Abstract
AbstractEffective environmental policy should consider how the financiers of polluting firms behave. We study phase III of the EU Emission Trading System. Loan spreads for cap‐and‐trade participants are a function of compliance costs, permit market features, and firms’ strategic actions. In contrast with the program intentions, we find that loan spreads fall by approximately 25%. We show that this decrease is almost entirely driven by low permit prices, the firms’ proactiveness to store permits, and imperfect foresight of market conditions in phase III. The drop in spreads cannot be explained by the decline in energy prices and/or other confounding factors.
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
