Pilot Agency and Promoting Development

The 1982 publication of Chalmers Johnson’s book, MITI and the Japanese Miracle: The Growth of Industrial Policy, 1925 to 1975, was a watershed moment in comparative policy studies (Johnson, 1982). The book introduced Western readers to the Japanese developmental experience, precisely at the moment when Japan was rivalling the United States in terms of global economic dominance. Johnson’s book provided in-depth analyses of trade, investment, human capital development and strategic industrial policies to grow Japanese enterprises into world-class competitors. His study revealed how Japanese firms were organized and how they were linked to the powerful state. The book also explained how policy decisions in Japan were made in a hierarchical manner, how power and authority over resource allocation decisions were centralized in a meritocratic bureaucracy, and specifically within what Johnson called the state’s ‘pilot agency’, the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI). Finally, Johnson’s book intimated that a hard or strong state was helpful, at least in Japan’s experience, in steering national economic development and continual industrial upgrading.KeywordsWelfare StateIndustrial PolicyMoral EconomySocial Science TheoryTheoretical BiasThese keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

A proposal for an aseismic design method of equipment and piping for NPPs in a low seismicity area

In 1989, Japan's Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) opened all its R&D consortia to foreign participation on more liberal terms than those offered by publicly sponsored consortia in the USA and the European Union. MITI calls this policy 'techno-globalism'.This article assesses MITI's techno-globalism with case studies of the ministry's two most controversial international consortia-the Real World Computing Program and the Intelligent Manufacturing Systems Initiative.The article argues that MITI learned from mistakes made in research consortia during the 1980s and is adapting to its diminished leverage over Japanese firms with consortia that offer greater flexibility in organization and research goals.The article also examines the structure of contemporary consortia in terms of techno-nationalism. It contends that Richard Samuels' notion of techno-national ideology fails to capture the nuances across MITI's international consortia which cover a range of technologies and forms of collaboration.These programs are not the efficient mechanisms for indigenizing foreign technologies that techno-national ideology suggests. Moreover, internationalization is not simply a token gesture. MITI has limited itself to a strategy of international co-operation across all programs-not just ones where Japan trails the state-of-the-art. In 1989, Japan's Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI), the ministry most closely associated with Japan's post-war industrial policy, opened all its large-scale research programs to

Literature on Japanese foreign policy in the past has mostly focused on the issues that fell within the jurisdictions of either the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) or the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI). The MOFA is generally considered weak within the domestic bureaucracy, and it barely shares the jurisdiction over foreign economic policies with various economic ministries. Although the MITI has kept the MOFA at bay on most foreign economic issues, the MITI’s increasingly diverse clientele has meant that its independence has been somewhat reduced. Such diversity of interests among domestic actors and the inability of the political leadership in Japan to solve the infighting have been blamed for Japan’s reactive diplomacy and dependence on gaiatsu (external pressure) for policy recourse. This chapter will instead explore macroeconomic diplomacy by the Ministry of Finance (MOF), the most powerful ministry, which is believed to have maintained the highest degree of independence from domestic interests and other ministries. In reviewing the MOF macroeconomic policy and international currency adjustments, one can find two main reasons for Japan’s reactive macroeconomic diplomacy: external structural constraints and internal policy immobilism. Externally, the sheer size of the U.S. market and Japan’s dependence on it, as well as the use of the U.S. dollar for international transactions, present structural limits to Japan’s macroeconomic policy. The internationalization of yen to reduce this structural disadvantage has been discussed, but its implementation has faced domestic policy immobilism.

