Playing by its own rules? A quantitative empirical analysis of justificatory legal reasoning in the registered trade mark case law of the European Court of Justice

The article explores the main problems of the application by the national courts of the case law of the European Court of Human Rights as a source of law. Analyzing the rules of the law and examining the views of the Supreme Court have highlighted the problematic issues of the obligation to apply the case law of the European Court of Human Rights to national courts as a source of law. The researchers' positions on the obligation of national courts to apply the case law of the European Court of Human Rights in cases against other states are examined and the importance of the application of the case law of the European Court of Human Rights is highlighted. Analyzing the views of scholars and experts, we have proposed ways to address the issues of the binding application of the case law of the European Court of Human Rights by reviewing the plenary sessions of high courts. The problems of the application of the case law of the European Court of Human Rights by national courts, such as the selective application of the case law of the Court, references to general principles and interpretations, ignoring the conditions of their application, absolutization of the binding position of the Court, application of the decisions of the Court by analogy, reference to the practice Court in the presence of clear and consistent provisions of national law, etc. The following ways of solving these problems are proposed: 1) revising the concept and content of the Law of Ukraine "On the implementation of decisions and application of the practice of the European Court of Human Rights" and amending the legislation in order to bring it in line with the provisions of the new procedural legislation and modern ideas of theorists and practitioners about the legal nature of decisions The European Court of Human Rights; 2) preparing a resolution of the Plenum of the Supreme Court on the application of the Convention and the case-law of the Court, which should be based on a thorough analysis of the shortcomings and peculiarities of the case-law of the national courts. The problematic issues of the application of the case law of the European Court of Human Rights in the absence of official translations of the Court's decisions are examined. Analyzing the views of scholars and experts, we have proposed ways to solve these problems by creating a single electronic database that will contain official translations of Court decisions in the Ukrainian language that will ensure their accessibility and dissemination.

Can absolute rights conflict? Is it permissible to torture a person to save others from torture? And what can judges learn from trolleys? In this article, presented as a reply to an article by Steven Greer, I investigate the above questions in the context of the case law of the European Court of Human Rights. Drawing on Gafgen v Germany, I construct a hypothetical case of conflicting absolute rights, which cannot be resolved by the existing strands of legal reasoning in the case law of the Court. Instead, I argue, recourse must be had to moral reasoning. In discussing one of moral philosophy’s deepest conundrums—the Trolley Problem—I rely on the distinction between negative and positive obligations and between direct and indirect agency to unravel the dilemma. Translating the moral argument into legal reasoning, I conclude that in cases of conflicts between absolute rights, negative obligations principally trump positive obligations.

The article discusses the impact of the European Convention on Human Rights (‘the Convention’)  and the  case law of the European Court of Human Rights on Estonian law. It gives historical background on the ratification of the Convention and its protocols by Estonia and describes the status of the Convention in the Estonian legal order. It then shows in more detail the impact of the case law of the Strasbourg Court on Estonia’s legislature, executive power, and judiciary and examines the case law pertaining in particular to the historical past, deprivation of liberty, prison conditions, fair trial and length of proceedings, retroactivity, and lack of foreseeability of criminal law, along with the case law on pluralism and civil rights, especially freedom of expression. In addition, the article focuses on the important issue of reopening of a case on national level once the European Court of Human Rights has found a violation and looks at the implementation of judgements of that court by Estonia in general. Additional remarks are made on the Supreme Court of Estonia’s application of the Convention and the case law of the European Court of Human Rights. Finally, the impact of the case law of the Strasbourg Court in relation to Estonia on the general development of precedents with that court is discussed. In conclusion, in relation to the case law of the European Court of Human Rights, it is important to understand that the Court finding a violation of the Convention in respect of Estonia is not so much a condemnation, ‘against’ the country, as a learning opportunity, in a sense, for Estonia’s democracy, rule of law, and human rights protection system. Furthermore, there could well be other difficulties in Estonia that the Court has for various reasons had no opportunity to address. This can be seen in areas wherein the Court has found a violation by another state but wherein a similar problem still exists in Estonia – e.g., in relation to prisoners’ voting rights. It is important to consider a more global picture of the human rights situation. It is unfortunate that in Estonia, especially in the media and for the wider public, little attention is paid still to the case law of the Court with respect to other states.  In general, European law has been well accepted in Estonia, especially the Convention and the case law of the Court. Working from the Estonian examples, one can confirm that the legislature; the executive power, even more so; and, above all, the judiciary of Estonia have recognised well that the Convention is an inseparable part of Estonia’s legal and democratic culture. Estonian courts need to feel that they also are human rights courts, especially in dealing with the facts and Estonian law, domains wherein the Court cannot and should not act as a fourth or first instance. At the same time, the Court should be able to speak not only to the Estonian courts as counterparts but also to the Estonian people. They as well need to understand European human rights law. All in all, Estonia is quite lucky: it does not have particularly worrying human rights problems; not many violations of the Convention are found in respect of Estonia by the Court. Estonian cases have been dealing with more or less the same issues every ordinary democratic country faces, even to a certain extent with problems of a modern, well-advanced society, such as freedom of expression and privacy rights on the Internet. Also the Court has been lucky to have Estonia as an exemplar: a country wherein the Convention system and the Court’s case law have been to a large extent respected and well complied with. But this mutual ‘happiness’, this quite nice two-way street, should not be taken for granted. The Court’s case law is a moving target. It is hoped that all future developments related to the Court will contribute to improvement of the protection of human rights, democracy, and the rule of law all over Europe. Neither Estonia nor any other European country can apply the generally recognised principles by choice ‘in its own way’.  Estonia’s trump in Europe and beyond could be to serve as a model in the protection of human rights. In consideration of its experience, geopolitical location, and size, alongside its investments in education and the historically rooted importance of nurturing intellectual and cultural values, Estonia could be in a very good position to achieve this ambitious goal.&#160

