Political leadership and crisis management during an inflation: An analysis of federal legislation

As urbanization and population growth continue to accelerate in China, maintaining public safety and crisis management has become increasingly complex. To address this issue, this research article proposes a new model for optimizing urban public safety governance and crisis management by integrating artificial intelligence (AI) technology with a focus on sustainability. This study aims to explore the construction and path of an urban public safety governance and crisis management optimization model integrating artificial intelligence (AI) technology in China. We developed a linear regression model to examine the relationship between public safety technologies and outcomes, with public safety outcomes (PSO) as the dependent variable and public safety governance structure (PSGS), AI-driven data collection and analysis (AIDC&A), crisis prediction and early warning system (CPEWS), AI-assisted decision-making (AIADM), and public safety response mechanisms (PSRM) as independent variables. The model summary revealed that the independent variables accounted for a moderate proportion of the variance in public safety outcomes, with an R² value of 0.5 and an adjusted R² value of 0.45. The results supported the hypothesis that the integration of different public safety technologies has a positive impact on public safety outcomes. The effective governance structure, AI-driven data collection and analysis, crisis prediction and early warning system, AI-assisted decision-making, and efficient public safety response mechanisms were all found to be crucial for enhancing public safety outcomes. The proposed model was validated through a case study in a Chinese city, with feedback from stakeholders confirming its effectiveness. Overall, the findings suggest that the urban public safety governance and crisis management optimization model integrating AI technology can significantly improve public safety management in urban areas.

With the continuous development of economic globalization, human society has increasingly become an organic whole, and the relationship between the two has become closer. Therefore, the public health crisis has become a global crisis event endangering the international community. It is the bounden duty of all countries in the world to calmly respond to the public health crisis. The COVID-19 provides a valuable window of opportunity to examine the governance system and governance capabilities of China's public health crisis. This major infectious disease has brought great challenges to China. Due to certain deviations in public health crisis management, a series of crises in the field of public health has been exposed to the epidemic prevention work. If we can proceed from China's national conditions, establish efficient monitoring and early warning system, continuously strengthen the emergency management guarantee system and social mobilization mechanism, incorporate public health security into the national security strategy, establish a scientific concept of public health governance, and promote the legalization of public health crisis management, the process of building a grassroots public health crisis governance pattern can turn the crisis into a major opportunity to improve China's public health crisis governance capabilities.

The research of innovation strategy of urban crisis management mechanism is benefit for the government to make timely, accurate and scientific decision-making when occurs public crisis to enhance the effectiveness of crisis management.Specific innovation strategies include: improving evaluation mechanism after occurring public crisis, building multivariate coordination joint mechanism of crisis management, perfecting the principles of government's public crisis management mechanism, strengthening citizen participation mechanism of public crisis management, improving information dissemination mechanism of public crisis management and improving decision-making mechanism of public crisis management and so on.Results of this study enrich and supplement theories and methods of existing urban crisis management in theory and can provide a scientific basis for government's decision-making on crisis management in practice.

Purpose This study aims to explore the dissemination and evolutionary path of online public opinion from a crisis management perspective. By clarifying the influencing factors and dynamic mechanisms of online public opinion dissemination, this study provides insights into attenuating the negative impact of online public opinion and creating a favorable ecological space for online public opinion. Design/methodology/approach This research employs bibliometric analysis and CiteSpace software to analyze 302 Chinese articles published from 2006 to 2023 in the China National Knowledge Infrastructure (CNKI) database and 276 English articles published from 1994 to 2023 in the Web of Science core set database. Through literature keyword clustering, co-citation analysis and burst terms analysis, this paper summarizes the core scientific research institutions, scholars, hot topics and evolutionary paths of online public opinion crisis management research from both Chinese and international academic communities. Findings The results show that the study of online public opinion crisis management in China and internationally is centered on the life cycle theory, which integrates knowledge from information, computer and system sciences. Although there are differences in political interaction and stage evolution, the overall evolutionary path is similar, and it develops dynamically in the “benign conflict” between the expansion of the research perspective and the gradual refinement of research granularity. Originality/value This study summarizes the research results of online public opinion crisis management from China and the international academic community and identifies current research hotspots and theoretical evolution paths. Future research can focus on deepening the basic theories of public opinion crisis management under the influence of frontier technologies, exploring the subjectivity and emotionality of web users using fine algorithms and promoting the international development of network public opinion crisis management theory through transnational comparison and international cooperation.

