Political Parties And The Direction of Political Development in The Republic of Tatarstan

Political parties reflect a democratic state, which is believed to be a condition for modern state life. As institutions for channeling interests, political parties are used as communication with a two-way function, namely, top-down and bottom-up. If this can be carried out well, then political parties' function as political socialization, political participation, political communication, articulation of interests, aggregation of interests, and policymaking can run well to realize the expected political development. The research method used in this research is qualitative research methods. Through qualitative research, the author has created a complex picture, examined words, reviewed detailed reports from the point of view of resource persons, and conducted studies on natural situations. This study aims to determine political parties' development in the Russian Republic of Tatarstan, political parties' function, and political development amid a society in this modern era. The problem in this research is that political parties in Russia tend to have their own interests, either from the central government or the state or Federation governments. In addition, there tends to be a mismatch between the central and state governments in decision making. In fact, in the context political parties can be a tool for realizing development in a country. Even though there are problems, the results showed that political parties in the Republic of Tatarstan rated quite well in carrying out their functions by the functions of political parties according to the Law of the Russian Federation and the Law of the Republic of Tatarstan concerning Political Parties. The development of political parties in the Tatarstan Republic has played a role in controlling conflicts of interest among the Republic of Tatarstan.

Russian parties and the political internet

On September 3, 2022, the price of subsidized fuel (pertalite and diesel) increased. This was determined through a Presidential Regulation on the grounds of the fluctuations in world crude oil prices, plus data showing that the distribution of subsidized fuel which was previously enjoyed by 70 percent was enjoyed by the wealthy, so it was deemed not right on target. This triggered various reactions from the people who were directly affected by the increase in fuel prices. The increase of fuel prices has the potential to increase the unemployment rate which will certainly increase the level of poverty in Indonesia. Because of that, a big question is the extent to which the existence of political parties as a medium for representing the people's voice to express the people's counter attitude to the increase in fuel prices.
 The method used in this study is a qualitative research method. This research will produce descriptive data in the form of writing. Qualitative descriptive research is research that tries to describe a phenomenon that occurs in the field. Furthermore, the research technique used in this paper is literature study, namely by researching and understanding books, documents or other written sources that are relevant to the study being raised.
 The results of this study indicate that the function of political parties as a function of political communication has not run optimally. This is evidenced by the majority of the existing political parties not fully voicing the public's contra stance on the increase of fuel prices. Indeed, with this political communication function, all political parties are willing and able to voice the attitudes of the public. This is a manifestation of the people's representation projected by the existence of political parties that are pro to the people.
 Keywords: Political Parties, Functions of Political Parties, Political Communication.

Preface. PartI.Introduction. 1. The European Context. The Purpose and Organization of this Book. The Emergence of Today's Europe. European Integration. Describing Europe: Large and Small Countries. Describing Europe: Rich and Poor Countries. Social Development and Welfare in Europe. Development, Modernization, and Democracy. Ethnic and Religious Conflict in Europe. Further Democratization? 2. Democratic Political Culture and Political Action. The Cultural Foundations of Democracy. The Levels of a Political Culture. Participation and Democracy. The Public and Democracy. 3. European Interest Groups and Parties. The Types of Interest Groups. Interest Group Systems. Interest Groups and Policy Making. Parties and Party Competition. 4. Democratic Government and Public Policy in Europe. Constitutional Organization: Rules for Making Rules. Limiting and Dispersing Policymaking Power. Constitutional Organization: Electoral Rules. Government Formation and Policymaking. Democratic Policies and Welfare in Europe. The Rule of Law, Corruption, and Democracy. Introducing and Sustaining Democracy. Part II. The Established Democracies. 5. Politics in England. Current Policy Challenges. The Constraints of History. The Environment of Politics. The Structure of Government. Political Culture and Legitimacy. Political Socialization. Political Participation and Recruitment. Organizing Group Interests. Party System and Electoral Choice. Central Authority and Decentralized Delivery of Government Policies. Policy Outcomes and Changes in Society. 6. Politics in France. Current Policy Challenges. A Historical Perspective. Economy and Society. Constitution and Governmental Structure. Political Culture. Political Socialization. Recruitment and Style of Ethics. Interest Groups. Political Parties. Political Parties and Patterns of Voting. Policy Processes. The State and Territorial Relations. Performance and Prospects. 7. Politics in Germany. Current Policy Challenges. The Historical Legacy. Following Two Paths. Social Forces. The Institutions and Structure of Government. Remaking Political Cultures. Political Learning and Political Communication. Citizen Participation. Politics at the Elite Level. Interest Groups. The Party System. The Electoral System. The Policy Process. Policy Performance. Addressing the Policy Challenges. After the Revolution. 8. Politics in Spain. Policy Challenges. The Historical Legacy. Democracy and Spain's Historical Cleavages. Resolving the Center-Periphery Cleavage. Structure and Process of the Political System. Spanish Political Culture. Political Socialization. Interest Groups. Electoral Competition in Spain. Policy Performance and Outcomes. The Peaceful Disappearance of the Two Spains. Part III. Democratic Transitions. 9. Politics in Russia. Rebuilding Russia. Current Policy Challenges. Historical Legacies. The Contemporary Constitutional Order. Russian Political Culture in the Post-Soviet Period. Political Participation. Interest Articulation: From Statism to Pluralism. Parties and the Aggregation of Interests. The Politics of Economic Reform. Rule Adjudication:Toward the Rule of Law. Russia and the International Community. 10. Politics in Poland. Current Policy Challenges. The Making of Modern Poland. Structure of the Political System. Political Culture. Political Socialization. Political Participation. Leadership Recruitment. Interest Groups. The Party System. The Policymaking Process. Policy Outcomes. Conclusion. 11. Politics in Hungary. Current Policy Challenges. Contested Readings of the Hungarian Historical Story. Social Forces in Transition. The New Democratic Structures. A Democratic Political Culture in the Making? Political Socialization. Elite Level Politics. Interest Groups in Transition. New Politics Groups. Democratic Elections and the Emerging Party System. Policy Process and Performance. Paying the Price of Negotiated Revolution? Part IV. The International Dimension. 12. Politics in the European Union. Why Europe? Historical Origins. The Institutions. Governments as Actors. Political Parties. Interest Groups. Public Opinion--Does It Matter? The Policymaking Process. External Relations. Entanglement of the National and the European. Policy Performance. Policy Challenges. Appendix: A Guide to Comparing Nations. Index.

