Sometimes, for we have not wholly rid ourselves of perversity, we long for nightmares.” Jim Hannan Le Moyne College Daniel Sada. One Out of Two. Katherine Silver, tr. Minneapolis, Minnesota. Graywolf. 2015. 88 pages. One Out of Two, by Daniel Sada, describes the lives of the Gamal twins, Constitución and Gloria. They live together, work together in their sewing business, eat together, bathe together, and even sleep together. Their lives are ruled by their very togetherness until Oscar Segura enters the scene. Now there is a distraction, an interruption of their very togetherness, a variation to their otherwise normal, boring lives. And although there has never been a competitive element between the middle-aged sisters, one now emerges. Will Oscar rend asunder the Gamal establishment? Will one of the two surrender herself to him and leave her alter ego to fend for herself as a singleton? Herein lies the enchantment of this novelette that dissects the experiences and combined existence of the twins. What is truly interesting about Sada’s rendering of the twin lives into a single entity is the way in...

Islamic theology as axiology that advocates various social inequalities both social and religious aspects. Although it is recognized that Ibn Rushd had the capacity as the greatest Muslim philosopher who was influential not only in the Islamic world but in the West. However, another fact Ibn Rushd was also an Islamic theologian based on philosophical and jurisprudential views. Both of these sources influenced Ibn Rushd's theology which was more rational but did not lead liberal because it was following his jurisprudence. This simple research is a type of library research, using theological approach. In this article, the writer wishes to present the analysis of Ibn Rushd on the views of theology, Ibn Rushd wa not only theologian but also a philosopher and jurist of Islam. This was interesting to be discussed; first, whether Ibn Rushd’s theology was different from other figures of theologians. Second, whether his philosophical and jurisprudential view affected his theology thought. The result of this writing showed that Ibn Rushd had unique strategies on Islamic theology, so the two strategies are Dalil al-‘Inayah and Dalil al-Ikhtira’. In this strategies, showed that Ibn Rushd had unique theology thought which his philosophical and juristprudential view affected his theology so that his theology was more rational but it was not too liberal. So in this article. Showed that Ibn Rushd had application are explained three important thoughts of Ibn Rusyd relating to the themes of Kalam namely; The oneness of God, the attributes of God and the matter of monotheism

The discourse on the role and contribution of Muslim scholars to the progress of mankind and modern life needs great attention. Their traces cannot be erased either from the existing facts or the collective memory of mankind. Ibn Rushd is one of the Muslim scholars who has made his mark on the Western World. Ibn Rushd is known in the Western world as Averroes. It is an indisputable fact that the traces of Ibn Rushd's scholarship are very clear in the Western world. This research explores the teachings and thoughts of Ibn Rushd who were influential in the Western World. The result of Ibn Rushd's thought has a very strong network to this day. The various rationality movements that took place in the West were inspired by the thought of Ibn Rushd. Therefore, the expression of Ibn Rushd's thought is something that really needs to be revealed, both its origin and its substance. The revelation of the origins and substance of this thought will prove the extent to which Muslim scholars contributed to modern civilization. Ibn Rushd's thought related to the relationship between philosophy and religion, namely that between philosophy and religion are interrelated. Philosophy reveals the nature of truth based on ratios; while Islam expresses a truth based on revelation from God. Islamic philosophy and religion should not contradict, so that the two cannot be separated and should even strengthen each other. Ibn Rushd's thought is understood and implemented by the West very differently, that is, only philosophical thought is considered correct. KEYWORDS Ibn Rushd, Averroes, Islamic philosophy

This paper investigates the twelfth-century commentary on Plato’s Republic by the Andalusian Muslim philosopher Ibn Rushd (Averroes). Ibn Rushd is considered to be the only Muslim philosopher who commented on the Republic. Written around 375 BC, Plato’s Republic discusses the order and character of a just city-state and contains revolutionary ideas on the position and qualities of women, which remained contested also in Ibn Rushd’s time. This Muslim philosopher is primarily known as the most esteemed commentator of Aristotle. However, for the lack of an Arabic translation of Aristotle’s Politics, Ibn Rushd commented on the political theory of Aristotle’s teacher, i.e. Plato’s Republic, instead. In his commentary, Ibn Rushd juxtaposes examples from Plato’s context and those from contemporary Muslim societies. Notably, when he diverges from the text, he does not drift off toward more patriarchal, Aristotelian interpretations. On the contrary, he argues that women are capable of being rulers and philosophers, that their true competencies remain unknown as long as they are deprived of education, and that this situation is detrimental to the flourishing of the city. This article aims to critically analyse Ibn Rushd’s statements on the position of women, as well as their reception in scholarly literature.

