Philosophy in the context of physics and cosmology: Leszek M. Sokołowski’s philosophical views

Introduction: Education is in a deep relationship with our perception of science and philosophy of science is a knowledge which shapes our perception of the nature of science. Different points of views in philosophy of science like positivistic views, critical rationalism, and after them the historical –sociological views of Thomas Kuhn and Paul Feyerabend, lead to different requirements and consequences in education. This paper studies Feyerabends views in philosophy of science and education and the consequences of his ideas. Method: The method in this paper is philosophical-analytical based on Feyerabend writings. Results: Although Feyerabend points of views are not weak, but he does not present any mechanism in order to make his suggestion practical. Until the time of introducing the methods to make his ideas practical, if assuming it possible ,the most important factor in realization of educating critical thinking and nurturing the modern and free thinker human being, which is considered by Feyerabend, is the characteristics and personal capabilities of teachers. Discussion: Paul Feyrabend is famous for his controversial views on philosophy of science. Two of his points of views are believed to be the most important ones: One is the incommensurability of scientific alternative theories and the other one is the negation of exact method in science production. There is another important aspect in Feyrabend’s views which is as important as the mentioned views. This important aspect is desacralizing of science and the denying of exclusive authority about new science. Denying of exact methods for new science, the incommensurability of theories, and the acceptance of knowledge relativity set the ground for all scientific claims.But Feyrabend thinks that the domination of science does not let the other epistemological traditions to express themselves.Almost all of the science philosophers ,except positivists such as Francis Bacon,believe that creation of scientific theories is not methodical,but for evaluating the theories both the positivistic inductive and Popperian non-inductive approaches see the science methodical. Feyrabend sees both the inductivism and Popperian non-inductivism unsuccessful in explaining the ups and downs of science and his famous quotation that “Anything goes” is a representative for his notion. He thinks that science is affected by the non-scientific factors .The hegemony of science,which has made the science as a sacred ideology,does not allow the other traditions to be seen.He looks at the nowadays educational institutions as the guards of the sanctity of science and the barriers of expressing other traditions. By elaborating on the aforementioned points, this paper aims at studying Feyrabend’s critiques about the educational system and his suggestions to improve the system and leads to a comprehensive philosophic evaluation of his suggestions.He imagines a free society in which,all of the traditions have equal rights and people choose based oncritical thinking and arguing rather than propaganda and under the authority of science and scientists.It can be said that he desires an utopian society than arealistic one. This paper illustrates that although his ideas are logically strong, there are lots of barriers to implement them in the society.

A major controversy in contemporary philosophy of science concerns the possibility and desirability of its ‘naturalization.’ In this paper I review the philosophical controversy concerning naturalism, and investigate the role it might play in the science classroom. I argue that science students can benefit from explicit study of this controversy, and from explicit consideration of the extent to which philosophy of science can be studied naturalistically. More specifically, I suggest that such consideration can enhance students' understanding of the nature of ‘natural’ science, of the nature and importance of philosophy of science, and of the relationship between the two — and that these benefits accrue to science education whichever philosophical view concerning naturalization proves to be correct. My hope is that the paper demonstrates the benefits to be gained from explicit consideration in the science classroom of an important issue in the philosophy of science.

The use of empirical work in philosophy of mind is an increasing trend and forms the starting point for this chapter. The potential value of such interdisciplinary research is not in question here, and it is assumed to be high. Rather, the chapter focuses on questions about the specific ways in which interdisciplinary research across philosophy and the mind/brain sciences is carried out. These include how empirical work can be used to support or revise existing philosophical positions, and the role of the empirically based philosopher in cognitive science. Following this, I suggest an alternative way of approaching questions in philosophy of mind and cognitive science in an interdisciplinary way, based on contemporary work in philosophy of science. This approach is explored through two examples, focusing on the interpretation of first-person data and questions about the boundaries of cognition. While not the only, or necessarily the best, approach to interdisciplinary work, I suggest that a focus on methodological questions from the point of view of philosophy of science is a potentially invaluable way of pursuing philosophical questions about the mind.