With the wide spread and application of the Internet, information and communication technology, an increasingly complex information age has arrived . How governments can manage public crisis more scientific and more effective, turn crises into opportunities, pass through a dangerous crisis safely in the information age has become the most pressing matter of every government now . General Electric Company, Chairman and CEO Jack Welch in his book Winning proposed the Five Hypotheses of crisis management. This article is written from the Five Hypotheses of crisis management based on Management Science, Media Science and Public Relations. This article believe that the public crisis management in China still can not meet the requirements of the information age, and there is not a mature, stable and viable public crisis management system. So, this thesis rebuild the measures and the work steps of the government in each stage of crisis management. The conclusions are that government should prepare for the worst at the beginning of public crisis management, be prepared for the emergence of some people and things which may happen in the process, be information disclosure, to frank and open to the public and the media. At last, the most important thing is confidential in overcoming the public crisis.

At present, China is in the key period of social transformation, the public crisis situation is serious. Governments at all levels must take seriously the public crisis management. Government as the main body of traditional public administration, although afford the main management responsibility in the crisis management, in front of the complex public crisis , the government will also appear to some extent ability insufficiency, the reacting condition. But in the face of the public crisis complex, the government will also appear to some extent ability insufficiency, the reacting condition. Therefore, calling for social forces to participate in public crisis management is the inevitable trend. Based on the above background, this paper trying to explore the reality value of NGO participation in public crisis management, in order to realize good governance of public crisis management.

Management of public crisis is an important function of modern government. From the perspective of political science, public crisis management is a government responsibility. The author in the article attempts to explore the inherent causality between public crisis and government responsibility. On the one hand, the characteristics of public crisis determine the need of government responsibility; on the other hand, the essence and function of government determines the management of public crisis is its natural mission. Up to the reality, management of public crisis is an important function of modern government. Management capacity of public crisis is an important indicator to measure government competence, and reflects the comprehensive strength of every state. Therefore, it is significant to strengthen public crisis management for China experiencing rapid development and change.

With domestic and international frequent public crisis occurring, public crisis management has become a hot academic research. The ability of crisis management capabilities of public crisis management sector and scientific evaluation system design is often affected by many complex factors. An appropriate computational model and the analysis system will be able to achieve the goals of ensuring social security. The optimal computing model of a crisis management is an effective way by the introduction of the basic principles of analytic hierarchy process.

