Abstract
Abstract Philosophers often infer that an emotion is unfitting because it would be wrong to feel. That is the moralistic fallacy, and it is argued here that this inference and related forms of moralism confound evaluative judgment in both philosophical and ordinary thought. A plausible form of pluralism about sentimental values entails that they can conflict with one another, and with moral and ethical standards. One influential source of resistance to our claims from a neo-Aristotelian thought: that the virtuous person is the standard of both ethical and fitting emotional response. This approach is explored and shown to have implausible consequences. Moreover, it does not rescue the moralistic fallacy from error.
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