This scientific work was written because the theme of political parties is interesting to me. The reason for my interest in political parties is the relevance of this legal institution. As stated at the outset, it is the political parties that determine the political life of the state, and hence the economic and social life of the country. The purpose of my research is to study the degree of influence of political parties on the economy and social life, in the study of the essence of the influence of political parties on the life of the state. The scientific work examines the history of the emergence and development of political parties in Russia. In scientific work political parties of the Russian Federation, political parties of Latvia are considered, compared and correlated. Political systems of two different countries are compared and correlated. The purpose of this analysis is to identify the General rules and principles of development and existence of political parties.

Click to increase image sizeClick to decrease image size Notes A. Bozóki and J.T. Ishiyama (eds.), The Communist Successor Parties of Central and Eastern Europe (Armonk, NY: Sharpe, 2002), pp.422–4. H. Kitschelt, Z. Mansfeldova, R. Markowski and G. Tóka, Post-Communist Party Systems: Competition, Representation, and Inter-Party Cooperation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), pp.383–9. R. Markowski, ‘The Polish SLD in the 1990s: From Opposition to Incumbents and Back’, in Bozóki and Ishiyama, p.81. S. Birch, F. Millard, M. Popescu and K. Williams, Embodying Democracy: Electoral System Design in Post-Communist Europe (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2002), p.178. R. Taagepera, ‘How Electoral Systems Matter for Democratization’, Democratization, Vol.5, No.3 (1998), p.86. Angelo Panebianco, Political Parties: Organization and Power (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988). P.G. Lewis, ‘Political Institutionalisation and Party Development in Post-communist Poland’, Europe–Asia Studies, Vol.46, No.5 (1994), pp.779–99. Z. Enyedi, ‘Organizing a Subcultural Party in Eastern Europe: The Case of the Hungarian Christian Democrats’, Party Politics, Vol.2, No.3 (1996), pp.377–96. I. van Biezen, Political Parties in New Democracies: Party Organization in Southern and Eastern and Central Europe (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2003), pp.214–17. I. van Biezen, ‘On the Internal Balance of Party Power: Party Organizations in New Democracies’, Party Politics, Vol.6, No.4 (2000), p.410. P.G. Lewis, ‘Recent Evolutions of European Parties East and West: Towards Cartelization?’, Central European Political Science Review, Vol.3, No.8 (2002), pp.16–17. R.F. Leslie (ed.), The History of Poland Since 1863 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980), p.166. Lewis, ‘Political Institutionalization and Party Development’, pp.785, 791–2. R.A. Dahl, Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1971); see also R. Grew, ‘Crises and Their Sequences’, in R. Grew (ed.), Crises of Political Development in Europe and the United States (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1978), pp.3–39. J. Simon, ‘Electoral Systems and Regime Change in Central and Eastern Europe, 1990–1994’, Representation, Vol.35, Nos 2/3 (1998), pp.122–36. D. Perkins, ‘Structure and Choice: The Role of Organizations, Patronage and the Media in Party Formation’, Party Politics, Vol.2, No.3 (1996), pp.355–75. S.M. Lipset and S. Rokkan (eds.), Party Systems and Voter Alignments: Cross-National Perspectives (New York: Free Press, 1967). Markowski, p. 52.

