Portuguese emigration to Europe in the 1960s and 1970s: The case of Montemor-o-Novo

The 'healthy migrant effect' (HME) hypothesis postulates that health selection has a positive effect on migrants' health outcomes, especially in the first years after migration. We examined the potential role of the HME by assessing the association between residence duration and disease occurrence. We performed a historical prospective cohort study. We included migrants who obtained residence permits in Denmark between 1 January 1993 and 31 December 2010 (n = 114,331). Occurrence of severe conditions was identified through linkage to the Danish National Patient Register. Hazard Ratios (HRs) were modelled for disease incidence by residence duration since arrival (0-5 years; 0-10 years; 0-18 years) adjusting for age and sex. Compared with Danish-born individuals, refugees and family reunited immigrants had lower HRs of stroke and breast cancer within 5 years after arrival; however, HRs increased at longer follow-up. For example, HRs of stroke among refugees increased from 0.77 (95% CI: 0.66; 0.91) to 0.96 (95% CI: 0.88; 1.05). For ischaemic heart disease (IHD) and diabetes, refugees and family reunited migrants had higher HRs within 5 years after arrival, and most HRs had increased by end of follow-up. For example, HRs of IHD among family reunited migrants increased from 1.29 (95% CI: 1.17; 1.42) to 1.43 (95% CI: 1.39; 1.52). In contrast, HRs for TB and HIV/AIDS showed a consistent decrease over time. Our analyses of the effect of duration of residence on disease occurrence among migrants imply that, when explaining migrants' advantageous health outcomes, the ruling theory of the HME should be used with caution, and other explanatory models should be included.

According to market competition theory the reasons for negative attitudes toward immigrants can be found in conditions prevailing on the labor market. In countries with rising unemployment and many immigrants, the latter are considered to be a threat to the economic standard of living of the native population. The contribution of this paper is a macro-level analysis of the conditions in 174 regions nested in European 19 countries that may affect the attitudes towards immigrants. The results indicate that when native unemployment is low the attitudes toward admitting immigrants into the host country are not influenced by immigration, but when native unemployment is rising high immigration flows are perceived as a threat. For attitudes toward immigration, an increase in the share of immigrants has a negative effect on attitudes and this effect is stronger in areas with weaker economies. These results are driven by the set of new immigration countries. For old immigration countries, we find that immigration emerges as the only contextual factor negatively affecting attitudes.

This paper reviews economic policies and instruments available to the developed countries to reduce unwanted migration from developing countries, not all of which is irregular migration. Countries generally welcome legal immigrants and visitors, try to make it unnecessary for people to become refugees and asylum seekers, and try to discourage, detect, and remove irregular foreigners.There are three major themes:1. There are as many reasons for migration as there are migrants, and the distinction between migrants motivated by economic and non–economic considerations is often blurred. Perhaps the best analogy is to a river – what begins as one channel that can be managed with a dam can become a series of rivulets forming a delta, making migration far more difficult to manage.2. The keys to reducing unwanted migration lie mostly in emigration countries, but trade and investment fostered by immigration countries can accelerate economic and job growth in both emigration and immigration countries, and make trading in goods a substitute for economically motivated migration. Trade and economic integration had the effect of slowing emigration from Europe to the Americas, between southern Europe and northern Europe, and in Asian Tiger countries such as South Korea and Malaysia. However, the process of moving toward freer trade and economic integration can also increase migration in the short term, producing a migration hump, and requiring cooperation between emigration and immigration destinations so that the threat of more migration does not slow economic integration and growth.3. Aid, intervention, and remittances can help reduce unwanted migration, but experience shows that there are no assurances that such aid, intervention, and remittances would, in fact, lead migrants to stay at home. The better use of remittances to promote development, which at US$65 billion in 1999 exceeded the US$56 billion in official development assistance (ODA), is a promising area for cooperation between migrants and their areas of origin, as well as emigration and immigration countries.There are two ways that differences between countries can be narrowed: migration alone in a world without free trade, or migration and trade in an open economy. Migration will eventually diminish in both cases, but there is an important difference between reducing migration pressures in a closed or open world economy. In a closed economy, economic differences can narrow as wages fall in the immigration country, a sure recipe for an anti–immigrant backlash. By contrast, in an open economy, economic differences can be narrowed as wages rise faster in the emigration country.Areas for additional research and exploration of policy options include: (1) how to phase in freer trade, investment, and economic integration to minimize unwanted migration; (2) strategies to increase the job–creating impacts of remittances, perhaps by using aid to match remittances that are invested in job–creating ways.