I. Introduction The Japanese nation-state has created regionwide in association with the nation-states in Southeast Asia. Japanese government officials, perhaps particularly from the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI), renamed the Ministry of Economy, Industry and Trade (METI) in 2001, consider that a close government-business relationship facilitates more rapid economic than the laissez-faire market system. The literature on the focuses on policies. However, the essence of the can be seen not only in the domestic matter of industrializing or restructuring industry, but also in the international strategy of the state. This study argues that the Japanese nation-state has been building institutional capacity in Southeast Asia to foster, in effect, the regionalization of the Japanese developmental or a interdependence of the Japanese state, ASEAN member states and Japanese capital throughout the region. In so doing, the Japanese governmentbusiness relationship has taken the initiative, particularly in developing small- and mediumsized enterprises (SMEs) within Southeast Asia, in transferring technology selectively, fostering human resource and expanding and elaborating physical infrastructure. The regionalization of Japanese production networks has been simultaneously a project of developing institutional and technical capacities under the guidance of the Japanese and capital. This study begins with identifying the concepts of the developmental state and interdependence in East Asia. A second issue to be examined is the form of expansion of interdependence in Southeast Asia. A committee known as AEM-MITI/METI Economic and Industrial Co-operation Committee (AMEICC), the joint product of the ASEAN Economic Ministers (AEM) and MITI/METI will be represented as an exemplar of the regionalization of governed interdependence, and as an illustration of how this and its implications are to be understood in politico-economic terms. II. Governed Interdependence in East Asian Developmental States Developmental theorists (or statists) stress the importance of guidance and intervention in economic development. They argue that the remarkable aspects of Northeast Asian industrialization, in particular that of Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan, were brought about not by market forces but by the role of the in cooperation with private capital. Development was achieved by management of the market, industrial strategies, public investment, and export strategies reflecting state-business co-operation. The notion of the was articulated by Chalmers Johnson (1982) and adopted by Amsden (1989), Wade (1990), and Weiss and Hobson (1995), among others. Johnson's contribution was to raise an alternative explanation of economic to that being purveyed by the American-dominated development economics literature of the time. In Johnson's perspective, Japan's performance challenges that of the AngloAmerican free economies and also challenges claims made for the capacities of socialist economies. In regard to the state-business relationship in the states, Johnson (1999, p. 60) mentioned that [t]he concept developmental state means that each side uses the other in a mutually beneficial relationship to achieve goals and enterprise viability. When the is working well, neither the officials nor the civilian enterprise managers prevail over the other. The government-business relationship in East Asia has been more institutionalized than that of other nations. Weiss and Hobson have subsequently described the mutually beneficial relationship as the interdependence of and business (Weiss and Hobson 1995; Weiss 1995 and 1998). …

For the purpose of evaluating methane hydrate occurrence offshore central Japan, 32 wells were drilled through the BSR (Bottom Simulating Reflector) horizon at the water depth of 720 m to 2,033 m over a 122-day period from January 2004 to May 2004. This was the second methane hydrate exploration campaign in the Nankai-Trough as a national project led by Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry(METI, re-structured from MITI (Ministry of International Trade and Industry) in 2001) to seek a new energy source, based on the technologies developed through the first campaign of 1999–2000 1. It was organized by Japan National Oil Corporation (JNOC, re-structured to JOGMEC (Oil, Gas and Metals National Corporation) in 2004) in collaboration with Japan Petroleum Exploration Co., Ltd. (JAPEX) as the drilling operator and with Teikoku Oil Co., Ltd. (TOC). Sixteen (16) wells were LWD-logged and two of them were installed with the high accuracy bore hole temperature sensors, 2 wells were wireline-logged, 12 wells were cored, and 2 wells were cased and experimented to verify technologies for the future possible stage including 1 horizontal well. All scheduled programs were performed successfully with a deepwater research vessel the "JOIDES Resolution" operated by Transocean. This paper introduces its general program. Introduction Japan has been seeking for the potential of natural hydrate as a future energy source and has developed systematic research programs in the last decade. In 1995, when Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) established the initial program and declared to drill an exploration well offshore Japan in 5 years, Japan National Oil Corporation (JNOC) immediately organized the research teams leading ten (10) Japanese private companies, including JAPEX, to develop the most efficient methodology for the challenging exploration drilling program 2. Based on the result of the research, the world-wide first offshore natural hydrate exploration wells were successfully drilled from November 1999 to February 2000 in the Nankai-Trough offshore Japan at a water depth of 945 m where BSR was clear on the seismic section 1. The program brought extremely valuable results regarding how hydrate occurred at the wells 3, 4, 5. And one of the biggest accomplishments of the program was to establish the methodology to evaluate hydrate occurrence by drilling a well. Thus, the next program was planned to apply the methodology to many wells drilled at many locations to explore the extensive area effectively. 2D and 3D seismic surveys were conducted in 2001 and 2002 respectively in order to select locations for the multi wells, and the multi-well exploration program was scheduled in 2004. In this paper, the previous exploration program conducted at the single location of the Nankai-Trough in 1999–2000 is described as "the 1999–2000 program", while the multi-well exploration program conducted in 2004 is described as "the 2004 program" which is the theme of this paper. General Plan of the 2004 Program Based on the comprehensive interpretation of 2D and 3D seismic surveys,

