Populism, Immigration and Liberal Democracies

This guide accompanies the following article(s): Sor‐hoon Tan, “Democracy in Confucianism,” Philosophy Compass 7.5 (May 2012): 293–303, DOI: 10.1111/j.1747‐9991.2012.00481.x Author’s Introduction Debates about the relation between democracy and Confucianism have seen views that range from attempts to show that some form, or at least the seeds, of democracy could be found in Confucianism, or that it is compatible with liberal or other forms of democracy, to the other extreme of labelling “Confucian democracy” an oxymoron and using Confucianism to criticize the excesses of Western liberal democracies or resist democratization based on Western liberal models and argue for alternative forms of good government. Has there been and can there be democracy in Confucianism? Do East Asian societies with a cultural legacy of Confucianism have to choose between their cultural heritage, and perhaps identity, on the one hand and democratic values associated with modernity on the other, and if so, how should they choose? These questions are highly relevant for today’s East Asian societies, and also important for other societies interacting with East Asian societies. They help us understand the influence of Confucianism on East Asian thinking about politics and government and may influence the political development of those societies. Exploring the question may be enlightening by raising questions for contemporary political philosophies and offering alternative views about democracy and good government. Author Recommends Angle, Stephen. Human Rights and Chinese Thought: A Cross‐Cultural Inquiry . New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002. This book examines the Chinese discourse about human rights, and argues for a way to take human rights seriously without riding rough shod over Chinese intellectual tradition. Bell, Daniel A. Beyond Liberal Democracy: Political Thinking for an East Asian Context . Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006. This work argues for an alternative to liberal democracy, based on key values and institutions the author identifies with Confucianism, that he believes would be more suitable for East Asian societies. See also criticisms and Bell’s response in Philosophy East and West 59 (Oct 2009). Chan, Joseph, “Moral Autonomy, Civil Liberties, and Confucianism.” Philosophy East and West 52 (Jul 2002): 281–310. This article identifies four elements in Western concepts of moral autonomy, and argues that only two can be found in early Confucian texts. It constructs a case for civil rights based on the “thin” moral autonomy found in Confucianism. de Bary, Wm. Theodore. The Liberal Tradition in China . Hong Kong: Chinese University Press, 1983. The author argues that, despite China’s reputation for despotism, there is a limited kind of liberal tradition to be found in Confucian philosophy of personal cultivation, conscientious dissent, and pursuit of sagehood. de Bary, Wm. Theodore and Tu Wei‐ming, eds. Confucianism and Human Rights . New York: Columbia University Press, 1997. Contributions to the debate about human rights and Confucianism by important scholars, including Irene Bloom, Julia Ching, Henry Rosemont, Chung‐ying Cheng, and Peter Zarrow. Elstein, David. ‘Why Early Confucianism Cannot Generate Democracy.’ Dao: A Journal of Comparative Philosophy 9 (Dec 2010): 427–43. This article argues against proponents of “Confucian democracy” with a detailed analysis of the Pre‐Qin Confucian texts, and concedes only the possibility of “Confucian‐inspired democracy.” Hall, David L. and Roger T. Ames. Democracy of the Dead: Dewey, Confucius, and the Hope for Democracy in China . La Salle: Open Court, 1999. With the context of significant cultural and historical differences between China and the West, this book argues that liberal democracy does not suit China, but an alternative democratic future might be found for China in John Dewey’s conception of democracy. Journal of Chinese Philosophy 34 (June 2007), special issue on Democracy and Chinese Philosophy. Rosemont, Henry, Jr. ‘Which Rights? Whose Democracy? A Confucian Critique of Western Liberal Tradition.’ Confucian Ethics. Eds Kwong‐loi Shun and David Wong. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004. One of the strongest critics of attempts to “import” rights concepts into Confucianism, in view of the many inadequacies of liberal democracy itself. Tan, Sor‐hoon. Confucian Democracy: A Deweyan Reconstruction . Albany: State University of New York Press, 2004. This book argues that Confucianism and Deweyan democracy, which emphasizes community without sacrificing individual freedom, provide a way of reconciling Confucianism with democracy. It approaches the issue through comparative philosophical analysis of key concepts of community, freedom, equality, and authority, and the relationship between ethics and politics in western philosophical discourses and in early Confucian texts. Online Materials “On the Compatibility between Confucian Principles and Democracy.” [Online]. Retrieved from: http://www.confucius2000.com/confucius/otcbcpad.htm Xu Keqian maintains that the direction of China’s political development is democratic and attempts to contribute to the effort to find indigenous cultural resources for “a democratic Chinese system with Chinese characteristics.” The China Beat: “China, Democracy, or Confucianism?” [Online]. Retrieved from: http://thechinabeat.blogspot.com/2008/06/china‐democracy‐or‐confucianism.html A post by Xujun Eberlein discussing the work of Jiang Qing, a contemporary Chinese thinker advocating a conservative institutional Confucianism that challenges Western liberal democracy. Manyul Im’s Chinese Philosophy blog: “Confucius: Democracy’s Advocate.” [Online]. Retrieved from: http://manyulim.wordpress.com/2008/02/17/confucius‐democracy‐advocate/ A string of discussions with several contributors sceptical about democratic interpretations of Confucianism, and some arguing for non insidious authoritarian regimes with Confucian virtues. “Democracy, Human Rights, and Confucian Values: Reconstructing Confucian Political Thought for China’s Development.” [Online]. Retrieved from: http://www.cornell.edu/video/?videoID=1957 Video Recording of a lecture given by Joseph Chan, Professor of Politics at the University of Hong Kong, in the Cornell Program on Ethics and Public Life (Mar

