Abstract
The historical process of government centralization in Prussia and later in Germany is confronted with the hypotheses of Popitz law and Bryce’s law which both suggest a tendency of central governments to grow faster than lower level governments. While these ‘laws’ exhibit some predictive power, turning points in the pattern of development are better explained by public choice theories, in particular Olson’s theory of The Rise and Decline of Nations. It seems that the process of centralization proceeds faster in an environment of oligopolistic international conflicts than in a system of multilateral international contracts.
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