Abstract

The article's objective is to analyze the development and evolution of the Mexican pension reform not only as such but also of two main bodies: on the one hand, the regulator (the National Saving for Retirement) and the other, from the pension fund manager designed as a public-private partnership (PPP Manager Retirement Funds, Afore XXI). This article finds firstly, the existence of a horizontal degree of specialization and a potential lack of accountability and transparency in organizations responsible for regulating the pension system, and secondly that the presence of values that may compete in public officials in developing their roles have affected the development of a new pension system in Mexico and the performance of the regulator.

Highlights

  • This article has two purposes, firstly to argue that reforms might be better when they contribute to the understanding of the key are seen as a mixture of internal and exterfeatures and potential paradoxes posed nal institutional features, because they are by the implementation of public-private embedded in a specific political and adminpartnerships, generally conceived as istrative context (Christensen, Laegreid, and co-operation schemes between public and Stigen, 2004)

  • We are interested in the reforms sizes how reforms are influenced by national of pension systems in Latin America and, in administrative cultures, traditions, and the particular in some strategies, such as those political context (Christensen and Lagreid, followed in Chile and Mexico, and by which 2007a, 2007b), and to the study of new and regulatory frameworks have been intro- useful perspectives for public management

  • During the 1990s, several Latin American agement discourse, public organizations countries were immersed in the fiscal crisis tend to develop a set of networks where and in response to it, prompted a series of a mixed collection of players in private, reforms that varied in scope and depth, many public and voluntary sectors, improve the of them as part of commitments to interna- governmental performance

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Summary

Introduction

This article has two purposes, firstly to argue that reforms might be better when they contribute to the understanding of the key are seen as a mixture of internal and exterfeatures and potential paradoxes posed nal institutional features, because they are by the implementation of public-private embedded in a specific political and adminpartnerships (ppp), generally conceived as istrative context (Christensen, Laegreid, and co-operation schemes between public and Stigen, 2004). The law created a regulatory the 1990s introduced reforms of the pension agency for the Afores, and the National Comsystems, including new public management mission of the Retirement Savings’ System recommendations, such as the following: (consar). The reform of corporate governance is limited by the the pension system was based on the idea of law, because Afores must have at least five gaining efficiency and effectiveness through members in their respective boards of direc- the introduction of a market-reassembling tors, and consar must be informed about mechanism The analysis of the Likewise, Afores require the approval governance bodies and the combination of of the consar’s Control and Surveillance public and private areas suggests that these Committee to appoint their comptrollers may become sources of tension and conflict, and independent members of the board. The pension reform and the sense, an important outcome of the reform introduction of public-private partnership has been a system which involves diverse seemed to follow these assumptions; howactors with competing interests, agencies ever, it must be noted that public servants with different organizational designs and are immersed within a complex framework goals and complex co-ordination mecha- where they operate in the face of competing values, such as efficiency and legitimacy

Instituto de Seguridad Social de los Trabajadores
Findings
Final considerations contribute to the debate on the reforms as
Full Text
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