Preface Acknowledgements Introduction: The 'Method' of Ellen Meiksins Wood 1. Capitalism The 'economic' and the 'political' in capitalism Class-power and state-power Feudalism and private property Capitalism as the privatisation of political power The localisation of class-struggle England vs. the dominant model of capitalism The bourgeois paradigm Begging the question Opportunity or imperative? The commercialisation-model Marx on the transition Towns and trade Agrarian capitalism Market-dependent producers A different kind of market-dependence? Competitive markets 2. Precapitalist Societies Class and state in China and Rome Rome and the empire of private property The city-states of Florence and Venice Master and slave vs. landlord and peasant Free producers and slaves Slavery and the 'decline' of the Roman Empire The 'logic' of slavery vs. the logic of capitalism The 'slave-mode of production' Agricultural slavery and the peasant-citizen The nexus of freedom and slavery in democratic Athens 3. The State in Historical Perspective Class and state in ancient society The emergence of the polis in ancient Athens The 'essence' of the polis Class in the democratic polis Village and state, town and country, in democratic Athens The rise and fall of Rome The culture of property: the Roman law From imperial Rome to 'feudalism' Absolutism and the modern state The idea of the state The peculiarities of the English state Contrasting states: France vs. England 4. Social and Political Thought The social history of political theory Political theory in history: an overview Plato The Greek concept of freedom Jean-Jacques Rousseau John Locke Revolution and tradition, c. 1640-1790 5. Democracy, Citizenship, Liberalism, and Civil Society Labour and democracy, ancient and modern From ancient to modern conceptions of citizenship Capitalism and democratic citizenship The American redefinition of democracy A democracy devoid of social content From democracy to liberalism Capitalism and 'liberal democracy' Liberal democracy and capitalist hegemony The idea of 'civil society' The civil-society argument 'Civil society' and the devaluation of democracy 6. The Enlightenment, Postmodernism, and the Post-'New Left' Modernity vs. capitalism: France vs. England From modernity to postmodernity Modernity and the non-history of capitalism Themes of the postmodern left Enlightenment vs. capitalism: Condorcet vs. Locke Enlightenment-universalism The periodisation of the Western left Left-intellectuals and contemporary capitalism 7. Globalisation and Imperialism Globalisation and the nation-state Nation-states, classes, and universal capitalism The indispensable state Precapitalist imperialism The classic age of imperialism Globalisation and war Globalisation and imperial hegemony The contradictions of capitalist imperialism 8. Socialism The end of the welfare-state 'compact' There are no social democrats now Market-dependence vs. market-enablement Left-strategies of market-enablement The political implications of competition The working class and the struggle for socialism Class-conflict and the socialist project Socialism and democracy The state in classless societies Liberalism vs. democracy 'Universal human goods' The self-emancipation of the working class The socialist movement Democracy as an economic mechanism Bibliography of Works by Ellen Meiksins Wood, 1970-2012 References Index

Friedrich Hayek presents a demarchic conception of democracy as a solution for what he takes to be the inherently corrupt and totalitarian nature of liberal democracy. While still preserving the label ‘liberal representative democracy’, this Hayekian demarchy precludes parliamentary and governmental institutions from providing positive laws and policies on behalf of their constituents where this would require the transfer of the private property of individuals. Such laws and policies would, on this demarchic conception of liberal democracy, undermine individuals’ free usufruct. I argue that demarchy’s detachment from any concern with the well-being of many of its citizens is an illiberal and anti-democratic (sub)version of liberal democracy that increases populism and risks crushing liberal democracy between the pseudo- and anti-liberal support of a totalitarian majoritarian people’s sovereign power and a minoritarian anti-democratic elite. As such, liberal democracy conceived of in Hayekian demarchic terms is itself an oppressive totalitarian political theory incapable of preventing an increase in illiberal and anti-liberal political forces. Moreover, I argue that it is imperative that we acknowledge and appreciate the extent to which demarchy undermines, rather than strengthens, liberal democracy.

