Polarization, and party politics in post-revolutionary and post-war Armenia

ABSTRACTThis paper investigates the relationship between economic inequality and the distribution of votes among political parties, namely political polarization and fracturalization. Economic inequality is captured by the Gini index, whereas new measures of political polarization and fracturalization are offered. This is the first paper to calculate political polarization and fracturalization indices by a methodology previously used for ethnic, religious and linguistic polarization and fracturalization. Empirical analysis uses data for 17 European countries and for three decades, 1980s, 1990s and 2000s. It is shown that increased income inequality increases political party polarization and reduces fracturalization and that political party polarization decreases with increased GDP per capita.

Robert Putnam's Irving Kristol Turn Haimo Li (bio) Robert Putnam and Shaylyn Romney Garrett, The Upswing: How America Came Together a Century Ago and How We Can Do It Again. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2020. 465 pp. Notes and index. $32.50 This genuinely insightful book traces four curves in the development of American society from the Gilded Age to the present: economic inequality, political partisanship, social capital, and cultural narcissism. These curves, in the authors' view, follow an inverted-U shape, with the mid 20th century serving as a kind of golden age for the United States, and the late 19th and early 21st centuries the nadirs, full of fierce partisan strife, far-reaching economic and social inequalities, and various critical problems. The major force that brought the U.S. from the first trough to the peak, from Gilded to golden age, was a grassroots communitarian ethos that emerged during the Progressive Era. That orientation, Putnam and Garrett suggest, helped significantly to curb oligarchical plutocracy, while fostering more equality, cooperation, and solidarity throughout the population. Then the pendulum began swinging. A series of social movements that emerged in the United States after the mid-1960s, including school violence, urban unrest, civil rights movements, anti-Vietnam War demonstrations, and assassinations of politicians eventually triggered the start of a downward trend, lasting through today, another nadir for the authors. The focal point of this book is to introduce and provide a "new evidence-based narratives that encompasses the ups and downs of an entire century," thereby "setting a clearer agenda for choice going forward" (p. 314). Simply put, the authors' essential suggestion is that we should borrow the communitarian progressivism formula from those previous reformers who lived 100 years ago. The transition from the Gilded Age to Progressive Era is a strong case. For example, if we compare the intensity of political polarization during the Gilded Age and Progressive Era, the former one is more severe and dramatic than the latter. Also, most scholars tend to agree that "the decline in congressional polarization occurred during the 1920s."1 That said, Putnam and Garrett are too hopeful that we can recapitulate the successes of the Progressive Era in generating a communitarian political culture in the twenty-first century. It is [End Page 317] not clear that the problems of the Gilded Age, such as "inequality, political polarization, social dislocation, and cultural narcissism" (p. 8), were actually all properly solved by the communitarian spirit of early-twentieth-century progressivism alone. And it seems even more dubious—an example of wishful thinking rather than scholarly rigor—to think that by creating a modern copy of that communitarian spirit, the United States can solve today's examples of inequality and political polarization. Many scholars tend to depict the current American political situation as a "New Gilded Age," however, we probably need to pay attention to the fact that the partisan clash that happened during the Gilded Age was fundamentally different from the widespread polarization today. As pointed out by political scientist Frances E. Lee, when we talk about contemporary political polarization, the term actually denotes a "wide divergence on an ideological continuum structuring alternative views on national policy." By contrast, that kind of phenomenon rarely happened in the Gilded Age. The ferocious partisan warfare at that era was mainly about spoils, patronage, and office—not about the "sharp party differences over national policy" per se, as the two major political parties at that time presented very few "programmatic alternatives" to each other.2 Moreover, there are many other vital differences between the current situation and the Gilded Age. For example, as pointed out by historian Patrick Maney, during the Gilded Age, the rich were often regarded with contempt or suspicion. Now, though, "when the rich flaunt their wealth as a sign of their success, the strongest emotion they provoke is envy." In other words, class envy has replaced class conflict.3 Another difference pointed out by some scholars is that there are now actually two different types of political and cultural polarization: one is issue polarization; the other is social/affective polarization (such as resentment and distrust).4 The second is particularly hard to...

