Abstract
Abstract This chapter analyzes Locke’s seminal treatment of personal identity and examines objections to it and replies to them. It (1) discusses his sharp divorce between a person’s identity and the identity of any substance, (2) formulates in analytical style his definition of personal identity in terms of memory, and (3) explains his view that personal identity is a “forensic” notion. Regarding (1), it argues that although Locke’s same substance/different person scenario makes sense, his same person/different substance scenario crosses the bounds of sense. Regarding (2), it shows how a definition of personal identity in terms of memory can be refined so as to avoid counterexamples proposed by Berkeley, Thomas Reid, and John Perry. Regarding (3), it argues that such a refined definition is incompatible with Locke’s forensic view of personhood, unless one appeals to Christian doctrine about the afterlife and about Judgement Day—as indeed Locke was prepared to do.
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