This chapter examines the widespread assumptions that intertheoretic reductions are common in the natural sciences and that reducibility serves as a kind of normative constraint upon the legitimacy of the special sciences. While this was the mainline view in philosophy of science in the mid‐twentieth century, it has received decisive criticism within philosophy of science since the 1970s. The basic reasons for this rejection of Carnap‐Nagel style reductionism are recounted in this chapter.

Historically, the problem of discovery or the problem of the genesis of scientific ideas has been taken seriously by the historians, psychologists, sociologists and philosophers who analyzed the creative thinking and formation of ideas and attempted to provide a meaningful account of them. In fact, the philosophical concern with scientific discovery is as old as science and philosophy of science themselves. However, almost throughout the first half of 20th century, philosophical reflection on the phenomenon of scientific discovery remained in a state of suspended animation. This is because the dominant trend in philosophy of science in this period outlawed it. The dominant view in philosophy of science maintained that the phenomenon of scientific discovery is philosophically irrelevant, and an adequate philosophical understanding of science should confine itself to the way in which scientific theories are justified; it was assumed that the process of justification is a neat, spick-and-span phenomenon eminently suited to be described in terms which are, logically speaking, cut and dry. The process of justification or evaluation according to this orthodox view constitutes the essence of science. Obviously, justification was demarcated from discovery. Justification, because of its supposed epistemic transparency, became the exclusive focus of philosophical attention to the detriment of discovery. The invidious distinction between discovery of scientific ideas and justification of finished ideas of science remained the catchword for a long time. This paper is an attempt to critically examine the nihilistic attitude of the dominant philosophies of science and to arrive at a philosophical theory of scientific discovery.

The wide and sophisticated terminology of contemporary philosophy of science seemingly points toward a multitude of different pre-scientific frameworks (for example, worldviews, philosophy) directing our scientific investigations. This study, however, illustrates forms of consensus between the views of various prominent twentieth-century philosophers of science on the characteristics and functions of pre-scientific frameworks in scientific activity. It specifically highlights various helpful insights offered by reformational philosophy as its point of departure. This study finds that, on the pre-scientific level, fundamental motives and worldviews are usually recognised as pre-theoretical frameworks – with specific characteristics and functions – influencing scientific investigation. Reformational notions such as ‘ground motive’ and certain definitions of ‘worldview’ that did not originate in the context of ‘philosophy of science’ are introduced with a two-fold purpose: to establish a fruitful dialogue between reformational philosophers and more recognised philosophers of science, as well as to better equip us to trace what their views have in common.