The literature on democratic consolidation emphasizes the importance of effective parties for the functioning of democracy. Specifically, the institutional resilience of democracy and the consolidation of broad-based representative government require the institutionalization of major political factions. In this article, I reassess this thesis and apply it to the political parties in Turkey and Southern Europe by employing the comparative method of difference. Two major conclusions are reached. First, party institutionalization does not constitute a sufficient condition for democratic consolidation. Moreover, several institutional rules that may challenge the very idea of democracy tend to support party institutionalization. Second, party institutionalization reinforced by partisan polarization may result in tenser relations among political parties – a situation that does not contribute to democratic consolidation.

This paper examines the relationship between ideological polarization and party disloyalty, focusing on the moderating role of the status of a political party in the legislature, i.e., the ruling party or the opposition party. It hypothesizes that the ruling party is willing to endorse disloyal candidates whose issue positions are not close to their own party's platform, whereas the opposition party is likely to punish disloyal candidates to demonstrate party unity in the nomination process. The present study tests this hypothesis, using data from South Korea, where the nomination process for the parliamentary election is dominated by party leaders. The results are by and large consistent with the hypotheses. In line with previous studies, our results suggest that party loyalty is one of the driving forces of polarization in politics. In order to fully understand party polarization at the level of political elites, it is necessary to consider heterogeneous effects of party members' behavior on candidate selection, varying across the party's status, either the ruling party or the opposition party.

The aims of this article are to clarify the relationship between institutionalization of political parties and institutionalization of the party system as a whole, and to explore the mechanisms of change in this relationship at a micro level. The subject of institutionalization of parties and the party system has been addressed to date in the course of studies of political parties in the field of comparative political science. This article identifies four patterns in institutionalization and de-institutionalization of parties and the party system. It is theoretically conceivable not only that institutionalization and de-institutionalization may proceed concurrently, but also that, as a party system is institutionalized, political parties themselves may become de-institutionalized; or, conversely, that de-institutionalization of the system is accompanied by institutionalization of parties. A review of postwar Japanese party politics reveals that as the one-party dominant system became institutionalized, the dominant party was de-institutionalized from the inside by factionalism and clientelism among members. The one-party dominant system was replaced by a more competitive party system from the 1990s onwards, the factionalism that formerly held sway within the dominant party was suppressed, and the dominant party became united by conservative ideology. Nevertheless, the institutionalization and de-institutionalization of parties and the party system are macro-level concepts, and lack the capacity to account for micro-level mechanisms of change. This article is therefore based on the hypothesis that the pattern and degree of competition among political parties exerted influence on the power of the dominant factional coalitions and factions within Japan’s Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), leading to change in the party’s organization and policies. Analysis of data gathered from members of the House of Representatives reveals that a reshuffle of partners in the coalition government at the end of the 1990s led to the dominant factional alliance within the LDP being replaced, resulting in a shift in LDP policy from moderate to conservative; and that increasing inter-party competition prompted a concentration of power in the party executive that engendered a decline in factionalism.

The contemporary literature on political parties has identified their gradual but consistent shift away from civil society and towards the state. As parties are becoming ever increasingly dependent on state resources and exclusively interested in governing, as Mair (Ruling the void: The hollowing of western democracy [Verso Books, 2013]) suggested, and patronage is a fundamental to that relationship, the degree and modes of party patronage becomes pivotal to understanding their performance, and the ways they organize and govern. In this paper we argue that party patronage is likely to be structured by the nature of political competition and explore the effects of political polarization, which is a feature of political competition relatively independent from the precise format of a party system, on patronage practices. We advance a theoretical argument which systematically links different types of political polarization with different patterns of party patronage, arguing that extreme polarization incentivizes political parties to develop heavily partisan strategies of party patronage which, in turn, further fuel political polarization. Thus, we also contribute to burgeoning literature on political polarization and its negative effects on the functioning of both political parties and overall political systems.