Previous articleNext article FreeOn Graduation from Default, Inflation, and Banking Crises: Elusive or Illusion?Rong Qian, Carmen M. Reinhart, and Kenneth RogoffRong QianUniversity of Maryland Search for more articles by this author , Carmen M. ReinhartUniversity of Maryland and NBER Search for more articles by this author , and Kenneth RogoffHarvard University and NBER Search for more articles by this author University of MarylandUniversity of Maryland and NBERHarvard University and NBERPDFPDF PLUSFull Text Add to favoritesDownload CitationTrack CitationsPermissionsReprints Share onFacebookTwitterLinked InRedditEmailQR Code SectionsMoreI. IntroductionThis paper addresses the concept of "graduation" from external default, banking, and inflation crises.1 Employing a vast data set cataloging more than 2 centuries of financial crises for over 60 countries developed in Reinhart and Rogoff (2009), we explore the risk of recidivism across advanced economies versus middle- and low-income countries. We show that 2 decades without a relapse (falling into crisis) is an important marker. After 1800, roughly two-thirds of recurrences of external default on sovereign debt and three-quarters of recurrence of inflation crisis occur within 20 years.2 However, crisis recidivism distributions have very fat tails, so that it takes at least 50 and perhaps 100 years to meaningfully speak of "graduation." Indeed, in the case of banking crises in particular, it is hard to argue that any country in the world has truly graduated.Given that graduation (with its companion question, will this ever happen again?) is arguably one of the most important issues in macroeconomics and development, there has been remarkably little theoretical or empirical investigation of the subject. For example, the large theory literature on sovereign lending and default, while producing many important insights into the fundamental distinction between willingness to pay and ability to pay, largely treats a country's basic developmental and political characteristics as parametric. There is very little on explaining the political, social, economic, and financial dynamics that ultimately lead a country to be less prone to certain types of crises.We acknowledge that the concept of graduation is a hard nut to crack. Many advanced countries had enjoyed a long hiatus from systemic banking crises after World War II and yet had huge problems during the recent global financial crisis. After 90 years of serial default running from 1557 to 1647, Spain did not default again until 1809. Even the advanced countries had high inflation as recently as the 1970s and early 1980s, while many emerging markets had hyperinflation less than 2 decades ago. Is the advent of modern independent central banks sufficient to guarantee that fiscal dominance never again reasserts itself? Have the rich countries that have supposedly "graduated" from serial default on external debt shifted the locus of risk to de jure or de facto (via inflation or financial repression) default on domestic debt? Does the theory of sovereign default or of financial development tell us that we should expect richer and more advanced countries to be immune? Or is graduation a mirage, with the "graduates" really being at best "star pupils," and can graduates be distinguished from patients in remission?Our goals in this paper are fairly narrowly circumscribed. Most of our analysis is based on data on the dates and duration of the crises themselves. We speculate on underlying causal factors but do not approach them empirically here.3 Although the various types of crises often occur in clusters, our quantitative analysis mainly treats individual crises separately.We begin the paper in Section II by defining the crises that we will catalog. In Section III of the paper, we present a summary time line of crisis, followed by a brief overview of the early history of serial default on external debt. An interesting case is France, which defaulted on its external debt no fewer than nine times from the middle of the sixteenth century through the end of the Napoleonic War but has not defaulted on external debt since. France is a canonical case of what we define as an "external default graduate." (This did not stop France from having numerous severe banking crises in the past 2 centuries.)In the main body of the paper, we provide a broad aggregative historical overview of the data across different types of crises, distinguishing between advanced countries and emerging markets, also taking into account the advent of International Monetary Fund (IMF) programs after World War II as another marker of a debt crisis.In Section IX of the paper, we speculate on links between graduation and development and the possibility for recidivism among richer countries. The fact that the canonical theory of sovereign default does not strongly predict smaller problems in richer countries (it does not strongly predict graduation) might be considered a flaw in theory. But it might also be taken as warning sign that graduation can be more difficult and take even more time than our data of "just" a few centuries can reveal. On banking crises, the theory needs to better explain why countries never seem to graduate.The main empirical results from our long-dated historical time series on financial crises may be described as follows. First, the process of "graduation," that is, emergence from frequent crisis suffering status, is a long process. False starts are common and recurrent. This is especially true in the case of banking crises, for both high-income countries and middle- and low-income countries.Second, the vulnerability to crisis in high-income countries versus middle- and low-income countries differs mostly in external default crises, to a lesser extent in inflation crises, and surprisingly little in banking crises.4Third, the sequence of graduation for most countries is first to graduate from external default crisis, then from inflation crisis, and eventually from banking. The last stage of graduation is extremely difficult, even for high-income countries. Among high-income countries, even though most of them have graduated from external default crisis and inflation crisis, more than 20% recently experienced a banking crisis, and far more when weighted by size. Schularick and Taylor (2009) speculate that advanced countries continue to experience credit busts despite arguably advancing regulation and institutions, because as risks moderate, financial systems grow and restore them.Finally, the role of IMF programs in crises in the modern period is important. The availability of IMF bridge loans certainly has increased countries' resilience to "sudden stops" but, even setting aside moral hazard problems, is by no means a cure-all. Countries entering IMF programs are still forced to undergo painful macroeconomic adjustments in an attempt to regain sound fiscal footing and regain access to private capital markets. The challenges of successfully implementing IMF programs are underscored by the fact that there are many significant cases in which countries default within 3 years of an IMF bailout. IMF programs may help facilitate orderly debt workouts but do not guarantee them. We also note that in its early history, many of today's rich countries regularly drew on IMF resources, although there has been a 3-decade hiatus.II. Definition of CrisesExternal debt crisis. We distinguish between external and internal debt on the basis of the legal jurisdiction where the debt contracts are enforced. This is a convenient construct given the history and evolution of sovereign debt. Obviously it may be useful to parse the data in other ways for some exercises, and in principle our data set allows that.Although there are exceptions and there has been some evolution in recent years, typically in our long-dated historical data set, external debt is denominated in foreign currency and held by foreign creditors. There are certainly important examples, such as Mexico's short-term Tesobono bonds in the mid-1990s, where the debt is domestic yet is denominated in foreign currency and held primarily by foreign creditors. Although we regard the U.S. abrogation of the gold clause in the early 1930s—when gold was revalued from $21 to $35 per ounce—to be a default on domestic debt, many non-U.S. residents were also holding the debt at the