Population Density, Elites, and the Distribution of Infrastructural Resources in Thailand

Abstract

This paper operationalizes both political-economic and ecological/economic explanations of infrastructure development (roads water electrification) using 1970 provincial data (except for the Bangkok Metropolis) from Thailand. The political-economic approach states that because elites make decisions which disproportionately benefit the interests of their class policies create or perpetuate regional economic inequalities. This approach stresses the needs of both central and non-central elites as a key force behind policy implementation in sharp contrast to the public need imagery of ecological/economic formulations. In Thailand decision making is extremely centralized policy is highly elitist and there are clear examples of the use of development policy for accumulation and social control. The findings support those of previous studies; the distribution of infrastructural resources is primarily a function of gross provincial product per capita (GPP) density and the presence of elites. The political-economic variables explain almost as much variance in the distribution of infrastructural resources as do the ecological/economic variables. Because Thailand is a patrimonial society both patrons and clients possess resources which the other needs. Provincial elites in their role as clients are able to demand resources and therefore villages without a large local elite political stratum fail to receive a share of available projects and resources. Both the inherent elitism in patrimonial policy making and the actual behavior of provincial entrepreneurs administrators and bureaucrats show that resources are allocated where elites are present.