The current article explains why netizens are escaping the political polarization observed in their activities on social media during the 2014 and 2019 Indonesian presidential elections. The research data were obtained from in-depth interviews with a number of netizens who were activists on social media and engaged in political polarization. The existing political polarization had been bolstered by netizen’s activities that were rampant across various echo chambers, which were established and driven by ideological and affective elements. Netizens succeeded in escaping the existing political polarization on account of promises broken by the pair of presidential-vice presidential candidates they supported and due to a natural drive of the election being over. Nevertheless, this article reveals that netizen’s escape from political polarization on social media does not necessarily suggest the end of the existing political polarization. The present study found that netizen’s political polarization on social media has shifted to political polarization awareness and latent political polarization. This clarifies that the existing political polarization has simply evolved into a new political polarization. The findings in this research may have implications on factors that threaten democracy in the general election system or new relations of political communication in the era of new media.

This article aims to discuss efforts to prevent political polarization in the 2024 election year by using library data collection methods. The results of this research are that political polarization can occur in any situation and condition especially during elections, public policy, socio-cultural issues including post-debate issues for the Presidential and Vice Presidential Candidates. The causes of political polarization are none other than political parties, mass media, regional expansion, political context and society's political ideology. Political polarization has positive and negative impacts. However, of these two impacts, there are more negative impacts. The negative impacts that can be caused by political polarization are the creation of divisions, damage to democratic institutions, loss of credibility of political parties, impact on government, and reduced credibility of society, while the positive impacts of political polarization are strengthening relationships and increasing participation in politics. Political polarization will very easily occur when the public or supporters are easily carried away by issues circulating in society such as differences in ideology, choices and principles between one camp and another. Several efforts can be made to prevent political polarization, namely: the public must be able to sort and choose the issues circulating and not be too fanatical about their choices, instill and implement the values of Pancasila, and implement the value of harmonization of Bhinneka Tunggal Ika.

The Relationship between Economic Growth and Transformation of Democracy of Bangladesh (A Historical and Strategic Analysis)

Turkey’s 2016 Citizenship by Investment Programme has sparked significant debates on citizenship. This study examines how five major Turkish political parties conceptualize citizenship through their positions on this practice. It argues that parties’ conceptions of citizenship shape their political behavior, a dynamic often underexplored in existing scholarship. While opposition parties’ perspectives inform their resistance to citizenship-by-investment policies, ruling parties adopt pragmatic, policy-oriented approaches that occasionally diverge from their stated ideological principles. Empirically, the study elucidates the complexities of citizenship by situating the practice of citizenship-by-investment within the context of Turkish politics. Conceptually, it enriches the literature by analyzing political polarization in Turkey through the lens of citizenship, an approach less commonly pursued compared to frameworks of authoritarianism or Islamization. Employing a case study methodology and critical discourse analysis with an inductive coding approach, the article identifies which citizenship conceptions align with parties’ stances on citizenship-by-investment, drawing on party documents, parliamentary records, and media reports from 2016 to 2025.

This research is entitled "INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF ISLAMIC POLITICAL PARTIES IN PALEMBANG CITY: A Case Study of the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS) and the United Development Party (PPP)". This research explains that the institutionalization of Islamic political parties in Palembang City can affect the results of the legislative elections and the existence of voters, which at the time of the 2019 legislative elections in Palembang City, the votes and seats of Islamic political parties experienced very significant changes in terms of the number of votes. and legislative seats. Islamic political parties that experienced an increase in the number of votes and legislative seats, namely the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS) when the 2014 legislative general election received three seats but in the 2019 legislative general election it got five seats, while the Islamic political parties which experienced a decrease in the number of votes and legislative seats, namely the Party The Development Association (PPP) when the 2014 legislative election won two seats, but in the 2019 legislative general election, it only got one seat.
 The reason the author chose the title Institutionalization of Islamic Political Parties in Palembang City is due to the extent to which Islamic parties have or have not been institutionalized, this research on the institutionalization of political parties uses the theory of Vicky Randall and Lars Svasand political parties are considered institutionalized if there are four degrees of institutionalization such as Degree of System, Degree of Value Identity , Degree of Decision Autonomy and Degree of Public Knowledge. Based on the theory used, the results of this study, among others, prove that PKS can be said to have been institutionalized and PPP has not been institutionalized based on the four degrees of political party institutionalization theory concept according to Vicky Randall and Lars Svasand. So that it can be directly proven by the results of research findings where the institutionalization of PKS and PPP parties has similarities and differences between the two Islamic political parties in absorbing the people's aspirations and fighting for the interests of Muslims in Palembang City.

