Politicians and Bureaucrats in Executive Government

Abstract

AbstractPolitical executives depend on bureaucrats in the formulation and implementation of public policy. This raises fundamental questions about the balancing of bureaucratic autonomy and political control. The chapter primarily focuses on the relationship between political executives and public officials tasked with policy development (‘policy bureaucrats’). It provides an overview of the main scholarly debates: the recruitment and replacement of public officials; sources of bureaucratic power; and interactions between policy bureaucrats and political executives. We also provide an overview of the main theories on politico-administrative relations, including political economy and Public Service Bargain (PSB) perspectives. The chapter then highlights key developments in current research, including comparative analyses, the study of ministerial advisers, and the politicization of regulatory agencies. We conclude with a research agenda on the impact of increasingly complex problems and political polarization on role understandings and patterns of decision-making, as well as on the motivations and effects of politicization.