Perception of the creation of a ‘Muslim state’ in intercepted telephone conversations between the serbian political elite 1991-1992.

Abstract

During 1991, the security services of Bosnia and Herzegovina began to monitor the telephone conversations of high-ranking officials of the Serbian Democratic Party (SDS). These recorded conversations reveal part of the truth to the preparations for the war and the genocide that followed. Intercepted conversations also show the connections that Serbian officials in Bosnia and Herzegovina had with Belgrade, that is, with Slobodan Milošević and other officials of the Yugoslav leadership. These conversations were recorded until the beginning of the aggression, that is, until they left the territory of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina in March and April 1992, by persons whose phones were tapped. This paper will deal with conversations that were recorded in the period from May 1991 to March 1992. One of the most common topics of these conversations was the issue of Islam, that is, the thematization of terms such as „Islamic Republic“, „Islamic Declaration“, „Islamic way of life“, „Islamic fundamentalism“, etc. The paper shows how the Serbian political elite used this terminology to instill fear in public opinion, but to a certain extent they also believed that an increased birth rate would lead to the establishment of a Muslim-majority state. For the purposes of writing this paper, research was done on primary sources, i.e. transcripts of intercepted conversations. The transcripts were used as evidence by the Prosecutor's Office of the Hague Tribunal during the trial of high-ranking Serbian officials. In addition to the research, sorting and analysis of the transcripts, this paper will also identify the most prominent participants in the conversation of the Serbian leadership. Also, given the aforementioned specificity of telephone conversations through their private nature, it is possible to dissect important topics in the conversations, which are often not military and political, and will contribute to finding additional answers. This makes these conversations even more important because they show a more intimate side of the genocidal strategist. Participants such as high-ranking officials Slobodan Milošević, Radovan Karadžić, Biljana Plavšić, Nikola Koljević, Momčilo Krajišnik, Dobrica Čosić and others, shows what and how those at the top thought in their private telephone conversations in those days in 1991 and 1992. On the other hand, through the conversations, one can see how well the SDS leadership managed the situation on the ground. Low-ranking figures who performed various political and social tasks such as Todor Dutin, director of the SRNA, Rajko Dukić, president of the SDS Executive Committee and a local strongman in Milići appear in the conversations; Vojo Kuprešanin, member of the Main Board of SDS and a key man in Krajina; Vitomir Žepinić, Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs of Bosnia and Herzegovina; Radoslav Brđanin, head of the Autonomous Region of Krajina, Zvonko Bajagić, a prominent member of the SDS in Vlasenica, Gojko Đogo, writer and essayist, a close friend of Karadžić, Momčilo Momo Mandić, Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs of Bosnia and Herzegovina and later wartime Minister of Justice of the so-called „Republic Serbian“,; Trifko Komad, head of Radovan Karadžić's Cabinet and member of the SDS Main Board and many others. Also, what is important to mention is the visible 'radicalization' of the participants in the talks. As the political situation on the ground worsened, hate speech and threats became more frequent and serious. This paper aims to further approach this important topic of intercepted conversations and to popularize its greater use in scientific research works. With the advancement of technology and means of communication, the primary sources for research are slowly shifting and taking on a new look. Thus, this paper also tries to analyze these intercepted conversations to give some insight into the complexity of understanding the genocidal intentions of the Bosnian Serb leadership.