Abstract
I show that a family firm’s decision to appoint non-family directors is strongly influenced by neighboring companies. Confirming the role of geographic proximity, I find that this effect becomes smaller when the distance between a firm and its geographic peers increases, and insignificant when firms are randomly allocated to geographic areas. Studying the mechanisms at play, I suggest that peer effects are driven by imitation of leading firms and social interactions within the local community.
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