The main contribution of this chapter is to study the central role information disorders play in political polarization; in concrete, the objective of this chapter is to illustrate how Spanish political elites – parties and politicians – feed radical ghettos and polarized groups, when distributing lies and fabricated stories on the Internet. For this purpose, we have applied a qualitative methodology, consisting of the case study method, to understand the potential impact of both – political polarization and false content – on the weakened quality of the Spanish democracy. The selected cases include the most popular political parties in Spain: PSOE, PP, Vox, Unidas Podemos and Ciudadanos. As we have demonstrated, political parties in Spain spread both, misinformation and disinformation. We confirm that political parties contribute to increase political polarization when they spread fabricated stories. This results in what we call diversification of polarization, which refers to people becoming isolated in multiple bubble cyber-ghettos depending upon the nature of the issue under debate, i.e. inequality between sexes, climate change, immigration issues, the high prices of rent or the Catalonian independence movement, among other examples. As a consequence, the act of lying increases the diversification of polarization and reduces the possibilities of achieving consensus.

This article studies electoral competition in a model of redistributive politics with deterministic voting and heterogeneous voter loyalties to political parties. We construct a natural measure of `party strength' based on the sizes and intensities of a party's loyal voter segments and demonstrate how party behavior varies with the two parties' strengths. In equilibrium, parties target or `poach' a strict subset of the opposition party's loyal voters: offering those voters a high expected transfer, while `freezing out' the remainder with a zero transfer. The size of the subset of opposition voters frozen out and, consequently, the level of inequality in utilities generated by a party's equilibrium redistribution schedule is increasing in the opposition party's strength. We also construct a measure of `political polarization' that is increasing in the sum and symmetry of the parties' strengths, and find that the expected ex-post inequality in utilities of the implemented policy is increasing in political polarization.

This study is intended to answer the question of how political polarization is related to social media users’ posts about Covid-19. The researchers chose health cases related to Covid-19 instead of political issues (e.g. elections) to prove that this political polarization has spread to many areas. The research also wants to see the relationship between this political polarization and selective exposure. Theories applied in this study are polarization, filter bubble, and selective exposure. The study applied two methods: social media network analysis and content analysis. The network analysis included 82,156 posts, while the content analysis was carried out on 4,050 social media accounts. The research outcome proves the occurrence of political polarization. Social media users were divided into two major groups, namely pro-Jokowi and anti-Jokowi. Each group interacted with fellow users who had the same political choices and shared the same message content. Users with certain political choices tend to receive the same information as their political choices, and ignore information from other political parties. Another interesting finding from this study is how this polarization was sharpened by the use of hashtags. Each party (supporters and oppositions of Jokowi) uses hashtags to create solidarity and mobilization from each supporter. Research also proves the validity of the selective exposure and filter bubble hypothesis in the Indonesian context.

This study investigates the relationship between individual-based relative deprivation and political party in Turkey. Findings reveal that individuals feel most deprived when comparing themselves to supporters of the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi: AKP), due to that party’s greater access to resources through extensive clientelist and patronage networks. This was followed by comparisons made with supporters of the Nationalist Movement Party (Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi: MHP), Republican People’s Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi: CHP), İYİ (Good Party), and Peoples’ Democratic Party (Halkların Demokrat Partisi: HDP). Deprivation is most strongly perceived in economic, social and political domains, highlighting the multidimensional nature of exclusion. While clientelism is often associated with the ruling party, the study shows that opposition parties also engage in such practices when they control resources. These findings suggest that clientelism is a structural feature of Turkish politics, contributing to political polarisation, weakening accountability and accelerating democratic backsliding. The study’s main contribution lies in its demonstration that clientelist relations are long term and widespread, shaping both perceptions of deprivation and democratic decline. Future research should further explore the mechanisms linking clientelism to political behaviour and institutional change.