European trade mark law is a remarkably difficult subject. There are a number of reasons for this. First, trade mark law is an inherently challenging topic. While many of the concepts and doctrines may seem straightforward to begin with, on deeper acquaintance one realizes that they are much more slippery and elusive than they first appeared. Secondly, the legislation is complicated and imperfectly drafted. Some of the problems have been addressed in the Trade Mark Reform Package that is currently in the process of being implemented, but others have not been dealt with and new problems have been introduced. Thirdly, there is a vast body of case law, a significant proportion of which is contradictory or poorly reasoned. Simply making sense of the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) on trade marks is hard enough, but the picture is far from complete unless one also takes into account the extensive case law of the General Court (GC) and of at least the leading national courts. Fourthly, trade mark law, like many other areas of intellectual property, faces a series of challenges posed by new technologies and business models. Fifthly, trade mark law, like some other areas of intellectual property, is an increasingly contested field, with trade mark proprietors and applicants continually trying to expand the boundaries of protection and users and commentators pushing back. Lastly, trade mark law, even more than many other areas of law, needs to be understood holistically, but an overall view of the system is hard to obtain. This only comes with a great deal of experience.

In light of the ever-growing and developing jurisprudence of the Court of Justice and the General Court, and forthcoming substantive and systemic changes to the law, there is a need for a fresh and practical approach to the procedure and case law of trade marks in Europe. Trade Mark Law in Europe is a comprehensive guide to European trade mark law following the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice of the European Union and the case law of the General Court. It provides a wide-ranging overview of the trade mark system, including detailed and critical discussion of forthcoming changes, as well as an in-depth look at the life of a trade mark up to enforcement. It considers the conditions for maintaining a registration, the protection and enforcement of trade marks, and the interface between trade mark law and other areas of practice. Finally, it offers detailed and insightful analysis of current developments, challenges, and opportunities. This is complemented by an international and comparative approach which selectively considers the contemporary jurisprudence of the Supreme Court of the United States and general US practice, as well as national jurisprudence in areas not yet covered by the CJEU. Written by highly-regarded authors with considerable expertise across a range of constituencies, Trade Marks in Europe is a timely and important study of this complex and challenging area of law.

En este artículo se expone la jurisprudencia del Tribunal Constitucional de Chile en materia de dignidad humana con valor fundamental del orden constitucional chileno, y la manera como lo instituye con un límite al ius puniendi estatal. Se exponen textos doctrinales, tanto nacionales como extranjeros, en torno a la noción de dignidad humana y su forma de incorporación en los ordenamientos constitucionales, específicamente en la Constitución chilena. Del mismo modo, se analiza la jurisprudencia del Tribunal, para indagar la idea de dignidad humana que posee, y la manera y los alcances en su aplicación. El Tribunal considera la dignidad humana como una condición intrínseca del ser humano, de la cual se colige un deber de respeto y de consideración, principalmente del Estado. La circunstancia del reconocimiento constitucional de la dignidad lleva a estimarla como la base del orden político y social en el contexto de un Estado democrático de derecho, de lo cual se derivan y concretan en el orden del derecho punitivo una serie de principios, como la presunción de inocencia, el principio non bis in idem, el principio de culpabilidad y el de proporcionalidad de las penas, los cuales necesariamente limitan el derecho penal subjetivo del Estado.