The purpose of this paper is to describe how coordination of plant investment in the petrochemical industry by the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) did not achieve its originally intended function.In 1967, MITI established a 300,000 ton standard for annual production of ethylene in order achieve economies of scale and strengthen international competitiveness. This standard sets the minimum size for new ethylene manufacturing facilities at annual production of 300,000 tons. In this way, MITI aimed to avoid overcapacity and consolidate investment. Part of the background behind establishing this standard was the ulterior motive of leading firms, who wished to block the entry of relatively weak latecomer firms.The intentions of MITI and the leading firms were realized comparatively well, based on the 300,000 ton standard, in initial coordination of plant investment. Facility construction was only approved for 5 companies, primarily leading firms. Furthermore, the scale of investment in the overall industry was restrained at a smaller scale than would have been the case had each firm invested freely.However, demand for petrochemical products subsequently increased more than expected, resulting in a situation different from that which was originally intended. In later coordination of plant investment, MITI concluded that it was necessary to construct more facilities to satisfy future demand, in response to the growth in demand at that time. Accordingly, new facility construction by 4 companies was gradually recognized. Due to growth in demand, MITI's policy of blocking the entry of latecomer firms lost its legitimacy. In the final phase, MITI recognized active construction of new facilities to match the increase in demand.

In the early 70's, an ocean mineral Development was adopted as one of the Government's mining policy in Japan. Ten Metal Mining Agency of Japan (MMAJ) has Started the exploration of manganese Nodules at the request of the Ministry Of International Trade and Industry (MITI) in 1975.MMAJ has also started the Exploration for hydrothermal deposits And cobalt rich manganese crust in mid 80's. The Agency of Industrial Science And Technology, MITI, started R&D of Manganese nodule mining system in 1981 And will conduct ocean mining test in 1997. in the mean time the National Institute for Resources and Environment (NIRE) and the geological Survey of Japan (GSJ) play important roles in the Scientific and fundamental research of Deep ocean resources development. Introduction Japanese self-support ratio of rare Metals is very low and the dependence On imports is 100% for cobalt, 99% for Molybdenum and 95% for manganese. The Major exporting countries to Japan are Limited to specificcduntries, reflecting The uneven distribution of production .87 Countries. Within the demands for rare Metals, the demand for nickel in the World rose by 3.2% on average every Year over the past 30 years. However, 70% of this demand was concentrated in Japan, US and Europe, indicating that The demand by advanced industrial Countries were very large. Among of mineral resources found on The deep sea-bed, the mineral deposits That are attracting most attention are Manganese nodules which are abundant At a depth of 4,000 to 6,000 m. As a Result of the preliminary surveys by Advanced countries in 1970s, the outline Of their distribution, characteristics, And formation process were clarifies And their economic value as future Expected resources were spotlighted. The promotion of the surveys and the Development of manganese nodules are Very important for Japan in order to Secure self-support long-term stabilized Supply of rare metals. On the other Hand, the deep sea where manganese Nodules are abundant is an extremely Severe environment with hydrostatic Pressures of 500 times of the atmospheric Pressure and a temperature Of 2 to 3 degree Celsius. Thus, there Are many problems to be solved technically. In this development, which needs large funding and a long lead time. Japanese Program Since early 1970'SA deep ocean minerals Development was adopted as one of the Government's principal mining policy. The Ocean Development Office of Agency Of Natural Resources and Energy, Ministry Of International Trade and Industry (MITI) is in charge of formulating basic Policy for deep sea-bed mineral resources Development. Then, the research Institutes of MITI such as the Geological Survey of Japan (GSJ) and the National Institute for Resources and Environment (NIRE), have been playing Important roles in the geological study And the fundamental engineering research Of the deep sea-bed mineral Resources development. The Metal Mining Agency of Japan (MMAJ) Has started the exploration of manganese Nodules in the Clarion-Clipper ton Zone (C-C zone) in the Pacific Ocean in 1975 at the request of the MITI. For This project, R/V "Hakurei-maru" was Launched.