time. In general, following standard practice, we define an external debt crisis as any failure to meet contractual repayment obligations on foreign debts, including both rescheduling or repayments and outright default. (As both of these examples make clear, however, one ultimately needs to think carefully about whether graduation from external default may sometimes just mean a shift to episodic de facto and de jure internal default.)In practice, most defaults on external debt end up being partial, with creditors typically (but not always) repaying 30¢–70¢ or more on the dollar, admittedly not adjusting for risk. The rationale for lumping together defaults regardless of the ultimate "haircuts" creditors are forced to absorb is that, in practice, the fixed costs of external debt default (which include difficulties in obtaining trade credits and loss of reputation) tend to be large relative to the variable costs. In principle, one could parse episodes more finely here according to, say, output or tax revenue loss depending on data availability, although we do not undertake that exercise here. See, however, Tomz (2007) and Tomz and Wright (2007).Inflation crises. Following Reinhart and Rogoff (2004), we define inflation crises as episodes in which annual inflation exceeds 20%. This threshold is lower than the 40% we and others have used in related studies on postwar data but is a compromise reflecting that prior to World War I, average inflation rates were much lower, and 20% inflation generally represented a significant level of dysfunction. Indeed, since we are particularly interested here in inflation as a vehicle for partial default, one clearly would also want to consider lower levels of sustained unanticipated inflation such as many advanced countries experienced in the 1970s. Depending on the maturity structure of debt, sustained 10% inflation can certainly be tantamount to de facto default. A proper calibration, however, would require detailed data on the maturity structure of debt (as in Missale and Blanchard 1994) and, ideally, also on the evolution of inflation expectations. We do not attempt this here, though again, this is an important caveat to interpreting the concept of graduation from external debt crises.Banking crises. Our definition of banking crises follows standard practice (e.g., Kaminsky and Reinhart 1999; Caprio and Klingebiel 2003). Following our own earlier work, "We mark a banking crisis by two types of events: (1) bank runs that lead to the closure, merging or takeover by the public sector of one or more financial institutions and (2) if there are no runs, the closure, merging, takeover, or large-scale government assistance of an important financial institution (or group of institutions) that marks the start of a string of similar outcomes for other financial institutions" (Reinhart and Rogoff 2009, 11). We recognize that our listing of systemic (on a national scale) banking crises may be incomplete, especially prior to 1970, especially for crises outside the large money centers that attract the attention of the world financial press.5Having set out basic definitions, we are now ready to view some basic characteristics of the data. To provide context and motivation for the concept of graduation, we begin with a summary time line of financial crises since 1550, followed by a brief overview of the early history of sovereign defaults.III. A Time Line of Financial Crises and the Early History of Sovereign DefaultsTable 1 provides a summary historical perspective that helps show how the three different varieties of financial crisis have spread over time and across country groups. Between 1550 and 1800, sovereign defaults on external debt were relatively common in Europe, but they were relatively rare elsewhere if only because (a) there were few other independent nations in a position to default and (b) given the crude state of global capital markets, relatively few countries were wealthy enough to attract international capital flows. Thus defaults were relatively insignificant in the regions that constitute today's emerging markets. Systemic banking crises, however, were relatively rare everywhere. The legal and technological underpinnings of modern private banking simply had not reached a stage of maturity and depth sufficient to cause systemic crises in most instances. (Of course, there are exceptions. Following Cipolla [1982] and MacDonald [2006], Reinhart and Rogoff [2009] discuss how England's 1340 default to Florentine bankers triggered a financial crisis in Italy.) Similarly, inflation crises were relatively rare, although again there are many exceptions (see Reinhart and Rogoff 2009, chap. 12). Prior to the widespread adoption of paper currency, bouts of very high inflation were relatively difficult to engineer.Table 1. Time Line of Crises, 1550–2010 External DebtCrisesBanking CrisesInflation Crises1550–1815 (Napoleonic wars end)Frequent in advanced economies (including the "world powers" of the time); serial in some casesRareRare1826Frequent in "peripheral" advanced economies and most emerging marketsSerial in advanced; rare in emergingRare18501900Serial in advanced; more frequent in emerging1913 (WW1 begins)Frequent in advanced and emerging1945 (WWII ends)Rare in advanced and emergingPost-1945Rare19641973Serial in some emerging marketsMore frequent in advanced; serial in emergingFrequent in advanced and emergingEarly 1980sEarly 1990sFrequent in emerging2000Rare20092010??View Table ImageThe end of the Napoleonic War in the early 1800s marks a significant transition. The largest advanced countries were increasingly able to avoid external default, albeit partly by their ability to issue an increasing share of their debt domestically. Default, however, became common in "peripheral" advanced countries such as Spain and Portugal, while newly independent emerging markets such as Greece and Latin America entered a long period of serial default. Over the same period, as advanced countries developed more sophisticated banking systems, banking crises became far more common. Emerging markets were certainly affected by advanced country banking crises but did not have so many of their own, if only because their financial systems were dominated by foreign banks.By the turn of the twentieth century, emerging market financial institutions had developed to the point where domestic banking crises became more common. By the time of the Great Depression of the 1930s, banking crises were a worldwide phenomenon. Owing in no small part to the financial repression that followed in reaction to the Great Depression, banking crises were relatively rare during the period from the end of World War II until the early 1970s. As financial repression thawed, banking crises became more frequent in the advanced economies and serial in many emerging markets, bringing us to the recent financial crisis episode.Finally, Table 1 gives a time line of inflation crises, which of course were quite common in all countries in the 1970s and remained a problem in emerging markets until the past decade.We thus focus our early history on sovereign external defaults. As Reinhart et al. (2003) and Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) emphasize, many of today's advanced economies had recurrent problems with default on sovereign debt during the period when they might arguably have been characterized as emerging markets. Table 2 illustrates the case of Europe for the 3-century period 1550–1850, with the years listed marking the beginning of a sovereign default episode.Table 2. External Defaults: Europe, 1550–1850CountryYears of DefaultNumberof DefaultsAustria-Hungary1796, 1802, 1805, 1811, 18165England*1594*1*France1558, 1624, 1648, 1661, 1701, 1715, 1770, 1788, 18129Germany: Prussia1683, 1807, 18133 Hesse18141 Schleswig-Holstein18501 Westphalia18121Netherlands18141Portugal1560, 1828, 1837, 1841, 18455Russia18391Spain1557, 1575, 1596, 1607, 1627, 1647, 1809, 1820, 1831, 184310Sweden18121Source: Reinhart et al. (2003), Reinhart and Rogoff (2009), and sources cited therein.Note: The table excludes Greece (which gained independence in 1829). Note that for some countries, even if there was a default on external debt, there may have been a default on domestic debt, as was the case for Denmark (1813).