The spectacular progress of Islamic civilization in the West cannot be separated from the role of communication and Muslim philosophers who existed in the Middle Ages. In this century, Islam became a spearhead in scientific civilization. Ibn Rushd was a Muslim philosopher who had a very important role in the development of Islam in Europe, but the influence of Ibn Rushd himself did not occur in the mass of his life, but through his students who loved his thoughts, so that these students translated his works into Latin and this is called Aveoroism. Aveorism itself has a point of view on the relationship between philosophy and religion, and this view is based on Ibn Rushd. With his abilities, Ibn Rushd succeeded in commenting on the works of Aristotle, and gave rise to a culture of thought that had never been experienced in that period of civilization. Ibn Rushd's thoughts had a lot of influence on other philosophers. And he is considered the most influential and instrumental figure in Islamic civilization in the western world. Therefore, studying his life journey and philosophical thoughts is very interesting.

Ibn Rushd’s thoughts on the integration of religion and philosophy exerted a major influence on Medieval Jewish, Christian and Islamic philosophy. However, a study that writes the full concept of Ibn Rushd’s integration and its advantages has yet to be found. This study aims to thoroughly analyze Ibn Rushd’s concept of the integration of religion and philosophy, discover the strengths of the integration, and identify its logical consequences. This study uses the content analysis method with primary sources as the main data. The results of the study indicate that (1) Ibn Rushd integrates religion and philosophy by combining three things from religion and philosophy: sources, methods, and goals. (2) The strength of Ibn Rushd’s integration lies in the integrity of the aspects involved, the placement of ratios at a very high position, the principle that philosophical thinking is part of religious order, and the use of allegorical interpretation (ta’wil) of the holy verses. The implication shows that religion and philosophy become inseparable, and the movement for integration must be a movement towards each other, between religion and philosophy. Ibn Rushd’s thoughts on integration can be the basis of the efforts to integrate contemporary religion and science.

This study is motivated by the importance of examining the relevance of the Muslim philosopher Ibn Rushd’s thought in shaping the Islamic Malay identity in Riau, which is currently facing the challenges of globalization, modernization, and shifting cultural values. The main problem addressed in this research is how Ibn Rushd’s concept of rationality is understood and integrated into the formation of religious and cultural character within the Islamic Malay community in Riau. This research employs a library research method by analyzing Ibn Rushd’s works alongside scholarly literature related to Islamic Malay identity. The findings reveal that Ibn Rushd’s idea of harmonizing reason and revelation aligns with the principle of “adat bersendikan syarak, syarak bersendikan Kitabullah” in the Riau Malay tradition. The rationality promoted by Ibn Rushd strengthens the intellectual framework of the Islamic Malay community, fostering a more moderate, critical, and responsive attitude toward contemporary challenges. This study contributes to Islamic and cultural studies by offering a philosophical framework that integrates classical Islamic rationality with local identity formation, thereby enriching discussions on how Muslim communities can sustain religious and cultural identity while engaging constructively with modern intellectual developments.

This article discusses the influence of ideas of the Islamic Philosopher ibn Rushd (Averroes) on the European intellectual world and how it contributed to the enlightenment process. Ibn Rushd, through his interpretations of the works of Aristotle, played an important role in the development of philosophical and scientific thought both in the Islamic world and in medieval Europe. His views on the relationship between reason and revelation, his views defending the independence of reason and supporting rationalist epistemology, gained popularity in Western thought, especially through his works translated into Latin in the XII-XIII centuries. Ibn Rushd's works were discussed by such thinkers as Thomas Aquinas, Siger de Brabantia, and Dante, which paved the way for the emergence of a philosophical current called "averroism". His explanations based on reason were an important reference in the process leading to Renaissance thought and later to the European Enlightenment. In addition, the ideas that he adhered to that scientific knowledge could exist without contradicting religious authority contributed to the development of modern secular thought. This study examines the historical process of the transition of Ibn Rushd's ideas to Western philosophy and analyzes its influence on science, philosophy and theology in Europe. It also aims to reveal the role of Islamic philosophy in intellectual transformation in Europe by discussing the influence of its rationalist heritage on the philosophers of the Enlightenment.