THE STORY OF AMERICAN STATE BUILDING is one in which crisis, once episodic, has become a routine feature of American politics. At the heart of this development is the modern executive: emergency powers are presidential powers. The principal objective of this article is to highlight institutional developments since the late 1960s that framed the Donald Trump administration's actions during the COVID-19 pandemic and currently roil the American state: the expansion of administrative power in the White House, which is largely unconstrained by the institutional imperatives of the bureaucracy, Congress, or state governments, and the emergence of the modern executive as the repository of party responsibility, with both Democrats and Republicans dependent on presidents for messaging, fundraising, mobilization, and programmatic action. Together, these developments form a dynamic of executive-centered partisanship—a merging of partisanship and executive prerogative characterized by presidential unilateralism, social activism, and polarizing struggles about national identity that divide the nation by race, ethnicity, and religion. Our account of executive-centered partisanship and how it affected the Trump administration's response to COVID-19 sheds new light on contemporary crisis management and the political nature of administrative power. Other presidents would have responded differently, perhaps with greater success in stemming the spread of the virus; other presidents might have attempted to centralize administrative power more aggressively in fighting the pandemic, rather than deflecting responsibility to states and private entities. Nevertheless, Trump's actions were not irresolute. They were defined by a purposeful pursuit of partisan objectives: a denigration of bureaucratic expertise and an attack on the “deep state”; the politicization and racialization of federal administrative procedures to crack down on legal and undocumented immigration; a campaign of “law and order” to quell civil rights demonstrations; and a punitive form of federalism, defined by partisan retaliation against “blue states.” Contrary to dominant analyses that paint an administration in disarray, we argue that the Trump administration responded to the crisis through a tactical redeployment of national administrative power to fulfill partisan goals, within a party system beholden to executive power.11 Nicholas F. Jacobs, Desmond King, and Sidney M. Milkis, “Building a Conservative State: Partisan Polarization and the Redeployment of Administrative Power,” Perspectives on Politics, 17 (June 2019): 453–469. As such, we conclude that given the current political and institutional context, American presidents are less likely to offer unifying leadership during national crises, or to suffer the political consequences for failing to do so. Instead of subjecting his party to the “blue wave” many Democrats hoped for, Trump's polarizing leadership agitated a highly mobilized and fiercely contested election that sharpened, rather than ameliorated, partisan conflict. Republicans did better than pre-election prognostications implied down ballot, where they gained 11 seats in the House and maintained control of most state legislatures. Moreover, Trump's term in office enabled Republicans to solidify a conservative majority in the courts. As a result, his successor, Joe Biden, came into office having to navigate public health and economic crisis with a bare majority in the Senate, statehouses and governors more deeply divided than Congress, and a judiciary in which 28 percent of all sitting judges were appointed by Trump, including three new justices on the U.S. Supreme Court. Most tellingly, despite his personal defeat, Trump reigned over his party and reveled in the adulation of its base supporters. In short, the American state offers modern presidents not only the opportunity to strengthen their commitment to partisan tactics under the cover of national emergencies, but also the power to do so without the traditional constraints of party, Congress, and the states. That this strategy mobilized the Republican base and did not arouse a national repudiation of the president's leadership is evidence of the power bestowed on the modern presidency to advance partisan objectives in a deeply divided nation. The article proceeds as follows: First, we argue that while the government's response to COVID-19 is an exceptional case, scholars often learn much about the operating dynamics of the American state by exploring how crises shape and transform certain governing commitments. Students of American politics have long argued that national crises have been central to major political developments. Therefore, the absence of transformative change in the wake of the COVID-19 crisis—the stubborn persistence of the polarizing struggles over American identity that have intensified since the late 1960s—poses hard challenges to this prevailing perspective. Second, we argue that executive-centered partisanship explains the discrepancy between received wisdom and the contemporary battle for the services of the administrative state. We identify three ways in which the Trump administration's actions revealed and reinforced the dysfunctionalism of executive-centered partisanship during COVID-19: the delegitimization of bureaucratic expertise in partisan politics; the decay of constitutional forms that sustain the division and separation of powers; and the politicization of administrative procedures and policy implementation, now central to the partisan struggle to contend with a diversifying and politically fragmented America. Each of these factors, we argue, is symptomatic of the political pathologies that fester under executive-centered partisanship. We conclude with an analysis of Trump's legacy and its effect on the first few months of Biden's presidency. We do not mean to suggest that Biden's leadership is equivalent to Trump's, or that the Democratic and Republican Parties share equal blame for routinizing presidential partisanship. Not only does the base of the Republican Party not apologize for violent insurrection and embrace conspiratorial tales about election fraud, Republican Party leaders in Congress and the states openly question foundational rules and precedent for short-term advantage. Nevertheless, from the early days of his presidency, Biden has struggled to escape from the cultural and institutional forces embedding executive-centered partisanship in American democracy. Despite claims to the contrary, Biden's early performance in office, especially with respect to the COVID-19 crisis, has reinforced the essential features of presidential partisanship.22 Nicholas F. Jacobs and Sidney M. Milkis, “Get Out of the Way: Joe Biden, the U.S. Congress, and Executive-Centered Partisanship during the President's First Year in Office,” The Forum 19, no. 4 (2021): 709–744. Trump's presidency, therefore, has further fused partisanship and executive administration, fanning, rather than dousing, the flames of social discord, all while testing the “resilience” of American democracy.33 Steven Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt, How Democracies Die (New York: Broadway Books, 2019). Emergencies have routinely engaged the potential power of the American state and served as a rallying cry to unify the nation. Yet the public health and economic crises wrought by COVID-19 revealed how the worst emergency since the Great Depression failed to free American politics and government from the conditions that deeply divided the nation. Therefore, there is a need to distinguish COVID-19 from previous crises in American political development, and to reconsider the ways in which earlier emergency responses have affected the development of the American state. To do so, we place the emergence of COVID-19 as a national crisis within a richer historical context, one that accounts for the secular development of a politicized administrative state and the deterioration of partisan organizations. Likewise, although