Political Stability in Divided Societies: A Rational-Institutional Explanation

Abstract

Analyses of consociationalism and corporatism are based, more often than not, on descriptive case studies. These concepts are considered to explain the stability of the political systems, where one would expect that conflict and stalemate in democratic decision-making were the rule rather than the exception. In this article an attempt is made to develop a more general argument, based on the idea of a structure-induced equilibrium, to analyse institutional adaptation and change in plural societies. Central to this approach, which I label 'rational institutionalism', are the concepts of 'room to manoeuvre' for political and societal actors, on the one hand, and the 'feasibility of political choice' allowing for more space to develop positive sum results for all involved, on the other hand. This argument is first elaborated a priori and then applied to Dutch consociationalism and corporatism. These empirical illustrations demonstrate that a logic of interaction has been developed in the Netherlands, which is not a feature of the Dutch case alone, but can be understood as a form of institutional adaptation and change. This institutional approach can be considered as an analytical instrument to explain political stability under differing circumstances cross-nationally and across time in democracies.