A large and widening gap has opened between Western democracies’ international ambitions and their domestic political capacity to support these objectives. Drawing on an array of cross-national data on Western governments, parties, and voters, Geopolitics and Democracy traces this ends-means divide back to decisions that Western governments made after the Cold War. The key decisions were to globalize markets and pool sovereignty at the supranational level, while at the same time reducing social protections and guarantees at home. This combination of foreign and domestic policies succeeded in expanding the Western liberal order in the quarter century after the Cold War, but at the cost of mounting public discontent and political fragmentation within the advanced industrial economies. The analysis reveals the large extent to which domestic support for international engagement during the long East-West geopolitical contest had rested on social protections within the Western democracies. At a time when problems of great power rivalry, spheres of influence, and reactionary nationalism have returned, Geopolitics and Democracy reminds us that the liberal order rose in an age of social democracy as well as Cold War. In the absence of a renewed commitment to those social purposes, Western democracies will struggle to find a collective grand strategy that their domestic publics will support.

What is the relevance of ‘liberal democracy’ to a developing country? How to think of the desirability, feasibility, conditions and possibilities of ‘liberal democracy’ for such a country, where there is an important need for ‘economic development’, a cultural and historical backdrop different from the West, and a state with different capacities? In exploring this question, this book goes back to the basic, big questions of what ‘liberal democracy’ actually consists in and why it is a good (as fact or idea, in its consequences or in itself). Can what ‘liberal democracy’ delivers (or is thought, perhaps uniquely, to deliver, most importantly for our purposes, ‘economic development’) be delivered by regimes of a distinctively different kind (how distinctively different?)? and different in what ways? and, enduringly different, or different only in their recent manifestations? The focus of this book is therefore on the relationship between ‘liberal democracy’ and ‘economic development’. With the ending of the Cold War, ‘liberal democracy’ seems to have become the only, and unchallengeably, good form of government, with many countries around the world undergoing ‘democratisation’. Indeed, some are pressed to do so by the emergence of the ‘good governance’ agenda within such international institutions as the World Bank. At the same time, one of the urgent needs for many of these countries is for economic development. Under these circumstances, the question of the democracy–development relation acquires a new significance and urgency. More exactly, what is the relevance of ‘liberal democracy’ for economic development?

Teaching and Learning Guide for: Democracy and Nationalism

Whereas established democracies have been responding to public pressures for broader inclusion, grassroots participation as well as public accountability, existing measures of democracy rely almost exclusively on a liberal conceptualization of representative democracy. Most notably, they ignore another fundamental tradition of democratic thought: that of radical democracy, which strives for direct participation of all citizens in the public debate and in political decision-making. Drawing from classical liberal and radical views on what democratic institutions can or should accomplish, we construct a multidimensional measurement instrument which we devise specifically for the subnational level of the Swiss cantons. The resulting measures point to a dilemma of radical democracy, since participatory cantons are markedly less inclusive. Liberal democracies in turn are faced with a different dilemma: Citizens in liberal democracies are significantly less supportive of both their political institutions and their political community.

The aim of this article is to compare the effectiveness of two political systems: liberal democracy and illiberal democracy in fighting the coronavirus pandemic. The analysis has been carried out on the basis of the theoretical assumptions and conceptualization of non-Marxian historical materialism. In the first part of my article, I present the concept of ‘regulative credit” which has been introduced in that theory. In standard socio-political conditions, the growth of power regulations is usually contested by citizens. However, in a situation of danger, when social order is undermined, citizens support the authorities’ extraordinary regulations. This social support, called regulative credit, lasts as long as the danger persists. In chapter two, I characterize shortly liberal and illiberal democracies. In liberal democracy, there is a balance between different branches of power, and citizens share a socio-political consciousness of the individualistic type. In illiberal democracy, the executive branch of power – although it has been democratically chosen – has an advantage over the two other kinds of power, and citizens share a socio-political consciousness of the collectivist type. Those differences result in diverse reactions of the authorities to a situation of threat. The political authorities of an illiberal democracy react faster in comparison with the political authorities in liberal democracies that react slower. Also, the attitude of citizens toward the introduced restrictions varied. Societies of illiberal democracies are more self-disciplined and more willing to accept restrictions from above. Whereas societies of liberal democracies are more individualistic and less willing to accept limitations. In the fourth part of my paper, I analyze briefly the influence of the pandemic on globalization processes and on the relations between the EU and the nation states in Europe. In the summary (chapter five), I predict that the mass use of modern technologies to control social life and strengthening of the sovereignty of nation states will be the two most important effects of the pandemic.