the COVID-19 pandemic has been unique in many ways, it is a telling case for understanding the underlying factors that influence the partisan imperatives to use public crises and the authority they confer for partisan advantage. Indeed, unlike other crises fabricated for partisan objectives—for example, the “war on drugs” that Richard Nixon declared in 1971—COVID-19 posed and proved a dire threat to public health. Paradoxically, the Trump administration sought to exploit the public health emergency, even as it denied its severity. As a result, COVID-19 deepened a political crisis that for decades had politicized the administrative state, subjecting it to a contest between liberals and conservatives for its services. Our analysis takes a broader understanding of the American state. The idea of a “state” cannot be encompassed by Max Weber's definition of “a human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory.”44 Max Weber, “Politics as Vocation,” in H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills, eds. and trans., From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology (New York: Oxford University Press, 1946), 77–128 (originally published 1919). Especially in the United States, with its fragmentation of power, the state should be understood as “negotiated arrangements between the central government and powerful subnational units, patterns of competition and contestation among political parties, and relations among ‘public’ and ‘private’ providers of social welfare.”55 Desmond King and Robert C. Lieberman, “Review: Ironies of State Building: A Comparative Perspective on the American State,” World Politics 61 (July 2009): 547–588, at 549. The American state is not easily characterized as weak or strong—its power derives from a centralizing ambition amid a complex system of institutions that seeks to cultivate or impose a specific type of American community. This American state is a legacy of unintended consequences, historical contingency, and the unique position of the presidency in the constitutional order. In particular, the rise of the modern state, especially in a political culture that presumes to proscribe centralized power, is inextricably connected to American wars and domestic emergencies, which are frequently characterized as the moral equivalent of wars. Unlike some other republican charters, the U.S. Constitution does not have formal provisions that establish prerogative executive power in times of emergency.66 For example, Article 16 of the French Constitution explicitly allows the president to take exceptional measures “where the institutions of the Republic, the independence of the Nation, the integrity of its territory or the fulfillment of its international commitments are under serious and immediate threat” (see https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/France_2008). This provision was an important template of the Fifth Republic, formed in 1958, which transformed a parliamentary into a presidential system. However, crises have created opportunities for presidents to cut through the normal working arrangements of American politics. The central role of the presidency as a vanguard of institutional change has long been understood by scholars; furthermore, territorial expansion, globalization, and the nationalization of American political culture have encouraged the consolidation of an executive-centered state. The imperative to act—especially when confronted with the existential possibility of the state's destruction—leads to creative extensions of existing administrative power and social policy.77 Suzanne Mettler, Soldiers to Citizen: The G.I. Bill and the Making of the Greatest Generation (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005); William J. Barber, Designs within Disorder: Franklin D. Roosevelt, the Economists, and the Shaping of American Economic Policy, 1933–1945 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996); Karen Orren and Stephen Skowronek, “Regimes and Regime Building in American Government: A Review of Literature on the 1940s,” Political Science Quarterly 113 (Winter, 1998): 689–702; and Sheldon D. Pollack, War, Revenue, and State Building; Financing the Development of the American State (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2009). Emergencies are not only instrumental in episodic bouts of executive aggrandizement; crises and presidential emergency powers have also entrenched the American state's more permanent features.88 Robert P. Saldin, War, the American State, and Politics since 1898 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010). Especially during major episodes of bellicosity, the terms of political conflict are redefined, and wartime presidents are central actors in defining these terms. Indeed, David Mayhew has written that wars “seem to be capable of generating whole new political universes.”99 David R. Mayhew, “Wars and American Politics,” Perspectives on Politics 3 (September 2005): 473–493, at 473. All-consuming emergencies open up space for presidents to act unilaterally, permitting political outcomes in both foreign and domestic policy that are largely inconceivable absent the nationalizing and centralizing tendencies of national crises.1010 William G. Howell, Saul P. Jackman, and Jon C. Rogowski, The Wartime President: Executive Influence and the Nationalizing Politics of Threat (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2013). As John Lapinski demonstrates, “crises often delegitimize existing government policies that are directly and, in some cases, indirectly linked to the event.”1111 John S. Lapinski, “Policy Substance and Performance in American Lawmaking, 1877–1994,” American Journal of Political Science 52 (April 2008): 235–251, at 238. Although Congress and the courts do not vanish during protracted states of crisis or war, “modern presidents are undoubtedly the preeminent actors.”1212 Douglas L. Kriner, After the Rubicon: Congress, Presidents, and the Politics of Waging War (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2010). “Reconstructive presidents,” Stephen Skowronek argues, can bring about new political orders, but they typically do so only when the prevailing regime is in disarray—after the extant regime's internal weaknesses are exposed, often because it cannot contend with governing exigencies.1313 Stephen Skowronek, The Politics Presidents Make: Leadership from John Adams to Bill Clinton, revised ed. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1997). Therefore, for liberals and conservatives alike, the grandeur of an energetic executive has been forged during the country's most perilous, unpredictable moments in history. More often than not, war and crisis are understood to be central to the development of foreign policy institutions within the presidency, such as the National Security Council.1414 Bryan Mabee, “Historical Institutionalism and Foreign Policy Analysis: The Origins of the National Security Council Revisited,” Foreign Policy Analysis 7 (January 2011): 27–44. However, the fact that foreign crises are so central to redefining domestic priorities for presidential administrations suggests that emergency powers cut more deeply into the fabric of the modern political system. Presidential state building is nurtured by large-scale, national crises, but the modern executive, dependent on loyal partisans, is not an institution that works on behalf of the “whole people” or rallies the country to tackle national crises through enduring reforms. Even in the work of administering less politically charged programs, such as disaster funding or decisions to close military bases, the modern presidency is electorally motivated and often acts to serve its core constituency.1515 Douglas L. Kriner and Andrew Reeves, The Particularistic President: Executive Branch Politics and Political Inequality (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015). During emergencies, well-organized and highly motivated factions within a single party can