* Denotes our uncertainty at this time about whether England's default involved external (as opposed to purely domestic) debt.View Table ImageAs one can see clearly from the table, serial default was quite common among the major European powers during the sixteenth through nineteenth centuries, with France defaulting on its external debt nine times and Spain defaulting 10 times (with three more to follow in the second half of the nineteenth century). One important observation, immediately apparent from the table, is that there is typically a substantial interval between defaults, typically decades, but sometimes centuries. (Note that we require at least 2 years between default episodes to regard them as independent events.) After defaulting in 1683, Prussia's next default episode did not follow for more than a century in 1807. Portugal, after defaulting in 1560, did not default again until 1828, when the country lapsed into a period of serial default that did not end until 1890. At this writing, Portugal has not defaulted again since. (Importantly, during a significant portion of Portugal's quiescent period, it had effectively lost its independence.)Figure 1 gives a measure of the duration of periods of recidivism during the pre-Napoleonic era for the independent (relatively) high-income countries of our sample. The the of time between default episodes (including cases in which there was no As one can see from the half of all default recurrences after a more than with a significant even after a 1. External default duration of high-income countries, of time is as the of years between two external We first the of external default then the duration of time if it was and the episodes of default crisis with and two episodes with no countries Portugal, and Reinhart and Rogoff (2009), sources cited and country external sovereign debt defaults have much in the modern most recent default in in and in (Reinhart and Rogoff interesting are the cases of and France, despite a level of defaults in its pre-Napoleonic has not defaulted on external debt since. has not defaulted on external debt since its default at the end of the Napoleonic War in would be interesting to explore whether defaults are less to than defaults, though of course over many it is the to that many countries to up large (as in the of we will consider the of our recidivism results to the of and Rogoff (2009) also show that the of long in Table 2 are quite of some of today's emerging markets, many of which have defaulted at least during the past The of emerging markets that have experienced external debt crises if one episodes in which countries default to IMF bridge In all these the countries still as were forced to fiscal as we do not include these in our although arguably from the point of view of macroeconomic and the of debt they are important. We to this issue when we IMF The and of Crises: The now to focus on the more period, to the at the same time the analysis to include banking and inflation crises, as in Table as important in this The past 2 centuries also a much of independent nations to as various regions of the world the of In Table we present of crisis measure takes the of years a country experienced of crisis (including all years and not just the by the of years since independence (or since of External and low-income Reinhart and Rogoff (2009), sources cited and is as the of years in crisis by the of years since were for country since or the country's independence countries for external default crisis and countries for inflation and banking Latin Table 3 that the between high-income countries and the of the world in to external default crisis. The average external default crisis of the high-income group is less than half of that of middle- and low-income countries and of that of Latin countries. The would be even if we only and defaults. crisis are also in the of the world than in high-income countries although the is the average of banking crises in high-income countries and in the of the world are The results in Table 3 of course, with the time line in Table that inflation and banking crisis are lower in part because the average duration of these crises to be much to external default crises. (Note also that we are years in crisis, as opposed to the of independent Table which gives the average duration of crises, the between the mean and duration of external default crises versus inflation and banking crises. The duration of banking crises is 3 years or less across all where the world for default crises is For inflation crises, the is only 1 across all this that a country can ways to on in a state of sovereign default far more than it can continue any of as during a banking or inflation the long duration of external default crises and their it is not that large of the world have been in default over much of the last years, as by Reinhart and Rogoff of the major default episodes include the Napoleonic in the early nineteenth century and then Latin countries and Portugal in the first of the The default during the era that the Great Depression and World War when at the more than 40% of the weighted by was in default on external 2 gives the share of countries in inflation crisis over the same Note the huge in inflation crises after World and II and again in the and early The very recent history of inflation most of the world a major shift from the to be whether inflation is a that has been As Rogoff (2003) has including especially the advent of independent central banks with a have been an important in this in but so was the that political on central banks to in unanticipated to be whether the period will another many in as opposed to a shift and 2. Share of countries in inflation crisis, countries that were independent in the given Reinhart and Rogoff (2009), sources cited and if one truly that fiscal dominance will never again in most countries, historical of outright default may the true the of default inflation has been effectively The recent of public debt this 3 gives the share of the world banking crises since Note the remarkably small of banking crises during the years of financial repression that during World War II and in many countries into the 1970s. By historical this was a quiescent is also from the that this era has been long but to be to an Share of countries in banking crisis, countries that were independent in the given Reinhart and Rogoff (2009), sources cited and next three the of high-income countries with of middle- and low-income countries (including Latin what we have in Table 3 but more on external debt crises, for example, illustrates two First, as middle- and low-income countries are in default on external debt a of the time than high-income countries. high-income countries had a in external defaults in the with (as of this since the advent of rates in the 1970s. we at on since the last default crisis. We from our middle- and low-income countries very low-income countries that do not have external default by of the fact that they are not able to at all on private Share of countries in external default crisis, high-income versus middle- and low-income countries. countries high-income and middle- and low-income that were independent in the given Reinhart and Rogoff (2009), sources cited and countries seem to have graduated from default crisis, or at least into But most middle- and low-income countries have not yet the of inflation crises in middle- and low-income countries versus high-income countries. countries have had inflation crises more recently than external default crises, but the has to since the early For middle- and low-income countries, a in the has been followed by a during the is of the of very high inflation we note that it does not episodes of sustained high inflation 20% that, if unanticipated and depending on the maturity structure of government debt, may a substantial de facto default on domestic Share of countries in inflation crisis, high-income versus middle- and low-income countries. countries high-income and middle- and low-income that were independent in the given Reinhart and Rogoff (2009), sources cited and on banking crises a very different data for countries begin more the line for middle- and low-income countries only in the course, many of today's countries did not their independence until One can see that in to external default and inflation crises, banking crises are (Reinhart and Rogoff 2009, chap. Although banking crises have up in