Summary form only given. The studies on space solar power (SSPS), which were carried out in 1970s at DOE/NASA, have been conducted in Japan as well. The fundamental investigation and economic study were conducted as contract with Science and Technology Agency (STA) and National Space Development Agency of Japan (NASDA) in early 1980s. In second half of 1980s, the study on space energy technology was conducted as contract with Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI). In 1990s, one of largest committees in past was organized under contract with The New Energy and Industrial Technology Development Organization (NEDO), and 3 years study named the study on space solar power systems had been conducted from JFY1991 to JFY1993. This study had examined feasibility as future commercial power source of SSPS. NASDA (On October 1 2003, ISAS, NAL and NASDA were merged into one independent administrative institution. Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency: JAXA) has started studies on SSPS and high efficiency hydrogen-methanol generating system since JFY1998, organizing special committees and working groups. In addition to technical studies, economic and social studies have been conducted. In order to acquire fundamental data for public acceptance of SSPS, awareness survey of SSPS was carried out to general adults in last year The Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI, MITI was reorganized to METI in 2001) has funded Institute for Unmanned Space Experiment Free Flyer (USEF) for SSPS study since JFY2001. USEF also organized a committee and some working groups and was mainly doing research on microwave power transmission. This paper shows overview of these SSPS studies and recent study activities.

The application of systems theory to a particular country is beset with practical and theoretical problems. In most cases, organizations and even individual players in the field of energy politics cannot be classed unambiguously with the relevant subsystems of economy, politics, or technology, but are part of their interactions. The Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI), for example, is an organ of the Japanese public administration, but its activities are at the interface between politics and the economy. It is the central representation of business in the government. At the same time, through its advisory and regulatory powers, it represents the government with respect to industry. In turn, the government is not simply a political organ; the economy is deeply entrenched in it by a variety of mechanisms. A particularly visible example is the great number of councils and committees as well as trade and industrial associations formed and controlled by MITI. The political administration of MITI, the minister’s office in particular, has to translate the reasonings of MITI’s offices, divisions, departments, bureaus, and agencies into political power, in terms appropriate to the political system. The same holds for individuals. The minister of MITI receives prestige and political power from being a major voice of the economy and, at the same time, he represents politics vis-a-vis the economy. Okimoto (1989) gives a perspicacious account of this.

In the interview granted to Amatori and Molteni, Shinji Fukukawa, for a long time Vice-Minister of the powerful Japanese Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI), retraces the role of the Ministry in guiding Japanese industrial economy. In the 1950s and 1960s, MITI effectively ran much of Japanese industrial policies, with the major objective of strengthening the country’s industrial basis, not differently from what other governments were doing through the instrument of State-owned enterprises (SOEs). The Ministry acted both as an arbiter and a regulator, providing private industries with guidelines on technological investments and on crucial competition challenges. Fukukawa underlines the vision inspiring MITI and also illustrates the working of MITI from inside, focusing on the relationships between its officials and private managers.