leverage the institution to enact unpopular and divisive schemes.1616 Daniel DiSalvo, Engines of Change: Party Factions in American Politics, 1868–2010 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012). Moreover, the reliance on unilateral administrative measures to advance party objectives—disingenuously justified in the name of the “national interest”—further enfeebles legislative institutions during moments of crisis.1717 Neomi Rao, “Administrative Collusion: How Delegation Diminishes the Collective Congress,” New York University Law Review 90 (November 2015): 1463–1526. With the country sharply divided by deep cultural rifts, such presidential unilateralism arouses fundamental struggles over inclusion. For a time, the executive-centered administrative state was sustained by a fragile consensus that obscured partisan conflict over national administrative power. The extraordinary crises of the Great Depression and World War II led to institutional changes and policies that subordinated partisanship to administration, consolidating a New Deal state committed to a “coalition” between partisans of executive power and the proponents of expertise, or “neutral competence.”1818 Herbert Kaufman identifies the “quest for neutral competence” and the “quest for executive leadership” as core commitments in the development of the administrative state. See Kaufman, “Emerging Conflicts in the Doctrines of Public Administration,” American Political Science Review 50 (December 1956): 1057–1073. Politics was then a search for pragmatic solutions to the challenging responsibilities that America had to assume, at home and abroad, to secure economic and national security. However, public support for the New Deal state fractured in the wake of the cultural and political upheavals of the 1960s.1919 Hugh Heclo, “Sixties Civics,” in Sidney M. Milkis and Jerome Mileur, eds., The Great Society and the High Tide of Liberalism (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 2005), 53–82. The attempt to realize the Great Society exposed the liberal state's central fault lines (notably racial inequalities), and with violent upheaval in Vietnam and in the nation's urban core, the pragmatic center that buttressed the New Deal disintegrated. Once contested by conservative Democrats and Republicans as a threat to constitutional government, national administrative power gained acceptance on the right as liberalism expanded throughout the 1960s. In the wake of the cultural revolution of that decade, Republicans built a conservative base whose foot soldiers, most notably the Christian Right, rallied around the belief that liberalism had so corrupted the country that the national government had a responsibility to aggressively protect “traditional values” and uphold “law and order.”2020 Nicholas F. Jacobs and Sidney M. Milkis, What Happened to the Vital Center? Presidentialism, Populist Revolt and the Fracturing of America (New York: Oxford University Press, 2020), chaps. 4 and 5. As presidents have the of partisan leadership and as partisans their political to the president's personal it has become more to national from the president's In the institutional of the presidency with the of the American emergencies offer even greater opportunity for presidents to they act on behalf of their partisan As a partisanship in the United is a struggle over the of the state. has become an executive-centered struggle for the services of national administrative power. The of executive has been deepened by partisan in which Democrats and Republicans not only on of and policy but also their as existential to the American of J. H. C. David G. J. J. S. and in Science no. of this party conflict it First, since the struggles over and have partisan fundamental about it to be an have been further by the expansion of presidential power, executive to partisan conflict. As party wars have Congress, the legislative have become more dependent on presidents to cut through the and advance through executive action. During the and both Democrats and Republicans dependent on presidents to their and advance partisan through unilateral Sidney M. Milkis, H. and J. Happened to and the New American Party Perspectives on Politics Indeed, Republican presidents have the development of executive-centered partisanship. to the of social in the Richard Nixon was the first conservative president to the of national emergency with a partisan of American With a rallying cry of and Nixon new in the urban core, and abroad, in the of an presidential administration and a conservative modern Richard P. The Administrative (New York: As of the National at the time, conservatives only the work of the New Deal and Great Society the of a powerful president is to to war within his executive in to his Conservative National in in The New Republic, that the politicization of emergency powers did not at the the unilateralism in foreign had been a since the of the threat of an was to its partisan Andrew The New Presidential University of Press, the one foreign the funding of the in is an of that is in the of the American The President: (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, the other the administration's and use of presidential power a deeply partisan commitment to the and to the Republican Party with a of American power A the War on in an by modern embrace of a state. Not only did legal a of legal support for the constitutional independence under the of the in by Donald Trump's Supreme M. of during the and Law Review the White House also to centralize the Republican to transform the and into on the president's leadership in the War against Sidney M. Milkis and H. the Republican and the American Party Perspectives on Politics (September Democratic presidents have also the that crises in to their partisan dynamics are not dependent on the of the White they are to executive-centered partisanship. was on the of the economic that the country had in a presidency, it would be by the of the country of an economic despite and from partisans, the administration its partisan to health the most divisive and partisan policy with perhaps the of The consequences are Democrats in Congress from an with the legislative of his the and of crisis the president's governing strategy long the worst of the Great had As the president in the to the and Sidney Milkis, Partisan Polarization and the Administrative The Forum no. built the centralizing of his conservative and liberal to advance through executive the of a powerful but of the the and especially The 17 at 16 The of and of the to control the federal bureaucracy, and the of Richard its into the administrative presidential powers over and to management strategy directly to his for example, J. and L. and the Administration,” The Journal of 2011): and R. The of in Press, In political crises often leadership and we the for to around the political upheavals also in the community and should in the current of American presidents are to power for partisan are that presidents the were Donald Trump's of the worst national crisis since the Great Depression should have to the of “a late regime Herbert or in a political repudiation of a conservative political and the rise of a new Richard about Trump's and Biden's The Nation, at 16 The Trump presidency at of the At the Trump's about the spread of the his that the president has to battle the pandemic, Trump responsibility to state and governments, and, when for racial and in the of of for the and sought to the of public and for as the president's public amid the of the and did his months a of these only how the Trump administration failed to the threat that COVID-19 posed to public health and the D. and David Trump's The to Leadership on the New York at 16 and C. and Trump from the Trump the of partisan than attempt to the modern executive as the of the public as many and public had been to during a national crisis of the Trump further fused executive prerogative and partisanship. This was not a of Trump's many was to executive