Science is commonly conceived as a system of propositions tested and justified through rigorous methods, that seeks to achieve epistemic values such as objectivity, coherence, precision, systematization, generalization, explanatory and predictive force. Even less orthodox authors, like Thomas Kuhn who focuses not only on science as product but also as a specific kind of social practice, only takes into account epistemic values, and leaves aside moral, social and political considerations. From this point of view, science is morally and politically neutral. More recently some philosophers like Javier Echeverria (2002) and Leon Olive (2000) have pointed out the relevance of non- epistemic values to understand the development of science and technology. However, from Karl Popper to Larry Laudan, most philosophers of science consider that introducing social or political discussions in the context of justification of scientific theories represents a serious threat to the rationality of science. Those authors like Paul Feyerabend and Michel Foucault, who point out the intrinsic relationship between scientific truth and political power, are condemned as irrational postmodernists. Fortunately during the last decades the social, moral and political dimensions of science have caught the attention of philosophers, sociologists and historians of science in the scope of Science and Technology Studies (STS) (Fuller, 1993; Pickering, 1992; Mitcham, 1995; Ibarra and Lopez Cerezo, 2003). But this new and increasingly innovative discipline, although it challenges many presuppositions of standard philosophy of science (mainly logical empiricism), deals more with the interaction of science and technology in applied contexts (techno science) rather than with the intrinsic problems of justification of scientific theories. My main purpose here is to argue that it is necessary to consider moral and political questions in the core of epistemological and methodological problems of scientific theories that are typically discussed in traditional philosophy of science. Accordingly, the first part of my argument relies on two important philosophers of science from the beginning of the twentieth century: Pierre Duhem and Otto Neurath. Both criticized the widespread idea that the rationality and objectivity of science is exclusively based on a rigorous methodology, and both introduced moral, social and political considerations to clarify the nature of scientific rationality. Unfortunately these important insights of the founding fathers of the twentieth century philosophy of science have not been recovered and acknowledged by most of their philosophical heirs. After clarifying some important moral, social, and political aspects of scientific rationality, the second part of my argument uses the pragmatic view of scientific rationality to challenge the methodological and exclusively epistemic concept of rationality that originated with Plato and became the dominant view in modern philosophy through the work of Rene Descartes, Francis Bacon, and Thomas Hobbes. I also discuss the political consequences of methodological and epistemic rationality, taken together with the widespread idea that political and even ethical decisions must be based on scientific knowledge. I maintain that these two theses are not only false, but have strong authoritarian implications. Finally, the third part of my argument turns again to Neurath in order to suggest a republican way of relating science and political decisions, so as to promote social and political values, such as justice and democracy, alongside epistemic values. Empirical Underdetermination, Good Sense, and Auxiliary Motives In his book, The End and Structure of Physical Theory (1906), Pierre Duhem presented one of the most important issues of contemporary philosophy of science: the empirical Underdetermination of theories. This problem was subsequently developed by Willard Van Orman Quine and is commonly know as the Duhem-Quine thesis. …

December 01 2002 Comments on the Precarious Relationship between History and Philosophy of Science Richard M. Burian Richard M. Burian Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google Scholar Author and Article Information Richard M. Burian Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University Online Issn: 1530-9274 Print Issn: 1063-6145 © 2003 Massachusetts Institute of Technology2003 Perspectives on Science (2002) 10 (4): 398–407. https://doi.org/10.1162/106361402322288039 Cite Icon Cite Permissions Share Icon Share Twitter LinkedIn Views Icon Views Article contents Figures & tables Video Audio Supplementary Data Search Site Citation Richard M. Burian; Comments on the Precarious Relationship between History and Philosophy of Science. Perspectives on Science 2002; 10 (4): 398–407. doi: https://doi.org/10.1162/106361402322288039 Download citation file: Ris (Zotero) Reference Manager EasyBib Bookends Mendeley Papers EndNote RefWorks BibTex toolbar search Search nav search search input Search input auto suggest search filter All ContentAll JournalsPerspectives on Science Search Advanced Search This content is only available as a PDF. © 2003 Massachusetts Institute of Technology2003 Article PDF first page preview Close Modal You do not currently have access to this content.

The relationship between the history and philosophy of engineering is similar to that between the history and philosophy of science and that between the history and philosophy of technology. Lakatos’ thesis—that “philosophy of science without history of science is empty; history of science without philosophy of science is blind”—applies as well to the history and philosophy of engineering. To advance the history of engineering requires some attention to the nature of engineering and vice versa. The effort here is to draw some lines of demarcation among the histories of engineering, of technology, of science, and of economics from a philosophical point view. With regard to history, a theory of engineering evolution can bridge philosophy and history; an important part of such an evolution will also consider historical developments in the engineering community. There nevertheless remain important tensions and complementarities between the history and philosophy of engineering.

Although I find most recent challenges to older ‘positivistic’ views in philosophy of science either unchallenging or unconvincing, there is one respect in which the new ‘post-positivists’ are, I believe, definitely right and the older ‘positivists’ definitely wrong. Reichenbach, Carnap, Popper and others all agreed that philosophy of science is exclusively concerned with the logical analysis of the merits of theories already ‘on the table’. Of course, these thinkers were ready to allow that the question of how a theory arrived on the table could be a fascinating one, but they held that it was a question of no interest to a philosopher as such. In particular, to hold that the origins of a theory have any relevance for the appraisal of its scientific merits was, according to these philosophers, to commit one form of the ‘genetic fallacy’.