Although the intellectual works of the Muslim thinker Ibn Rushd have attracted considerable scholarly attention, studies that specifically examine his metaphysical concepts and their contribution to Islamic thought in the East and the West remain limited. This study aims to analyze Ibn Rushd’s concept of metaphysics, particularly the relationship between reason and revelation, and its influence on the development of philosophical thought in the Western world. The research employed library study (library research) with a qualitative-descriptive approach through analysis of Ibn Rushd’s primary texts and relevant secondary literature. The findings show that Ibn Rushd’s ideas affirm the central role of reason in understanding existence, strengthen the tradition of critical thinking, and constitute one of the foundations for the development of scholastic philosophy and rationalism in Europe. The study concludes that Ibn Rushd’s metaphysical thought is not only significant within the context of Islamic philosophy, but also functions as an intellectual bridge between Islamic and Western traditions of thought, helping to pave the way for the intellectual renaissance in Europe. The implications of this research include a theoretical contribution to enriching the literature on metaphysics, as well as practical implications for readers in deepening their understanding and application of metaphysical principles in life, while also opening opportunities for further exploration of the importance of accepting and developing rational ideas in contemporary Islamic philosophical studies.

The Middle Commentary on Aristotle's Poetics by the Andalusian philosopher Ibn Rushd (d. 1198) has been treated by commentators as wide-ranging as Borges, Renan, and Kilito as an exemplary case of the failure of translation. Critics who presume Ibn Rushd's failure often concentrate on his rendering of Aristotle's tragedy and comedy by praise (madīh) and blame (hijā’). Taking account of Ibn Rushd's stated intention of using Aristotle‘s Poetics to facilitate comparative literary analysis, I argue here that far from representing a failure of comprehension, the rendering of tragedy and comedy as praise and blame respectively offered the Arabic philosopher a useful means of conceiving literary form outside the confines of a single literary tradition. Contrary to recent arguments in contemporary translation theory, Ibn Rushd's methodical appropriation of Aristotle's treatise suggests that at certain cultural junctures pursuing the path of fluency and localization can accomplish more than literalist foreignization.

Few passages in Arabic philosophy have attracted as much attention as al-Ghazâlî's discussion of causality in the seventeenth discussion of Tahâfut al-Falsafa, along with the response of Ibn Rushd (Averroës) in his Tahâfut al-Tahâfut. A question often asked is to what extent al-Ghazâlî can be called an occasionalist; that is, whether he follows other Kalâm thinkers in restricting causal agency to God alone. What has not been thoroughly addressed in previous studies is a question which al-Ghazâlî and Ibn Rushd both see as decisive in the seventeenth discussion: what theory of causality is sufficient to explain human knowledge? In this paper I show that al-Ghazâlî's and Ibn Rushd's theories of causality are closely related to their epistemologies. The difference between the two thinkers can be briefly summerized as follows. For Ibn Rushd, the paradigm of human knowledge is demonstrative science; for al-Ghazâlî, in contrast, the paradigm of human knowledge is (or at least includes) revelation. Yet both remain committed to the possibility of Aristotelian science and its underlying principles. Thus, I suggest that al-Ghazâlî's stance in the seventeenth discussion sheds light on his critique of philosophy in the Tahâfut: namely, philosophy is not inherently incoherent, but simply limited in scope. I also briefly compare this position to that of Thomas Aquinas, in order to place the view in a more familiar context.

The question of whether the universe can or must come to an end is rarely addressed in Arabic philosophy but informs the Second Discussion of al-Ghazālī’s Incoherence of the Philosophers and Ibn Rushd’s rejoinder in his Incoherence of the Incoherence. The philosophical debate between the two reveals limits to the symmetries between time and space in Aristotelian thinking. Additionally, we discern in Ibn Rushd’s responses a dedication to scientific reasoning even in the face of theological concerns, while al-Ghazālī is more willing to make allowances—within a rational worldview—for events that fall outside the normal course of nature.