Peculiarities of application of the practice of the European Court of Human Rights in the justice in Ukraine

Regional human rights courts like the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR), and the African Court of Human and People's Rights (ACtHPR) have become popular sites of mobilization for victims and activists who seek justice when justice fails at home. Besides being platforms for individual remedy, human rights courts increasingly shape social norms and state policy within countries, making them attractive avenues for rights advocates to develop new norms or to push domestic authorities to reform legislation. The judges of these courts can decide, for example, whether same-sex couples have a right to be married, if prisoners have the right to vote or receive HIV/AIDS treatment, or when a state can deport illegal immigrants to a country where they will likely be tortured. As these courts pass their judgments, they often find themselves in conflict with states that are violating human rights of marginalized groups on a large scale and are unwilling to implement international rulings. Although international human rights courts have become increasingly popular venues among victims and activists who seek justice when justice fails at home, we are only beginning to understand how activists play roles in shaping the development of regional human rights courts' case law—the body of judgments that shapes how judges will make their decisions in the future. We now have plenty of international relations and international legal research on the interactions between states and international courts: how judges in these courts wrestle between deferring to the interests of member state governments whose actions are on trial and sticking closely to the conventions' fundamental yet evolving principles (Alter et al., 2019; Helfer & Voeten, 2014). As some states begin to resist international courts' authority, scholars have begun to examine the dynamics of this backlash (Hillebrecht, 2022; Madsen et al., 2018; Sandholtz et al., 2018). Recent studies have also demonstrated that human rights advocates—whether NGOs or individual lawyers—have a significant impact on shaping the jurisprudence of international courts and the impact judgments have in concrete locations (Kahraman, 2018; Sundstrom, 2014; van der Vet, 2012; Kurban, 2020; Conant, 2018; Harms, 2021; Cichowski, 2016; Hodson, 2011; Haddad, 2018). Meanwhile, these advocates themselves have been subject to repression and stigmatization by governments as part of the backlash phenomenon. Without an adequate understanding of the factors shaping activists' engagement with international courts, we risk undervaluing their strategic impact on the expansion of case law, the human rights protection of marginalized groups who cannot find remedies at home, and the domestic implementation of these judgments in an age of state backlash. In this section, we summarize the three papers contained in this symposium and their original contributions to these themes. Over the last decade, dozens of countries have erected legal barriers or started vilifying campaigns to stymie the work of NGOs (Buyse, 2018; Chaudhry, 2022). One tactic in this toolkit is the enactment of burdensome regulation on NGOs that receive funds from foreign donors as they allegedly promote foreign agendas (Christensen & Weinstein, 2013; Dupuy et al., 2021). States that frequently abuse human rights are especially prone to target NGOs that engage in strategic litigation (Hillebrecht, 2019). Most NGOs depend on foreign funding, and NGOs that litigate international cases fall disproportionately in this category, but do funders affect the selection of cases? In “Foreign Agents or Agents of Justice? Private Foundations, NGO Backlash, and International Human Rights Litigation,” Heidi Haddad and Lisa Sundstrom examine the extent to which Western donors, particularly private foundations, have encouraged NGOs in Europe to litigate at the ECtHR as a human rights advocacy strategy. They examine overall patterns of donor funding and NGO litigation records, and look in more detail at the case of Russian NGOs' foreign funding and litigation records. The analysis is extremely timely, as the Russian government's criminalization of independent civil society actors, especially in the human rights field, and their accusation that foreign funding turns NGOs into “foreign agents” have been crucial elements of the Russian regime's autocratization. This claim has also provided fuel for Russia's disenchantment with the ECtHR in recent years, contributing to the assessment of many observers that Russia's full-scale attack on Ukraine was the last straw in an inevitable collision course leading to its exit from the Council of Europe. Haddad and Sundstrom debunk the idea that foreign donors are pushing NGOs toward strategies of human rights litigation. Instead, they argue, there is more evidence that NGOs themselves promoted the mechanism of international litigation as a strategy that donors later adopted. This article is a poignant reminder of the advocacy tools that