Abstract: In the 1960s, the former Japanese Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) controlled key industries through its industrial policy. It is commonly believed that this policy was based on an economic rationale. In particular, the MITI justified what are known as recession cartels on the grounds that reducing production volume would prevent destructive competition. Our purpose is to go beyond this current economic understanding via a sociopsychological analysis. We focus on the so‐called Sumitomo Metals incident of 1965 when the Sumitomo Metals Company refused to follow the MITI guideline demanding a reduction in steel production. This was the first such incident in which a private company explicitly refused to abide by MITI administrative guidance. We hold that the industrial policy was not necessarily based on an economic rationale. Sumitomo was alone enjoying profit while all other companies were suffering loss. The MITI and major steel manufacturers insisted, without economically sound reasoning, that Sumitomo should reduce its steel exports. On an economic basis, however, steel exports should have been promoted, not restricted, to counterbalance the domestic recession. The whole incident was a sociopsychological battle disguised as an economic debate, and the economic argument of the MITI and other steel manufacturers was actually an elaborate scheme of psychological rationalization. Their severe denouncement of Sumitomo is best explained by the psychological defense mechanisms of projection and displacement. Furthermore, the recession cartel in this case was essentially a ritual of collective suffering under the orchestration of state authority.

Collaboration between government and industry has been widely acknowledged as a characteristic of the Japanese economic and social system. In particular, the history of industrial policy operated by MITI (Ministry of International Trade and Industry) is central to the relationship. It took MITI a long time to establish an arena for government-industry relationships that enabled the government to both achieve policy objectives and preserve competition among private enterprises.1 It is also often pointed out, however, that over the past decade, industrial policy has become less important in overall government economic policy. Business has become strong and independent and MITI now has less powerful instruments available to it to implement policies.2 Although these developments suggest that MITI’s collaboration with industry is now partly a myth, other Japanese ministries now place more attention on collaboration with industry than ever before. Their new enthusiasm is in part attributable to the economic context of continual budget deficits for the Japanese government and in part to new high technology industries and new technology such as telecommunications and biotechnology. The government tends to expect more private money to be devoted to activities to achieve policy objectives in order to compensate for decreased government expenditures.

Modern institutional theory specifies two different aspects of institutions. The first aspect—and by far the predominant perspective—sees institutions as recurrent patterns of behavior, values, norms and practices which guide social and political behavior. The second aspect refers to the manifest institutional systems of the state. These two sides of institutions are supposed to be mutually reinforcing. Thus, institutions are “embedded” in overarching systems of values at the same time as they “constrain” behavior. This article takes exactly the opposite approach and seeks to separate the two different meanings of institutions in order to explain changes in the effective capabilities of manifest institutions. Using the Japanese Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) as an empirical case, the argument advanced in the article is that variations in the institutional leverage and capacity of MITI can to a significant extent be explained by changes in the relationship between “abstract” and “manifest” institutions, i.e. the extent to which the institutional arrangement of the state reflects predominant systems of values, norms and beliefs in society. In addition to the vast literature on institutional theory, the article draws on a series of interviews with MITI senior officials between 1988 and 1996 as well as on the literature on Japanese political economy.

This article examines antidumping policy and politics in Japan. on detailed analysis of the institutional system regarding antidumping and the filed dumping cases, I explore how evolving trade policy preferences of the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) have antidumping policy and politics, and what has altered MITI policy In the 1980s, MITI bureaucrats sought to settle dumping issues by encouraging the industries concerned to hold inter-industry meetings and pursuing bilateral voluntary export restraints. As Japan has accumulated trade disputes with developed countries, MITI officials have over time a strict application of the antidumping legislation on the basis of the principles embodied in the international trading system.