This paper proposes the five different democracies and their international relations. Democracy literally means that power (kratos) belongs to the common people (demos) instead of dictators and inherited kings-aristocrats. Different types of powers and different types of the common people constitute different types of democracies. Within a democratic nation, the intergroup relation among different social groups can be competitive or cooperative. The most conventional democracy is liberal democracy where power, intergroup relation, and people are liberty, competition, and all people, respectively. The power of the liberty to compete belongs to all people. All people have liberty to compete. Democracies in general are the combinations of different powers (elitism, tradition, liberty, equality, and wellbeing), different intergroup relations (competition and cooperation), and different people (few, most, and all). Therefore, depending on powers, intergroup relations, and people, the five democracies are elite democracy (elitism, competition, few people), nationalist democracy (tradition, competition, most people), liberal democracy (liberty, competition, all people), socialist democracy (equality, competition, all people), and relationalist democracy (wellbeing, cooperation, all people). Different people in different times, cultures, and political situations have different democracies. Each democracy has advantages and deficiencies. The democracies today are mostly mixed democracies to minimize deficiencies. The optimal mixed democracies have competition, cooperation, tradition, liberty, equality, and wellbeing. International relations as international intergroup relations reflect democracies as domestic intergroup politics. Liberal, socialist, and relationalist democracies are for all people, so they can generate cooperative international orders (liberal, socialist, and relationalist) for all nations within their respective democracies. For example, liberal democracy can generate cooperative liberal international order for all liberal democratic nations. Elite democracy and nationalist democracy are not for all people, and are against foreigners, so they can only generate competitive international relation as competitive realism. Peace and prosperity in the world can be maintained by proper international relations.

We need to summarise. This will be done in 7.1, which further queries whether it may be useful to keep on asking the question of the relevance of ‘liberal democracy’ to developing countries. The final section, 7.2, considers the question whether there is an ‘Asian model’ and whether Asian countries will move towards the Western model, as a result both of the pressures arising out of the ‘financial crisis’ and of ‘globalisation’ more generally. Summarising This present study started by asking the question of how political regime-type may affect economic development, or, more specifically, how ‘liberal democracy’ affects economic development. It set out to demonstrate that one way to make some progress in answering the question is by means of a three-fold model of ‘liberal democracy’. This framework was duly set up in chapter 2 and involves a distinction between the ‘liberal’ and the ‘democratic’, and further between ‘economic’, ‘civil’ and ‘political’ liberties. The usefulness of this three-fold understanding of ‘liberal democracy’ was first highlighted in chapter 3 where it was argued that some of the characteristics (particularly difficulties) of present democratisation processes can be traced to the complicatedness of the concept of ‘liberal democracy’. The three-fold conceptual framework was then used to re-examine (in chapter 5) the theoretical debate between those for whom ‘democracy is good for development’ and those arguing against this.

This chapter aims to expand debate on the complexities of the pivotal human right and its implications for free movement, focusing in particular on how liberal democracies have conceptualized and shaped the implementation of the right by their own citizens, as well as by displaced persons from other countries. It explores trends that have developed over the past twenty years in liberal democracies' interpretations of the right of return, demonstrating that liberal democracies have embraced a wide range of interpretations of the right, depending on the political considerations at stake. The chapter highlights the inconsistencies that have emerged between the expansive definition of the right that liberal democracies have selectively imposed on post-conflict states in order to legitimize the speedy return of displaced. The chapter also examines trends in liberal democracies' engagement with the right of return during and after the Cold War. Keywords:divergent interpretations; free movement; liberal democracies; right of return