ABSTRACTPolitical socialisation plays a crucial but complex role in determining how immigrants adjust to the political environment of their host country. This study examines the effects of initial political socialisation and resocialisation on immigrants’ electoral participation in Canada. It addresses three questions: To what extent does the outlooks that develop from earlier political experiences in the country of origin shape immigrants’ subsequent electoral participation in Canada? To what extent, and how, does subsequent experience with politics in Canada affect electoral participation? And finally, how does initial socialisation in the country of origin condition resocialisation in Canada? The results indicate that not only does resocialisation leave a unique and lasting imprint on immigrant electoral participation in the host country, but also that the nature of resocialisation process in the host country is conditioned by the distinctive political outlooks immigrants acquire under different political regimes in their respective countries of origin.

Maternal Touch in Pilar Rodiles's Bidún (Undocumented) Yeon-Soo Kim is Assistant Professor of Spanish at Rutgers University, New Brunswick. She specializes in Spanish Cultural Studies. Her forthcoming book, The Family Album: Histories, Subjectivities and Immigration in Contemporary Spanish Culture, interrogates the role of the family album as a critical and ethical tool through which to reevaluate the complexities of twentiethcentury Spanish history. Her current project analyzes the different moral weights assigned to Asians and Arabs in the contemporary Spanish cultural imaginary. S ami Na'ir, in his La inmigración explicada a mi hija (2001), claims that Spain has become a country of immigration during the last decade and quotes the statistics that there are more than 300,000 undocumented immigrants residing in Spain, in addition to the 100,000 who acquired legal status in 1991 (18). While Nair's statement reflects the irrefutable social reality of what Spain has recently become, Javier Casqueiro's report about racism in Spain, published in El Pais on January 26, 2001, suggests that the sudden increase in the number of immigrants has largely produced negative reactions among native citizens. Casqueiro claims that according to research conducted in 2000 by the Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas, 49.4% of Spaniards consider themselves racists and 48.6% feel somewhat or absolutely intolerant of other ethnic groups and foreign customs. The latter statistic is alarming, the journalist notes, because it reflects a 13.6% increase from a study performed in 1994 by the same institute. These data reflect an intensification in xenophobia in Spanish society, concomitant with an upsurge in immigration, and reveal an attitude that challenges the belief in an accepting, multicultural society based on mutual deference. In tune with more populist public sentiment, a divisive discourse that hierarchizes Europe over Africa and native citizens over immigrants occasionally issued from the mouths of political figures. For instance, as reported in El Mundo on December 2, 2002, the government sub-delegate to Tarragona, Angel Sagardy, made chauvinistic comments, referring to African immigration as an invasion: "AquÃArizona Journal of Hispanic Cultural Studies Volume 8, 2004 Arizona Journal of Hispanic Cultural Studies necesitamos gente, pero no a toda Africa." More well-known and vigorously disputed racist statements are those Marta Ferrusola, wife of the former president of the Generalit ät, Jordi Pujol, made in February 2001. She condemned Kurdish immigrants who arrived on the French coast for being difficult in spite of the host country's hospitality because they requested a diet that observed the rules of their religion. Ferrusola also lamented Catalonia's generous social assistance to North African immigrants who have no interest in learning the region's cultural history. Both Sagardy and Ferrusola's comments point to an underlying mentality that the host country's self-interest takes precedence over hospitality and when munificence is offered, immigrants need to comply with the cultural codes of their new homeland and conceptions of its historic mission. One problem this formula poses is that immigrants are perceived as indebted to generous native residents. In contrast, many non-governmental organizations led by both Spanish and immigrant social activists and journalists have been working robustly to thwart social hostility toward immigrants and to promote a critical understanding of immigration among their fellow citizens since they first witnessed the dead bodies of African immigrants appearing on Spanish shores on November 2, 1989.' Numerous artists and intellectuals also lent their voices to the call to resist xenophobia and ignorance by creating works that bring this social issue to the fore. Among them are authors Juan Goytisolo, Gerardo Muñoz Lorente, Adolfo Hernández Lafuente, Eduardo Mendicutti, and Nieves GarcÃ-a Benito; film directors Montxo Armendáriz, Imanol Uribe, IcÃ-ar BollaÃ-n, Manuel Gutiérrez Aragón, Chus Gutiérrez and Carlos Molinero; and photographers Nuria Andreu and Rick Dávila, to name but a few.2 In this essay I add Pilar Rodiles to the aforementioned list because this Canarian painter provides a unique perspective on the discussion of immigration with her 2000 collection of paintings, Bidún (Undocumented).3 While many artists have attempted to represent immigrants with respect and equality, disavowing any hierarchical relationship, Rodiles...