Geographies of local government

Political parties initially formed on the basis of a desire to unite the various groups of people who have the same vision and mission, so that the mind and their orientation can be consolidated. Departing from that, it can be described that political parties are organized groups, where members have an orientation, values , and ideals of the same, which aims to realize these goals by acquiring political power and seize the political. In order to achieve the objectives of political parties should be able to carry out their functions properly. The functions of political parties are as follows: (1) Means of Political Communication, (2) Means of Political Socialization, (3) Means of Political Recruitment, and (4) Means Regulatory Conflicts. Post-reform in Indonesia, political parties are not able to function properly as a pillar of democracy. Several factors could be the cause of the failure of political parties in Indonesia to perform its functions, namely (1) the party system in Indonesia, (2) cultural elitism, and (3) political pragmatism itself. To improve the conditions said, one of the political parties as democratic institutions that play an important role in the democratic process should be able to provide political education for the people of Indonesia, and to be able to put its position actively and creatively in order to carry out the duties and functions both in the preparation for the general election and in the aftermath of the elections.

Introduction This chapter concerns the formation and development of political parties in Russia over the course of four distinct periods, dubbed here: (1) late-Soviet (1988–91), and characterized by the struggle of Russian political society against the Communist party-state, a struggle in which political parties first appeared; (2) postcommunist (1991–93), a period marked by the ascendance of the executive, its duel with the legislature for authority, and the consequent reconfiguration – and degeneration – of the party system; (3) Fifth Duma (1993–95), defined by the constitutional order imposed by the president following the elimination of his antagonists in the Supreme Soviet, one in which new legislative elections stimulated party development even while the negligible authority exercised by the legislature inhibited the influence of parties and thus restricted their development; and (4) elections to the Sixth Duma (1995–), which includes a survey of the election campaign and the balloting of December 17. The central problem that we address involves the relative weakness and incoherence of Russian parties and, attendantly, the rather marginal role that they have played (in most respects) in the country's government and political life. We use two related sets of categories to frame this problem, examining the way in which it has appeared concretely in the respective periods and outlining changes in its manifestation over time. The first set of categories – “identity” and “interest” – refers to that which political parties express.

