Abstract
The phenomenon of a transactional rent in agrarian business in Russian regions is studied in the presented paperwork. The authors have found such phenomenon while they were analyzing contractual relations in regional agrarian branches. The research was supported by the state grant for young scientists in 2015-2016. The authors gathered a set of qualitative and quantitative results exploring the problem of agrarian contractual relations.The article’s purpose is to research the nature and forms of transactional rent, to develop a technique of the quantitative assessment of contractual relations’ efficiency, and to evaluate that level.Transactional rent is understood as the income gained by one subject (contractor) while there are reasons to suppose that this income shall belong to the other subject of a transaction (if the market is perfect). Transactional rent is a result of imperfection in the market mechanism. The authors consider inefficiency of the contractual relations as the main problem of agrarian market functioning. That is shown by the presence of high market barriers, discriminating conditions, multiplicity of subjects of a contractual chain, and lack of regulation of contractual relations in business practice. The high prices of food for customers, monopolization of markets at the level of retail trade, high level of shadow operations in this market and, respectively, imperfection of monitoring over food quality are the consequences of similar inefficiencies of contractual relations. Threat of food security and regional economic stability in general can arise as the result of a high level of transactional rent. The research is based on neoinstitutional methodology. Key methods of research are statistical and econometric as a method of economic modeling. For carrying out empirical research, authors have access to the paid database (FIRA PRO) where a huge number of statistical information on the agrarian market is available. For the analysis of the level of transactional rent in agrarian business, the authors use a technique with such indicators as effectiveness ratio of the contract relations and coefficient of opportunism. In the conducted statistical research, it is established that the greatest transactional rent is formed at the third element of an agrarian contract chain (wholesale trade).
Highlights
The development of the agrarian industry of Russia is one of its priorities for regional economic policy
For the analysis of the level of transactional rent in agrarian business, the authors use a technique with such indicators as effectiveness ratio of the contract relations and coefficient of opportunism
The research of a transactional rent is based on the statistical information about the enterprises of the Chelyabinsk and Kurgan regions occupied in the agrarian industry (Table 2)
Summary
The development of the agrarian industry of Russia is one of its priorities for regional economic policy. Examination of a problem of transactional rent nature in the sector has revealed that there are rather long contractual chains which cause forming of transactional rent These chains often include those subjects (intermediaries) whose activity seriously complicates a situation in industry. These intermediaries set the discriminating prices for producers, monopolize the market, obtain market power, and establish inflated prices on food production for ultimate consumers. Their actions lead to the strengthening of imperfection in agrarian markets and generate high transactional costs of other economic subjects. The goal of this paper is to study the mechanism of formation and features of a transactional rent as economic phenomenon in more detail
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