Sovereignty and the National Interest Erik Jones (bio) Much of the world today is torn between national populists and liberal democrats. The national populists put the nation first; the liberal democrats argue for something closer to multicultural multilateralism. In doing so, they offer distinct visions of how sovereignty and the national interest interact. For national populists, sovereignty is an expression of the national interest; whoever wields sovereign authority should ensure that the national interest is served. For liberal democrats, sovereignty is the responsibility to determine what is in the nation's best interests and then to reconcile competing claims and distribute scarce resources accordingly. The two groups also offer contrasting views of world order. The national populists focus on self-help and mutual respect. The liberal democrats emphasise integration, cooperation, and solidarity. Viewed side-by-side, the two worldviews present irreconcilable differences in the constitution of political authority and the structure of international relations. Hence it is tempting to argue that the interaction between national populists and liberal democrats should be limited, particularly when national populism threatens to descend into authoritarianism. But there is a narrow path along which interaction between national populists and liberal democrats can be beneficial, when national populists promise to reconnect members of society who have lost representation within liberal democratic politics. Reconnecting those who fall away from politics is essential to the stability of liberal democracy over the longer term. Indeed, the same point applies for populists from all parts of the political spectrum, and not just the nationalist right that is so prominent in Europe, Turkey, Brazil, India, and the United States today. The question is whether and how populists can effectively represent their constituents while at the same time adapting to liberal democratic norms for reconciling competing interests. That question has not received much attention in the scholarly literature.1 We know a lot more about the origins [End Page 392] and nature of populism, and about how populism can lead to authoritarianism by undermining democratic norms and institutions, than we know about how populists become something closer to mainstream liberal democrats. Research on populists in power is still in its infancy.2 The key to striking a beneficial relationship between national populists and liberal democrats lies in reinforcing the formal and informal institutions that underpin the liberal democratic connection between sovereignty and the national interest. The 'rule of law' debate in Europe and the United States is about protecting those institutions that frame the exercise of sovereignty and ensure that the national interest is defined within the context of liberal democratic politics. So long as those institutions are resilient, national populists will have little choice but to learn how to exercise sovereignty to identify the interests of the nation, rather than bending sovereignty to the service of a national interest they take as given. A study in contrast This relationship between sovereignty and the national interest seems abstract when presented at the start of an essay, but it comes across concretely when laid out in political speeches. Consider the contrast between Donald Trump and Barack Obama. When Donald Trump gave his first address to the General Assembly of the United Nations in September 2017, his message was simple. True patriots everywhere should invest their sovereignty – a word he used twenty-one times during the speech – in the pursuit of the national interest. As Trump explained, 'if we do not invest ourselves, our hearts, and our minds in our nations, if we will not build strong families, safe communities, and healthy societies for ourselves, no one can do it for us'. His only qualification to this notion of self-help is that 'in fulfilling our obligations to our own nations, we also realize that it's in everyone's interest to seek a future where all nations can be sovereign, prosperous, and secure'.3 Trump left open the question how those sovereign nations should reconcile competing claims with one another. Trump's UN speech was different from any given by a United States president to the General Assembly. When Barack Obama spoke at the United Nations the year before, he never mentioned the term sovereignty. There is no question for Obama that the...

While the Unification Education Support Act emphasizes ‘liberal democracy and free and democratic basic order’, core values and institutions of liberal democracy have not been taught enough in unification education of South Korea. It is because liberal democracy is theoretically contentious by itself and politically sensitive in Korea. This study explores liberal values and practical institutions of liberal democracy as a combination of economic liberalism and political democracy, and provides basic elements of free and democratic basic order, investigating precedents by the Constitutional Court of Korea and that of Germany. This study suggests content framework of liberal democracy for unification education.

Populism has become the issue of comparative political science today. The rise and continuing success of populist parties is by now evident across Europe, despite persistent cross-national variations. Populist parties’ electoral success and their participation in government have raised questions about their impact: not just on established party systems, but also on the systemic core of European democracies. In theory, this impact can be both beneficial for, as well as a challenge to democracy in general, and the tenets of liberal constitutional democracy in particular. The presence of populist parties has, in several cases, increased electoral turnout and public participation, which is generally seen as a positive effect when measuring the quality of democracy. However, populist parties’ rise also points to negative effects. In addition to profoundly reshaping European party systems, they advocate what the populist Hungarian prime minister Viktor Orbán calls “illiberal democracy”. Both as an ideal and as an institutional practice when in government, the illiberal remaking of democracy implies eroding the separation of powers and subordinating constitutionally guaranteed individual civil and human rights to an alleged “general will” and a particular conception of “the people”. The thematic issue explores the ideological supply, favorable conditions, political contexts and dynamics, as well as the impact of the populist surge in Europe in relation to the systemic consolidation of (il)liberal democracy on a theoretical and comparative empirical level.

The main line of argument in the chapter is that populism should be carefully studied in its
\nparticular “habitat,” not least because it reacts to specific historical and societal circumstances.
\nThe relation between populism, illiberalism, and constitutional democracy warrants careful,
\nhistorical and comparative analysis which explores the reasons for the emergence of populism
\nand takes into account the critical positions towards liberalism, the aspirations and stages
\nof populist projects, and the actual practices of populist parties.