O F ALL POSSIBLE POLITICAL ACTIONS the voting decision has received the most attention from behavioral political scientists. Probably we have compiled and analyzed more data on candidate choice and turnout than on any other form of political behavior. Of course, this heavy emphasis comes as no surprise. The voting act is the fundamental political act in a democracy. It is the most widespread political act. Furthermore, on the surface, at least, the voting act would appear to be one of the simplest (and therefore, most understandable) political acts. A heavy scholarly focus on the voting act follows naturally from these considerations. While our data base expands, however, our theoretical superstructure remains far from finished. It is fair to say that political science has relied chiefly on models rooted in the sociological, and later the social-psychological tradition.' These models hold that

REVIEWS 789 active hand' (p. 233) in forminga winning coalition unlikehis predecessor. In that he was helped by the fact that voters remain almost totallyignorantof theirrepresentatives'behaviourin parliament.Putin used the Communiststo deny Primakov the chairmanship, but then brokered an anti-Communist allianceon policy issues. For Stephen Hanson the elections were a 'severe setback'to the notion of 'genuinelyrepresentativeparties'(p. I63) and the post-electiondisarrayin the parliament as deputies changed partywas 'almostfarcical'(p. I64). But he is ambiguous about whether the alternativeto farce might not be tragedy. The 'absence of powerfulpartyideologies ... .] could prove increasinglyproblematic for democratic consolidation', but 'has arguablyplayed a positive role in preserving Russia's formal constitutional order' (p. I85). The problem with politicalideologies is that they are not necessarilyliberalor democratic. PoliticsDepartment WILLIAM L. MILLER University ofGlasgow Hutcheson, Derek. PoliticalPartiesin theRussianRegions. BASEES/Routledge Series on Russian and East European Studies, 2. RoutledgeCurzon, London and New York, 2003. xii + I96 pp. Maps. Tables. Notes. Bibliography.Index. 65s.oo. How can scholars handle the wealth of data about parties, elections and voters that has accumulatedfrom severalRussian elections since the collapse of the Soviet Union? In Political Parties intheRussian Regions, Derek Hutcheson demonstrates a useful and meaningful approach to this research. The book, which presents a wealth of empirical data on political party organizations, also addressesthe larger questions posed by the post-Soviet political experience . How have politicalpartiesfaredin a post-Soviet environmentand what has this meant for attemptsto graftdemocracy onto the post-Soviet political culture? Hutcheson explores this through a careful and detailed analysis of political parties, particularlyat the regional level in Russia (with case studies of Tatarstan, Ulyanovsk and Samara). In doing so, he presents detailed informationto testparticulartheoriesof partydevelopment. While the overview of national political party development in the book is useful and well informed, Hutcheson's particular contribution to the field comes in his detailsabout Russianpartymembership,elitesand organizations in the regions. Studies of Russian regional politics are relatively rare, particularlyas much of the work on political party development has focused on nationaltrends.Yet,theregionsprovidecriticalinformationin understanding how party networks develop or fail to thrive from the grassroots. When Hutcheson chartsthe comparativeorganizationaland power structure of keypoliticalpartiesin I999 (includingthe Communist Partyof the Russian Federation and the government-backed Unity party), the different ways in whichpartyorganizationshave developedbecome much clearer.Forexample, Hutcheson's researchmakesa clear case for the way in which the xenophobic LiberalDemocrats areessentiallya 'propagandamachine, organizedfromthe centre outwards, rather than a political party in the normal sense' (p. 75). 790 SEER, 83, 4, 2005 While political scientistshave assertedthisabout the LiberalDemocrats based on party leader Vladimir Zhirinovskii'spersonal style, Hutcheson provides evidence of thisthroughresearchand analysisof the partiesas organizations. This researchpattern is repeated through the book, as Hutcheson presents material from fieldwork at the national and regional level about party organization, membership, campaign techniques and other activities. Some of this is as elucidating as it is amusing. For example, Hutcheson cites instructionsfor pickets for support of the Liberal Democrats, quoting party material that asks participants to be 'sober, well-dressed and cheerful' and pointing out thatleafletscan be given to anyone (except 'drunksand tramps') and that the larger booklets should be reserved for 'intelligent-looking members of the crowd' (p. 120). More worryingly, the Liberal Democrat material also encourages groups of party members to carry out rumour campaigns through casual conversations in places such as railway stations, shops and public baths (p. 120). The book has much of this fascinatingdetail, synthesizingit in an analysisthatboth comparesthe Russianpartieswith each other and placing them within the larger comparative context through discussionsof the work of Michels, Duverger, Panebianco and others. While the emphasis is more on an in-depth study of Russian parties, the discussion of politicalpartydevelopment theoryand the Russiancase is quite useful. Hutcheson's evidence and approach are particularlyvaluable in that this type of studyrepresentsa new trend in analysingthe formerSoviet Union. In the firstyears of the post-Soviet period, political scientiststended to measure Russia and other countries againsta scale of democratizationimported from the West. It was assumed that parties and elections would lead to more democratizationand a widening of politicalpower (aslong asthe Communists were not re-elected into power). However, Russia and most other post-Soviet countries have not followed a path toward democratization;rather,evidence in Russia toward...