ABSTRACTThis article compares how two different migration models – legal permanence and legal temporary settlement – shape 1.5 and second-generation Egyptians’ feelings of belonging towards the host countries of the U.S. and Qatar. Relying on formal semi-structured interviews, I argue that the inability of Egyptians in Qatar to obtain Qatari citizenship contributes greatly to their lack of sense of belonging to Qatar. However, a central paradox appears when Egyptians in Qatar simultaneously discuss other factors, such as family and/or friends’ networks, comfort, safety, and country familiarity, which make them feel Qatar is home. Conversely, while Egyptian-Americans appear to be more confident with their host country relationship because of their experience in a country of immigrants, factors such as post-9/11 discrimination and U.S. foreign policy towards the Middle East complicate their relationship with the U.S. Both groups reflect simultaneous feelings of home, belonging, discrimination, and/or exclusion in their respective ‘host’ countries but in different ways. These case studies demonstrate that different migration models do not necessarily lead to predicted understandings of home and belonging. This article thus argues for the need to reassess the assumptions we have of the relationship between citizenship and belonging.

An analysis of labor migration from Mediterranean countries to Western Europe is presented. Attention is paid to the influence of the economic crises of the 1970s on this migration and to the impact of migration policies in countries of immigration with particular reference to the success of these policies in promoting return migration. The data concern the migration of Spaniards Yugoslavs Italians Turks and Moroccans to the Netherlands the Federal Republic of Germany and Switzerland. The authors note a substantial decline in labor migration after the oil crisis of 1973-1974 but a continuing migration of dependents up to 1980. Return migration which was substantial has declined as immigration has declined; the potential for further migration despite the increasing pressures for it in host countries is practically zero.

Immigration to Germany, Italy and Finland represent different stages of the new migration to Europe. The scale and types of immigration also differ between the three. Though each country is experiencing different stages of immigration, they all recognize the necessity to better integrate minors. The three countries seem to have only recently started to regard themselves as countries of immigration. As a result, their policies towards seem to be based on tolerating, not integrating them. The presence of in the juvenile justice system is a reflection on their approaches and attitudes towards immigrants. Therefore, we set out on an 18-month project funded by the European Commission to study how being foreign affects the treatment of in the penal systems in Italy, Germany and Finland. The project is called INTO: Inside the Outsiders: Deviant Immigrant Minors and Integration Strategies in European Justice Systems. In this paper, we will present the difficulties encountered when creating comparable data in terms of contrasting labels for and definitions of the target group and data collection as well as the solutions created for addressing these difficulties. At the outset of the project, it became clear that the terms used to define the target group had different meanings for each of the partners and one term was not deemed sufficient for use in all three contexts, both due to the immigration history in each country and due to the counting methods used by the data collection institutions in each country (National Censuses, Justice Systems, etc.). In the project proposal, we defined minors as including two categories of children: 1) those born in the host country and are either naturalised citizens, hold dual citizenship or are permanent residents 2) children who immigrated to the host country with their family or by themselves. Yet statistical data in each country uses multiple and diverse terms to describe our target group - minors, migrants, ethnic minorities, citizens, etc. Clearly, this made the collection and comparison of three different sets of national statistics quite challenging. The diverse terminology and categorisation of minors in the three countries made it difficult to find directly comparable statistics. The discussion of how to resolve this technical difficultly revealed the different conceptions of what it means to be an immigrant and a minor in each country and within their respective social and judicial systems. This discussion reflected each country's individual conceptions and laws regarding citizenship as well as their past and present approaches to integration. We argue that despite their different labels, social class and rights, foreigners, ethnic minorities and migrants share similar social conditions. Foreigners, even when they become citizens, still experience social constraints and suffer in the process of cultural integration. Migrants, who must overcome the legal and economic challenges and risks of migrating, have difficulty fully integrating into the host society. The second generation seems to experience greater frustration from their continued exclusion. Ethnic minorities are often identifiable and visibly different from the majority which prevents their full integration despite being long-established in a country. They all remain foreign from the perspective of the autochthonous population. And when examining discrimination, we find that these terms often overlap and are used interchangeably. Given this background, it is no wonder that there are difficulties in addressing this new migration to Europe. The social conflicts arising from the recent migration, during the last fifty years (at most), cannot be easily understood in terms of class, racial or ethnic conflict. While we might say the subjects of this conflict belong to a socially disadvantaged group or that our societies are quick to discriminate against them, we cannot, since the situation is still not clear. What is clear is that it will continue to be difficult to study these difficult issues in a European setting if we lack of adequate, comparable data collection techniques in Europe. However, refining the techniques will require serious reflection and discussion of the terms currently in use and of the theoretical approaches to immigration in each of the European member states. This is a reflection we intend to begin in this paper.

