Abstract

I test whether the political budget cycle depends on the level of fiscal conservatism among voters. To this end, I use data from a referendum to collect revealed preferences for fiscal conservatism. I find that pre-election spending is increased only if voters have a sufficiently low level of fiscal conservatism. If voters are highly fiscally conservative, incumbents even decrease spending before elections.

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