Policy Information and the Polarization of American Social Policy Preferences

Abstract

A burgeoning literature has found that “submerged” social policies – those delivered through non-state actors or the tax code – are less visible to citizens, meaning that citizens are less capable of forming informed preferences about those policies. But even non-submerged policies provided directly by the state can be highly complex. In these cases, how does the provision of policy-specific information change individuals’ opinions about the social program? We examine how the provision of information about the rules governing unemployment insurance affects individuals’ preferences for, and perceptions of, unemployment insurance benefits using a survey experiment. We find that policy-specific information produces a moderating effect on individuals’ opinions, making conservatives more likely to hold more liberal attitudes about program features and beneficiaries while making liberals hold more conservative attitudes. Our results are strongest for those individuals who were less knowledgeable about the program before our experiment. We thus argue that the polarization of public opinion regarding social programs like unemployment insurance is shaped, in part, by the availability of policy-specific information disseminated by the state and other actors, such as interest groups and the media.