Continuing immigration of low wage and low skill workers to more developed countries from less developed regions of the world has become an issue of policy debate. Host countries which do not view themselves as countries of immigration are eager to develop incentives which forestall migrants from becoming permanent residents. This paper reports that return migrants with savings have a higher probability of settling in birth place regions which tend to be lagging and less developed regions. Policies which encourage savings among migrants are likely to encourage return migration which is spread across regions of outmigration rather than concentrated in major urban areas. Without savings the rate of return to less developed regions would be extremely low demonstrating the importance of savings to a pattern of balanced return migration. (EXCERPT)

This chapter treats North Africa, known in Arabic as the Maghreb. The chapter focuses on Morocco as a way of illuminating the role of transit states situated “in-between” sending and receiving dynamics. Admittedly, “transit state” is a bit of a misnomer, as migrants are more often blocked and not really in transit. Nonetheless, the label as “host country” or “country of immigration” does not work either; the new population does not comprise immigrants who are seeking to settle, as is the case in advanced-industrialized economies. Chapter 4 treats the politics of CIM within a transit state and the ways in which CIM is used to “reborder” a country, cement territorial claims, and control the national space. CIM is also used by transit states as a bargaining chip to enhance the status of their own emigrants—both legal and undocumented—living in North Atlantic countries. Finally, chapter 4 treats the ways in which CIM enhances collaboration between North Atlantic and transit state officials and facilitates the elaboration of a transnational security state—that is, the internationalization of security apparatuses and interior ministries.

Immigration to Germany, Italy and Finland represent different stages of the ‘new migration’ to Europe. The scale and types of immigration also differ between the three. Though each country is experiencing different stages of immigration, they all recognize the necessity to better integrate foreign minors. The three countries seem to have only recently started to regard themselves as countries of immigration. As a result, their policies towards foreign minors seem to be based on tolerating, not integrating them. The presence of foreign minors in the juvenile justice system is a reflection on their approaches and attitudes towards immigrants. Therefore, we set out on an 18-month project funded by the European Commission to study how being ‘foreign’ affects the treatment of minors in the penal systems in Italy, Germany and Finland. The project is called “INTO: Inside the Outsiders: Deviant Immigrant Minors and Integration Strategies in European Justice Systems.” In this paper, we will present the difficulties encountered when creating comparable data in terms of contrasting labels for and definitions of the target group and data collection as well as the solutions created for addressing these difficulties. At the outset of the project, it became clear that the terms used to define the target group had different meanings for each of the partners and one term was not deemed sufficient for use in all three contexts, both due to the immigration history in each country and due to the counting methods used by the data collection institutions in each country (National Censuses, Justice Systems, etc.). In the project proposal, we defined ‘immigrant minors’ as including two categories of children: 1) those born in the host country and are either naturalised citizens, hold dual citizenship or are permanent residents 2) children who immigrated to the host country with their family or by themselves. Yet statistical data in each country uses multiple and diverse terms to describe our target group – foreign minors, migrants, ethnic minorities, foreign citizens, etc. Clearly, this made the collection and comparison of three different sets of national statistics quite challenging. The diverse terminology and categorisation of ‘immigrant minors’ in the three countries made it difficult to find directly comparable statistics. The discussion of how to resolve this ‘technical’ difficultly revealed the different conceptions of what it means to be an ‘immigrant’ and a ‘minor’ in each country and within their respective social and judicial systems. This discussion reflected each country’s individual conceptions and laws regarding citizenship as well as their past and present approaches to integration. We argue that despite their different labels, social class and rights, foreigners, ethnic minorities and migrants share similar social conditions. Foreigners, even when they become citizens, still experience social constraints and suffer in the process of cultural integration. Migrants, who must overcome the legal and economic challenges and risks of migrating, have difficulty fully integrating into the host society. The second generation seems to experience greater frustration from their continued exclusion. Ethnic minorities are often identifiable and visibly different from the majority which prevents their full integration despite being long-established in a country. They all remain ‘foreign’ from the perspective of the autochthonous population. And when examining discrimination, we find that these terms often overlap and are used interchangeably. Given this background, it is no wonder that there are difficulties in addressing this ‘new migration’ to Europe. The social conflicts arising from the recent migration, during the last fifty years (at most), cannot be easily understood in terms of class, racial or ethnic conflict. While we might say the subjects of this conflict belong to a socially disadvantaged group or that our societies are quick to discriminate against them, we cannot, since the situation is still not clear. What is clear is that it will continue to be difficult to study these difficult issues in a European setting if we lack of adequate, comparable data collection techniques in Europe. However, refining the techniques will require serious reflection and discussion of the terms currently in use and of the theoretical approaches to immigration in each of the European member states. This is a reflection we intend to begin in this paper.