Changing Perspectives - From the Experimental to the Technological Turn in History and Philosophy of Science. In the 1960s the philosophy of science was transformed through the encounter with the history of science, resulting in a collaborative venture by the name of "History and Philosophy of Science" (HPS). Philosophy of science adopted ever more regularly the format of the case study to reconstruct certain episodes from the history of science, and historians were mostly interested in the production of scientific knowledge. The so-called "experimental turn" of the 1980s owed to this interaction between philosophy and history. Its guiding question remained quite traditional, however, namely "How do the sciences achieve an agreement between representation and reality?" Only the answers to this question broke with tradition by focusing not on theory but on the role of instruments and experiments. - Roughly 30 years after the experimental turn, another transformative encounter appears to be taking place. HPS is being transformed in the encounter with philosophy of technology. From the point of view of philosophy of technology, the question does not arise whether and how the agreement of mind and world, representation and reality can be achieved. When things are constructed, built or made, human thinking and physical materiality are inseparably intertwined. Instead of seeking to describe a mind-independent reality, technoscientific researchers are working to acquire and demonstrate capabilities of experimental or predictive control. When science is regarded as a kind of technology, a program of study opens up for epistemology and so do avenues for the historiography of science. History of science might now show how the problems and procedures of the sciences arise from and impinge back upon a world that is itself a product of science and technology. It thereby abandons its traditional HPS niche existence and joins forces with environmental history, history of technology, social, labor, and consumer history.

Several prominent scientists have publicly expressed negative views about philosophy of science-and philosophy more generally-ranging from declarations that philosophy is dead to assertions that philosophy of science is a waste of time for scientists. Some philosophers of science have responded by defending the relevance of philosophy to scientific practice, illustrating how philosophical concepts, skills, and approaches can help make scientific research more epistemically and ethically sound. Such defenses are often motivated at least in part by claims that many scientists are antagonistic towards philosophy of science. A recent empirical study even suggests that philosophers of science perceive a 'lack of interest from scientists' as one of the main barriers to fruitful engagement between the two. These claims raise the question: How widespread are negative views of philosophy of science across the broader scientific community? We empirically investigated this and other research questions with data from a standardized survey administered to a probability-based sample of over 2000 scientists and engineers at 54 universities across Canada and the USA. Our findings indicate that the negative sentiments mentioned above are not representative of the wider scientific community. Many respondents even expressed interest in pursuing research collaborations with philosophers of science. Moreover, a majority of respondents reported having informally engaged with philosophers of science in one way or another. This study demonstrates why it is essential to empirically examine scientists' views rather than generalizing from a few cases, regardless of how prominent they may be.

In 1903 Mach and Duhem, discovering one another’s writings, acknowledged the proximity of the philosophical views that they had been elaborating independently. A correspondence followed, which lasted several years. And in their ensuing publications both of these philosopher-scientists were careful to discuss their interlocutor’s claims. We have here ample matter for consideration. Mach and Duhem were to have an impact on the development of the Vienna Circle. Yet their conceptions are indeed different from those that followed. Characteristically, they drew on history and psychology. They were interested in the genesis of concepts, the evolution of theories and the patterns of discovery. If rational reconstruction and logical analysis were admitted, these techniques were counter-balanced by historical study. In view of recent evolutions in philosophy of science — the growing importance of cognitive science, history of science, interdisciplinarity — it is worthwhile to return again to the beginning of the twentieth century. The aim of this paper is then to reexamine the relation between Duhem and Mach, in particular with regard to the methods whereby they sought to provide a philosophical reflection on science.

How is it possible to adopt an idealist and holist ontology while maintaining a commitment to science, or positivism broadly understood? This chapter constructs the “via media” that grounds my modernist constructivism.

“Lest we forget”: An issue concerning the Doctorate in Nursing Practice (DNP)