Perceived Ontological Levels and Language Games

Abstract

Abstract This paper argues against assuming that analysis, in the sense of breaking things into their constituent parts, can result in understanding of either universal truths or unequivocal local realities. “Analysis” most commonly refers to the process of looking into things to identify their constituent parts and the relations between them. To Kant, an analytic fact is self-evident. However, a phenomenon is only recognized as such at particular ontological, or perceptual, levels; when approached as a series of sub-phenomena, the question to which we are responding is not “what is this made of,” so much as “what are you reminded of when you look into this?” Therefore, analysis is a process of semiotic interpretation rather than pure logic: the response to a series of prompts in a particular context, where those responses are individual variations on sociocultural habits of response. Analysis is therefore analogical and intersubjective, and this should be recognized within educational and scholarly practices. On this account, ontological levels are better understood as perceptual levels. Analysis should therefore be preceded by explanatory sensitivity, as construals of any entity are dependent on the contexts that locate that entity. Some practical examples and implications for education are offered.