Demographic globalisation, as the counterpart of economic globalisation, is interpreted as the movement towards a state depicted as the "global village" where there are no official impediments to the cross-border movement of people. Such movement is posited as the outcome of inter-country disequilibria which determine the levels of the propensity to migrate. Relevant problems are addressed such as whether the international trade in goods and services can serve as substitute for migration of labour (accompanied or unacompanied by dependents); demographic complementarity between more and less developed countries; the type of labour demanded by countries of immigration; demographically perverse migratory flows; the socio-economic problems ensuing from the formation of numerically strong ethnic minorities in host countries; and what the outlook is for the realisation, in demographic terms, of a global village mode.

While the effects of immigrants on aggregate trade flows have been extensively examined, the role of immigrants in shaping trade in value added (TiVA) remains underexplored. Employing a panel dataset covering 38 Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) member host countries and 64 immigrant home countries spanning 2000–2018 and estimating a random intercept and random slope mixed-effects model, we find that immigrants play a significant role in enhancing the value added from their home countries that is embedded in their host countries’ exports to the world. We document these effects at the aggregate level and across sectors (i.e., manufacturing, agriculture, and services). There is, however, considerable variation in the influence of immigrants on TiVA across country pairs. Our findings highlight that immigrants significantly enhance trade sophistication by promoting specialization and upward movement in the value chain, yielding economic benefits for their home and host countries.

Growing global migration flows highlight the importance of understanding their economic impact. While many studies have explored how immigration affects host countries’ macroeconomic indicators, the results are mixed. In this work, we develop a meta-analysis to investigate the effect of immigration on the economic performance of the host country, focusing on key indicators such as economic growth, productivity, unemployment, and innovation. The results indicate that, on average, immigration has a positive and statistically significant impact on economic performance. The effect varies based on immigrant and host country characteristics, including qualifications, age, and economic development level. Additionally, differences in methodological approaches across studies contribute to the observed heterogeneity in findings. These findings underscore the importance of further research on the economic effects of immigration and offer implications for both policy and future research.

Do experiences with civil war violence affect an individual's level of social trust? The literature on this topic suggests that being a victim of violence or being involved in violence has a profound effect on an individual's political behavior in the new host country. However, what has not been explored is how experiences with civil war and violence impact levels of social trust among immigrants. Building on prior research on premigratory experience and literature on experience with violence, we intend to determine if the premigratory experiences with violence in an immigrant's country of origin affect whether social trust is increased or decreased in an immigrant's country of residence. We investigate this question using the National Latino and Asian American Study. We find that immigrants who had experienced civil war as unarmed civilians and were persecuted due to their political beliefs were less likely to acculturate to the host country. Participation in combat also tended to reduce acculturation but did not affect social trust.