This chapter analyses the legal protection available to vulnerable groups and their members under the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), and in particular the vulnerability paradigm of the European Court of Human Rights. It traces the development of the concept of ‘vulnerable groups’ and its use in the case law of the Court and identifies the main groups of persons systematically considered by the Court as vulnerable.When discussing the case law of the European Court of Human Rights, two groups of cases are covered. First, the chapter identifies key cases with respect to specific vulnerable groups, and secondly the most recent cases are analysed to reveal the latest trends. For this purpose, to establish how often ‘vulnerable groups’ appear on the agenda of the European Court of Human Rights, case law research was performed. The time frame chosen was the last five years starting from 1 January 2016 and ending 31 December 2020. After identification of all the cases, 37 most relevant cases were chosen and scrutinised in more detail. In this way, the chapter seeks to offer the reader a contextual analysis of the notion of vulnerable groups in European human rights law and sets out the framework for further chapters of the book.KeywordsVulnerable groupsVulnerabilityConcept of ‘vulnerable groups’Vulnerable groups in the European Court of Human Rights case lawVulnerability in ECHR

The aim of this chapter is to analyse the ECtHR’s evolving bad faith jurisprudence against this backdrop of the difficulties associated with proving bad faith violations in international law. By way of a close reading of the case law of the European Court of Human Rights between 2004, when it found its first bad faith violation until 2019, the chapter investigates how the Court has come to treat good faith as a rebuttable presumption, how the secondary rules of evidence concerning bad faith violations have developed in the case law of the Court over time, and the consequences of these developments for the primary rule provided in Article 18 of the Convention. The Chapter argues that the development of secondary rules of evidence to prove bad faith violations of the Convention are closely interrelated with the recent developments in the interpretation of primary rules of the Convention under Article 18. The ECtHR’s bad faith case law has, over time, evolved away from a direct and subjective evidence paradigm to a circumstantial and indirect evidence paradigm. At the same time, the substantive interpretation of Article 18 of the Convention, too evolved, to signal that the use of domestic laws and judicial proceedings in the service of anti rule of law and anti-democratic agendas constitutes a violation of the Convention. These developments make the ECtHR an avant -garde adjudicatory body in developing secondary rules of evidence for deciding whether states violate their international law obligations in bad faith.

The article examines some aspects of realization of the rule of law principle in the case law of the European Court of Human Rights. The author notes that the principle of the rule of law is a fundamental component of international legal acts regulating human rights and fundamental freedoms. It is emphasized that the Constitution of Ukraine proclaims that the principle of the rule of law is recognized and operates in Ukraine, but the concept of the rule of law itself is not fully disclosed in national legislation. The principle of the rule of law is actually the only effective means of ensuring the inviolability of democracy. The separate elements of this principle as its integral parts and mandatory prerequisites through which the European Court of Human Rights reveals the content of the rule of law was considered. The author provides examples of grouping certain requirements of the rule of law in the case law of the European Court of Human Rights. The author notes that there are no unified approaches to understanding the exact meaning of the rule of law principle either in theory or in practice. The author substantiates that the elements of the rule of law in the case law of the European Court of Human Rights are legality, legal certainty, fairness of a trial and priority of human rights. The main element of the rule of law in the case law of the European Court of Human Rights is legality. The requirement of legality has formal (procedural) and substantive aspects (requirements for the quality of the law). It is noted that the requirement to respect human rights and recognize their priority is key in the case law of the European Court of Human Rights. Cases of human rights restrictions must comply with the principle of proportionality. The provisions of the documents of the Venice Commission on the understanding of principle of the rule are analyzed, the activity of the European Court of Human Rights in ensuring the principle of the rule of law in the process of protection of human rights and freedoms is studied. The author concludes that the case law of the European Court of Human Rights is the basis for understanding the essence of the rule of law as a principle. The author emphasizes that the case law of the European Court of Human Rights has a positive impact on the indicators of strengthening the rule of law in the state, and contributes to the improvement of each individual element of this principle and all of them in aggregate.

The article deals with the ways of regarding the case law of the European Court of Human Rights as a source of criminal procedural law of Ukraine, which is relevant both in terms of the criminal procedure as a science and for the practice of law enforcement. The purpose of the article is to formulate the concept of the case law of the European Court of Human Rights as a source of criminal procedural law of Ukraine. The paper justifies the opinion that the case law of the European Court of Human Rights is developed and based on the decisions of the European Court of Human Rights and the European Commission of Human Rights, regardless of the country in which they were adopted (i. e. has a polyterritorial jurisdiction over states being the participants of the Convention). The article proves that the case law of the European Court of Human Rights is draws upon the decisions made by the European Court of Human Rights and the European Commission of Human Rights regardless of the time of adoption, i. e. it includes the decisions adopted before Ukraine ratified the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. The author points out the appropriateness of classifying decisions that have acquired the status of final as «case law of the European Court of Human Rights». It is also mentioned that there is a need to include final decisions in the case (as the matter of fact), which have a decisive nature and contain a legal position in this case, into the scope of the category «case law of the European Court of Human Rights». Moreover, the article substantiates the necessity to include the decisions adopted by the European Court of Human Rights in full, i. e. not only the set forth legal positions, into the category of «case law of the European Court of Human Rights». Following the results of the study, the case law of the European Court of Human Rights as a source of criminal procedural law of Ukraine is defined as a set of decisions adopted by the European Court of Human Rights and the European Commission of Human Rights, which have entered into force and contain legal policies which either clarify or specify the provisions of the Convention as for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and relate to human and citizen’s rights and freedoms.

