Playing and asserting

Boghossian has an interesting and insightful account of basic statements. For him, the explanation of such cases provides the necessary footing for the claim that objectively correct language use is settled by epistemic rules and that linguistic normativity is, if anything, epistemic normativity in disguise. What he is after, then, is an account which buttresses the assimilation of factual and semantic correctness by adducing a specific conception of epistemological correctness.KeywordsJustify BeliefBasic BeliefDeductive ReasoningLogical ConstantModus PonensThese keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

We have taken a look at the rules of games in order to acquire some knowledge concerning constitutive rules and, probably, institutional phenomena in general. In this paper we tried to elaborate a system account of constitutive rules. We claim that all accounts that put emphasis on the form of rules are vulnerable. It appears that constitutive rules are interconnected and always form a system that can be internally differentiated. Thanks to adopting certain qualitative criterion we were able to distinguish central and peripheral constitutive rules. Moreover, that very account makes it possible to distinguish between different types (rigid and flexible) of practices that are determined by types of systems of rules. Secondly, it appears there are three “layers” of games that should not be confused: deep conventions, constitutive rules that establish the game and determine games’ identities, and “rules of efficiency” that are some sort of recommendations as to how to play well.

Bonne and Higgins (2022) explore game playing and fluctuations in emotional climate at a classroom level of analysis using a social and phenomenological orientation. My aim in this forum paper is to extend upon their work by exploring the nature of both formal game rules and practical game rules as reasoning-in-action where science reasoning may be embedded. Rules as reasoning-in-action are considered from the perspective of studies of ethnomethods, which are the interactional methods people use in everyday situations to make sense of social reality. I apply these ideas to compare gamification of science learning with learning through authentic science practices by discussing similarities and differences in the way we might regard reality in game play and the application of emotions to the design of learning contexts. I suggest the need for future research to embed gamification more routinely in science teacher education, including raised awareness about emotions and aesthetics in learning science.

Epistemic norms are the normative sensibilities by which folk regulate their epistemic practices. Like the rules of grammar, epistemic rules guide epistemic activity without necessarily being fully articulated in the minds of those who are guided by them. Epistemic norms are thus the extant epistemic normative sensibilities possessed by agents that influence the production and dissemination of an important epistemic good. Such norms reflect the information available at the time—information bearing on what has apparently been reliable, in what combinations, with what weaknesses, and how such weaknesses may be patched. Epistemic norms as social norms serve goods that individuals in a group have reason to pursue. Shared epistemic norms allow for a coordinated community pursuit of epistemic goods. To the extent that epistemic practice in a community is regulated by shared norms, people can readily rely on results gotten elsewhere in the community.

Many contemporary philosophers argue that assertion is governed by an epistemic norm. In particular, many defend the knowledge account of assertion, which says that one should assert only what one knows. Here, I defend a non‐normative alternative to the knowledge account that I call the repK account of assertion. According to the repK account, assertion represents knowledge, but it is not governed by a constitutive epistemic rule. I show that the repK account offers a more straightforward interpretation of the conversational patterns and intuitions that motivate the knowledge account. It does so in terms of ordinary normative principles that philosophers already accept, none of which are constitutive to assertion. I then contend that the repK account is preferable to the knowledge account because it is simpler, its implications are less contentious, and it avoids a problem for normative accounts of assertion recently raised by Peter Pagin. I also argue that the repK account offers a satisfying explanation of selfless assertion, a counterexample to the knowledge account posed by Jennifer Lackey.

<i>Sharing Knowledge: A Functionalist Account of Assertion</i>

In a recent article in this journal, Del Mar offered two main criticisms of Marmor’s account of social conventions. The first took issue with Marmor’s claim that the constitutive rules of games and kindred social practices determine in an objective way their central aims and values; the second charged Marmor with scanting the historical context in which conventions do their important normative work in shaping the goals of games. I argue that Del Mar’s criticism of Marmor’s account of the normative centrality and force of constitutive rules in games and the like fails, but that his criticism faulting Marmor for giving short shrift to the normative work conventions do in these social practices is on the mark. So while I reject Del Mar’s claim that a closer look at the social and historical contexts in which the conventions of games and the like carry out their normative tasks undermines Marmor’s account of constitutive rules, I think his argument that conventions play a far more important, even if supplementary, role in shaping our understanding of and participation in these social practices than Marmor allows is persuasive.

I argue that assertion and practical reasoning must be governed by the same epistemic norm. This is because the epistemic rule governing assertion derives from the epistemic rule governing practical reasoning, together with a plausible rule regarding assertion, according to which assertion must manifest belief.

Timothy Williamson holds that the knowledge rule of assertion, according to which one should assert only what one knows, is the single norm of assertion. I explain and defend Williamson’s thesis. I identify three key features associated with the thesis: the single norm of assertion should be constitutive, individuating and basic. Roughly, a constitutive rule of a speech act governs every possible performance of the act. A rule of assertion is individuating if it differentiates assertion from every other speech act. Finally, a rule of assertion is basic if it does not derive from other rules governing assertion, or other speech acts. I thus construe Williamson’s thesis as the claim that the knowledge rule is the only individuating, constitutive and basic rule of assertion. This thesis is compatible with the idea that assertion is governed by non-epistemic constitutive rules such as moral and prudential rules. Since these rules are not individuating, there is no need to understand Williamson’s thesis as bearing solely on the epistemic rule of assertion. I explain how the existing arguments in favor of the knowledge rule can serve to support the thesis that this rule is also the single norm of assertion. I also respond to some objections against the knowledge rule, and criticize alternative rules.KeywordsConstitutive RuleGettier CaseUnique RuleKnowledge RuleTruth RuleThese keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

