Abstract
A theoretical framework for describing the role of perceptual information in early conceptual development is presented. In the main section of the article, a general operationalization of perceptual boundedness is introduced, 3 causes of this limitation are identified, the conditions under which infants and children seem to be perceptually bound are formulated, and the mechanisms by which this limitation declines are described. Traditional claims that young children are perceptually bound, as well as contemporary objections to these claims, are often based on the assumption that perceptual information is generally unveridical or insufficient. Recent doubts about this assumption are evaluated in the final section of the article. It is concluded that although realist arguments are untenable, there are limited forms of perceptual support for conceptual development.
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