Pierre Charron's View of the Source of Wisdom

Abstract

Pierre Charron's View of the Source of Wisdom MARYANNE CLINE HOROWITZ THE IMPORTANCE OF PIERRE CHARRON (1541-1603) in the history of philosophy has come to historical attention in Eugene Rice's The Renaissance Idea of Wisdom 1 and in Richard Popkin's History oJ Scepticism from Erasmus to Descartes. 2 To Rice, "Pierre Charron's De la Sagesse is the most important Renaissance treatise on wisdom." 3 Traditionally, Pierre Charron has been viewed as a minor disciple of Michel de Montaigne and as a precursor to the much maligned libertins. Richard Popkin has revamped this interpretation. He sees Charron as a key disciple of Montaigne: the disciple who helped spread the master's Pyrrhonian scepticism to the libertins drudits. In analyzing Charron's scepticism from the perspective of De la Sagesse instead of from the perspective of Pyrrhonism, I find that Popkin has overemphasized the significance of Charron's Pyrrhonian arguments, and has neglected to point out that Charron's scepticism is severely limited by his theory of natural seeds of virtue and knowledge. My proof of this claim rests on my discovery of crucial textual changes from the 1601 edition to the 1604 edition of De la Sagesse. In his second edition Pierre Charron clarifies his rejection of the Aristotelian epistemological assumption of his so-called master Michel de Montaigne. A basic assumption of Aristotelian epistemology is that the senses are the basis of knowledge: "Nihil est in intellectu quod non prius in sensu." The rational faculty cannot generalize except from discrete things known through the senses. Thus human knowledge is dependent upon the adequacy and natural functioning of the sense organs.4 In his chapter "The natural senses" Charron raises doubts about the reliability and adequacy of man's senses. Various animals excel man in the acuteness of a particular sense organ. Is it not possible that a brute's perception of an object be closer to the truth than man's perception of it? A blind man can have no idea of the sense of sight. Might not mankind be unaware of a sixth sense 1 Eugene Rice, The Renaissance Idea o/ Wisdom (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1958). Richard Popkin, History of Scepticism ]rom Erasmus to Descartes, revised edition (Netherlands: Van Gorcum Company, 1964). 3 Rice, p. 178. 4 Herschel Baker, The Dignity o/ Man (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1947), pp. 58-59,279. [443] 444 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY which, though missing, is necessary for the full knowledge of the workings of nature? Multiple examples of optical illusions and sense impressions distorted by the passions reveal that man is unable to distinguish reliable sense data from unreliable sense data. What man or beast then has the authority to judge? 5 Albert Desjardins, John Owen, Heinrich Teipel, J. B. Sabrir, and most recently Richard Popkin have quoted and referred to these arguments as an important basis of Charron's scepticism.6 John Owen imputes to Charron the Aristotelian belief that the senses are the source of all knowledge, and then implies by reciting these arguments that Charron holds that certain knowledge is unattainable: When he comes to treat the soul, its different powers and faculties, and the many irreconciliable opinions which have been held concerning it, his scepticism breaks forth in a quite unmistakeable form.... The senses are with Charron, as with other skeptics, the source of human knowledge, though of course such knowledge is imperfect .7 As shall be seen, Owen's argument is fallacious because his original assumption is incorrect: Charron attacks the Aristotelian theory of sense knowledge not as an Aristotelian but from the perspective of one outside the system. Richard Popkin interprets Charron in this way when he notes the necessary failure of Charron's early critics who merely restate the Aristotelian theory of the natural functioning of the senses. 8 Charron, according to Richard Popkin, attacks the Aristotelian theory from the perspective of Pyrrhonian scepticism. "The natural senses" plays a preponderant role in Popkin's proof that Charron is a Pyrrhonian sceptic: Charron borrows his arguments from Michel de Montaigne, who in turn borrows from the then new Latin translation of Sextus Empiricus' Outlines of Pyrrhonism. 9 Popkin's emphasis on...