Game theory and rules are deeply intertwined for at least two reasons: first, in many cases rules are necessary to break the indeterminacy that surrounds most of the games; second, in the past 30 years game theory has been increasingly used as a major tool to build a theory of social rules. Interestingly, though the concept of rules is now part of most game theorists' tool box, none of them has explicitly entertained the important distinction between regulative rules and constitutive rules. This distinction, which finds its roots in Ludwig Wittgenstein's profound discussion of ‘language games’, is at the core of modern philosophy of social sciences. This article asks whether game theory can account for constitutive rules. I distinguish between three game-theoretic accounts of rules: the rules-as-behavioral-regularities account, the rules-as-normative-expectations account, and the rules-as-correlated-devices account. I show that only the latter two are able to make sense of constitutive rules by giving up any pure individualistic understanding of game theory.

In the final extra time minutes of the 2010 World Cup quarterfinal match between Uruguay and Ghana, Uruguay’s star striker Luis Suarez deliberately batted the ball with his hand off of his own team’s goal line. The referee quickly detected his action, penalizing Suarez with a red card for deliberately handling the ball and rewarding Ghana with a penalty kick. Given that he had no other way to stop the ball and with only seconds remaining, his decision appeared—despite the odds—to be a calculated one. Had Suarez not stopped the ball, Uruguay’s World Cup run was over. Even with the impending penalty kick, Uruguay’s chances of winning were slim but not impossible. Yet when Ghana’s Asamoah Gyan failed to convert the subsequent penalty kick, Suarez’s “deal with the devil” turned into either an act of strategic brilliance or the mischievous manipulation of a loophole in soccer rules. Suarez’s actions raise questions about games and their rules. He openly violated the rules and willingly accepted his punishment, yet he also broke the rules in order to deny Ghana a fair and earned victory. So his case indicates a larger problem—what to make of this type of egregious but strategic rule breaking. To better understand the appropriateness of Suarez’s actions, one needs to understand the more fundamental relationship between games and their rules. And it is here that, despite much effort, the field of sport philosophy is still without a satisfactory paradigm that explains game rules. The existing paradigm focuses mainly on a categorical distinction developed by John Searle between constitutive rules that make the convention possible by determining relationships where none existed before, and regulative rules that identify relevant existing relationships and regulate behavior. This constitutive/ regulative categorical distinction has a number of clear uses. It can help us understand the need for rules to define practices like sports. It also indicates that some connection exists between sports and potentially incompatible rule violations. But it still remains unclear whether the constitutive/regulative distinction adequately provides a rough account of game rules or even if it sufficiently explains the relationship between games and their rules. More importantly, can such an account of game rules actually help us to evaluate a player’s behavior in relation to a game’s

This paper examines the state of sovereignty in post-integration Europe. Drawing on linguistic approaches to law and IR, it interrogates Neil Walker’s conception of ‘late sovereignty’, in terms of how it manages the problem of continuity and change in concepts in transition as well as the constitutive and regulative rules of late sovereignty games. The transition from what the paper calls ‘high sovereignty’ to ‘late sovereignty’ entails a broadening of the range of actors who play late sovereignty games to include non-sovereign state entities such as the EU, a redefinition of the ‘particularising’ element of ultimate authority from territory to function, and an evolution of the criteria for what constitutes a ‘good’ sovereignty claim as stipulated by the regulative rules of late sovereignty games. It concludes by assessing the relevance of late sovereignty for the trilateral relationship between the non-continental territories of EU Member States, the Member states themselves and the EU.

Rules in games are fundamental to the ethics of practice. Rules provide a context or space where a game is defined and played. Throughout human life, games may be formalized with written and unwritten rules. Imaginations may be sparked in the creative structuring of new, informal games. Formal and informal rules can serve to provide direction for what may be viewed as decorum and appropriate behavior with professional groups. In this column, the author illuminates possible ethical meanings for rule-making and breaking with implications for nursing practice and education from a nursing theoretical perspective.

We present initial research regarding a system capable of generating novel card games. We furthermore propose a method for computationally analysing existing games of the same genre. Ultimately, we present a formalisation of card game rules, and a context-free grammar G cardgame capable of expressing the rules of a large variety of card games. Example derivations are given for the poker variant Texas hold ’em, Blackjack and UNO. Stochastic simulations are used both to verify the implementation of these well-known games, and to evaluate the results of new game rules derived from the grammar. In future work, this grammar will be used to evolve completely novel card games using a grammar-guided genetic program.KeywordsGame designgame description languageevolutionary computationgrammar guided genetic programmingautomated game design

This paper highlights the design of a chemistry based puzzle game. The design of the game is meant to teach basic concepts of chemistry related to covalent bonds. The area of Educational Technology is still not so developed for young learners. An interactive technology is required for learning effectively and efficiently. The result is Atoms to Molecule (A2M). In A2M the environment of the levels are designed as such a player will have complete feel of chemistry lab. This game tries to intact fun with education. In this paper we are trying to highlight the features of chemistry objects which are used in our game. While teaching the basic concept of Chemistry, like bonds between atoms and how molecules are formed teacher usually gives examples to define the formation of bonds. However, the concepts of atoms and molecules are difficult for students to imagine. This game A2M has clearly presented the concepts lying behind the formation of bonds, game rules and simple game levels is chosen as the teaching aid along with a fun puzzle game.