With the development of information technology, WeChat, Weibo, Douyin, Kuaishou and other new media have become more and more the main way for the public to understand public events. New media, with its timeliness, interactivity and openness, has brought opportunities and new challenges to local government's public crisis management. The development of new media accelerates the spread of public crisis, expands the spread range of public crisis, and greatly strengthens the influence of public crisis in time and space. This paper will focus on the analysis of local government public crisis management in the new media era, and make an in-depth study on how local governments can do a good job in public crisis management in the new media era.

In order to overcome the problems existing in the management of network public opinion crisis, such as asymmetric information, too much data, slow data processing and low work efficiency, this paper proposes a novel construction method of network public opinion crisis management mechanism based on big data technology. Combined with the characteristics of network public opinion crisis events and the advantages of big data technology, the construction method can improve the management level of network public opinion crisis from four dimensions, namely, the prevention of network public opinion crisis events, the preparation of network public opinion crisis events, the response of network public opinion crisis events, and the recovery of network public opinion crisis events. The research results show that the construction method can indeed realize the deep integration of network public opinion crisis management mechanism and big data technology, so as to improve the level of network public opinion crisis management in China.

Nonprofit organization is one of the social organizations. The nonprofit organizations in China have started to pay close attention to the public and play an important role in public crisis management. With the public crisis broke out constantly in recent years around the world, nonprofit organizations have become a majority force to handle public crisis with its social effects. However, due to the unstable of social circumstance, the internal and external factors of nonprofit organization, the public crisis management of nonprofit organizations still have various problems in China. This article analyzes the crisis management, the role and the problems of nonprofit organization, to explore the measures for nonprofit organizations to involve in public crisis management.