Problem setting. Evolution of media led to the fact that in addition to their main functions, they began to perform certain functions of political parties, namely political socialization and mobilization. Therefore, one of the central places in the election campaigns ofpolitical parties is occupied by the media, and their participation acts as an independent institution of democracy. The Austrian media system represents special model of functioning of media which has an impact, both on political outlook of the Austrians, and on transformation of the electoral strategies ofpolitical parties of Austria. Recent research and publications analysis. The topic of the influence of the media on political orientations of electorate, political communication and strategies became a studying subject for scientists. (D. Dubov, D. Farrell, N. Garmash, O. Gruber, K. Kholodkovsky, Z. Komilova, M. Lettner, S. Lisova, A. Nazarbetova, P. Norris, F. Plasser, G. Plasser, P. Ulram and other). Paper objective. The article analyzes the stages of the evolution of election campaigns and the development of a political communication system in the Republic of Austria. The purpose of the article is to show, with the example of the evolution of the Austrian media system, its influence on the transformation of the political world outlook and electoral strategies of the Austrian political parties. Paper main body. A modern democratic society needs politics and political mass media. On the other hand, politics needs the society itself (voters), which, in turn, is sufficiently achieved only through the media. In the development of the political communication system in Austria allocate three stages (according to F. Plasser and P. Ulram): 1) between 1945 and the middle of the 60th of the 20th century - «domination ofparty with the newspaper»; 2) the middle of the 60th - the beginning of the 90th of the 20th century - «television» phase; 3) since the beginning of the 1990th years till today - «multimedia diversity». Thus, the perception ofpolitics occurs through various media channels, which leads to the fragmentation of political communication. Owing to social changes and technical progress, the struggle to retain their dominant position in the Austrian party system forces political parties to look for new methods to attract the electorate, hence their election campaigns become more professional. Analysis of election campaigns in the period 2006-2017 allows you to highlight the elements of their «Americanization», «personalization», «negativization». In turn, the strategies by which candidates and parties attract votes within the election campaigns are also influenced by factors such as the configuration ofpolitical institutions and the structure of the media system. A specific feature of the Austrian media system, which belongs to the democratic corporatist model (according to the classification of D. Hallin and P. Mancini), is the relatively late realization of the dualization of the television market and strong monopolistic media structures at the national level. There are four types of Austrian voters using political information and media: 1) traditionalist, the information-conscious, politically-involved (largest Austrian People’s Party voter share); 2) established, the information-interested, politically close (largest Social Democratic Party of Austria voter share); 3) modernity, politically distant, not interested information (votes for the Austrian Green Party more often); 4) unprivileged, dissatisfied with the policy, moderately informed (a high proportion of voters of the party «Alliance for the Future of Austria» and the Freedom Party of Austria). Conclusions of the research. Traditional media are an important and primary source for political information and decision making in elections, which leads to a trend of politicization of the media. The research conducted by the author allows to come to a conclusion that changes in political agitation, as a rule, need to be considered as reaction to the previous changes in a media system and electorate, and from features of modern Austrian election campaigns it is possible to allocate orientation to television and media.

Infrastructure plays an important role in economic growth and development. Increasingly, infrastructure projects are being developed with investment from private sector. In recent years, India has implemented a large number of roads under public private partnership (PPP) projects. This study is an empirical analysis of the impact of political environment on various project outcomes. The data set for the study comprised 62 completed national highway PPP projects. Our results showed that project technical characteristics influenced project performance more than political factors. Among the different political factors, the factors pertaining to state government were prominent in influencing performance as compared to those of Central Government. The change in state government during the project development phase resulted in higher time overruns. Interestingly, different political parties in the state and Central Government need not necessarily impact the project negatively. Projects developed in states where the state and Central Government are different had lower unit time and lower time overrun. For private investors, our results imply that in a country with strong political and legal systems, project development performance is more dependent on the project technical characteristics and operating environment variables as compared to political factors.

Role of the party in the political system of Russia becoming important. An important aspect of their operation is to develop and bring to the attention to the electorate of their programs. The author believes that the elections should be competitive programs but no a struggle of parties or political elites. The purpose of this study – to argue the need for changes to the current legislation of Russia on political parties so as to increase the importance of party programs. The scientific, theoretical and practical significance of the work is proposal of remedies to overcome the lack of attention to this important aspect of the political parties. The author uses a comparative, hermeneutic, mathematical techniques, and general methods of scientific research. The author studied the programs of all the registered political parties in Russia. The results of this study are scientific and practical value, as may be applicable in the teaching of constitutional law and political science; in science – the search patterns of development of the political system. The work may be useful for party building, for formation programs of political parties as well as to work on improving the legislation on political parties.