Jurisdiction — Exterritorial Effect of — Confiscation of Property — Expropriation of Foreign Business — Trade Mark Owned by Foreign Business — Fate of Trade Mark Abroad — Divisibility of Trade Mark — Reparations Agreement of January 14, 1946.Jurisdiction — Territorial — Exemptions from — Foreign States — Nationalization of Foreign Business Enterprise by Foreign State — Trade Mark Owned by Enterprise in Country of Forum — Whether Courts of Forum Entitled to Exercise Jurisdiction over Trade Mark.Treaties — Interpretation of — Agencies of Interpretation — Courts of Law — Reparations Agreement of January 14, 1946 — Vesting of German Property in France — German Trade Marks — The Law of France.

China has long been the World's Walmart of counterfeits, and the remedies in counterfeiting cases have always been criticized as too small to compensate trademark owners. In the year 2013, China revised its trademark law, which increased the cap of statutory damages and incorporated secondary liability clauses into the law. Does the change of law bring any changes to the remedies granted in counterfeiting civil cases? What are the factors affecting court decisions? Relying on more than 800 civil cases in trademark counterfeiting, this article empirically studies the case characteristics and court decisions to understand the case outcomes and litigation scenario. It reveals the characteristics of civil litigation and factors affecting court decisions on trademark counterfeiting in China. Though there is some literature on remedies in trademark cases, very few analyses focus on courts' legal reasonings or the changes in civil remedies after the law revision. This article tries to fill in this gap, looking through the lens of the law on the books – the law revisions – and the law in practice – the court decisions.

This paper analyzes the significance of texts for the legal construction of human rights. First, it argues that a written and legally enforceable Bill of Rights is no precondition to the legal existence of human rights. But, secondly, such texts, be they binding or non-binding, of a constitutional nature or simple Acts of Parliament, serve to rationalize legal discourse by channeling legal reasoning. To prove this, human rights concepts and modes of legal reasoning will be analyzed both in EU member states representative of diverse human rights models - Germany, France, and Great Britain-and at the level of European Union law.In fact, human rights interpretation underlies cultural patterns that shape the scope and interpretation of rights rather than mere texts. Their existence and wording as a source of law is neither essential nor does it determine the scope of human rights. But texts do interfere at various levels with human rights adjudication and thereby shape the very idea we have of particular rights in society. Therefore, this paper analyzes strongly diverging approaches to legal reasoning in the field of human rights in EU member states. It further establishes how these interact and converge at EU level in the case law of the European Court of Justice. The paper focuses on the EC as this can be seen as a unique human rights laboratory in which a new culture of legal reasoning emerges out of a multitude of established human rights cultures.

Both the treaties of the European Union (EU) and the secondary legislation from EU institutions are currently issued in twenty-three different language versions. Discrepancies between these versions both jeopardize their equal authenticity, and make a uniform interpretation and application of EU law in all EU Member States more difficult. Yet, discrepancies between language versions have come up in the case law of the European Court of Justice (ECJ). Using a statistical analysis of fifty years of the ECJ's case law, all relevant judgments between 1960 and 2010, this article sheds further light on which interpretive method the ECJ is more likely to use in the event of linguistic discrepancies as an argument to justify its interpretation of EU law. It first discusses the discrepancies between the language versions that impede the multilingual interpretation of EU law. The article then makes use of the so-called ‘legal reasoning’ methodology to analyze the ECJ's case law, and considers the ECJ's use of the teleological approach and the literal approach to discrepancies.

Legal context The present article discusses the opinion of Advocate-General Jacobs in Case C-405/05 Class International BV v Unilever NV and others, according to which trade mark owners cannot oppose the entry into the European Union of grey market non-Community goods placed in external transit, on the grounds of Article 5(1) of the Trade Mark Directive, or any equivalent provision, as such entry does not constitute trade mark use. Key points We examine the consistency of this approach with prior case law of the European Court of Justice, namely in the Commission v France, Rioglass, The Polo/Lauren and Rolex cases and draw a parallelism with Council Regulation (EC) 1383/2003. Practical significance We conclude that trade mark owners should be allowed to prohibit the placing in transit of goods which would infringe an intellectual property right under the law of the transit country, unless the owner or consignor of the litigious goods can undeniably prove that the goods are not destined for the internal market. Stop press. At the end of the article the authors provide a brief analysis of the European Court of Justice's decision of 18th October 2005 in this case.