A real crisis experienced by a national nonprofit organization is used in this case study to help students apply concepts associated with crisis management planning (CMP). Students are introduced to crisis planning, management, and communication strategies to help them develop the skills necessary to lead a nonprofit organization through a crisis. Concepts introduced in the theoretical background of the case provide students with a theoretical and a practical understanding of crisis, crisis management, crisis communication planning, and crisis communication strategies. Communication strategies presented are focused on image restoration strategies. The case is appropriate for undergraduate and graduate students preparing to work in the nonprofit sector. Instructors are encouraged to use this case in conjunction with discussions of public relations, crisis management, or crisis communication strategies. The sample assignments and discussion questions allow students to connect crisis management theory to a practical organizational crisis within a classroom setting.

Crisis management is a complex systematic project. In order to deal with emergency situation and reduce the cost of crisis management and improve the efficiency of the process, it is necessary to introduce governmental procurement system into public crisis management. By expressing the role that the emergency governmental procurement plays during the public crisis, this paper examines and analyses the particularity of the governmental emergency procurement during public crisis and the difficulties and problems that are often encountered. Based on this, suggestions are made on the innovation of governmental emergency procurement system from six angles: the construction of legal system, judicial involvement, credit records, institution-building, procurement supervision and procurement network. Therefore, we can find methods and ways to maximize the beneficial influences of the system and achieve the effective combination of public crisis management and government procurement system.

This article aims to provide insights into the research conducted in 2019 when recommendations for changes in the Act on Crisis Management in Poland were formulated and to evaluate the changes introduced in the form of an amendment to the Act on Crisis Management in 2020. The research presented in the article is based on the assessment of the recommendations formulated by the authors in 2019 according to the trends in public crisis management (New Public Management, Public Governments) made in comparison to the literature in this area. The practical part of the presented research consists of a comparative analysis in four categories (General, Risk, Critical Infrastructure, Other) and a discussion of the compliance of the formulated recommendations with the changes in the amended act in 2020. The research showed that the recommendations formulated in 2019 were accurate, especially in the categories of Risk and Critical Infrastructure. The recommendations in the General category relate to the concept of security at the state level, but not to this law on crisis management and thus appear to be neutral. In the theoretical context, compliance of individual recommendations with the trends in public management was indicated.