Russian human rights activists and citizens have lost as a result of their government's departure from the Council of Europe, including ECtHR jurisdiction. Yet it also provides insight into the likely roles of foreign donors in other country cases where NGOs are using international court litigation as a human rights advocacy strategy, which is often a target of the ire of national governments, as explored in the next article in the symposium. When states attack human rights NGOs within their borders and/or international human rights courts themselves, how does this affect the willingness of those NGOs to take cases to international courts, and the ways in which they do so? De Silva and Plagis ask this question in their article about state backlash against NGOs in the case of Tanzania and the African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights. A fascinating empirical question they pose is: does state backlash against NGOs increase NGO litigation at international courts (to contest state repression at those courts and use international mechanisms when domestic ones are not available), roughly in line with Keck and Sikkink's famous “boomerang pattern” (Keck & Sikkink, 1998), or decrease it due to heightened fear and restricted NGO capabilities that state repression creates? Employing a process-tracing analysis of NGOs' involvement in three cases before the African Court at different stages of the Tanzanian government's backlash against the Court, De Silva and Plagis find that “two-level backlash” by states can result in both phenomena, either promoting or deterring NGO legal mobilization at international human rights courts, depending on certain conditions. The three selected cases concerning the death penalty, the rights of persons with albinism, and the rights of pregnant schoolgirls and mothers, which took place at different time periods, demonstrate a number of patterns of state backlash interacting with NGO strategies. The authors find that domestic-level state backlash deterred domestic NGOs from partnering with international NGOs in litigation, but that such backlash, when it repressed domestic political and legal mobilization opportunities, actually encouraged both Tanzanian and international NGOs to turn to the African Court more frequently to seek remedies. International-level backlash in turn only deterred NGOs from international litigation when such backlash consisted of state efforts to restrict NGOs' ability to engage in litigation, and not when the international backlash was in the form of routine noncompliance with African Court rulings. Importantly, the authors find that NGO responses to state backlash were significantly shaped by their degree of legal consciousness and expertise with the rules, proceedings, and workings of the African Court. Those NGOs with less knowledge and experience were more likely to back away from engaging with the Court under the pressure of state backlash. De Silva and Plagis conclude that “NGOs' persistent human rights advocacy in the face of state backlash is a double-edged sword,” in the sense that they may not be deterred by state backlash initially, but there is a danger that their continued determination to engage in international litigation could prompt governments to engage in even more severe forms of backlash, with critical impacts on international courts and already vulnerable human rights defenders. Rights advocates have a growing menu of institutions and courts available to them. How do activists choose at which institution to lodge their cases in a world where legal remedies have diversified, or as some have argued, fragmented (Koskenniemi & Leino, 2002)? In “What Makes an International Institution Work for Labor Activists? Shaping International Law through Strategic Litigation,” Filiz Kahraman goes beyond the tendency of legal mobilization studies to only examine how activists interact with a single court or institution. Instead, Kahraman opens up how rights advocates imagine which institution is most receptive to their claims. Drawing on a comparative interview study of British and Turkish trade union activists and their legal mobilization campaigns at international courts and quasi-judicial institutions like the International Labor Organization (ILO), Kahraman examines how activists first probe and then strategically identify which court or international institution is most susceptible to their primary goals of influencing structural reforms and setting new norms. Through this probing process—or dynamic signaling game between courts and litigants—activists push a court's jurisprudence and case law into new issue areas. For instance, at the ECtHR, Turkish trade unionists challenged domestic courts' ruling that public sector workers did not have the right to establish unions, even though the ECtHR had no established case law on labor rights in 1990s. They won the case, with the ECtHR finding that Turkey violated the right of public sector workers to unionize. These cases not only had an impact within Turkey, but over the next decades, similar cases brought by British unionists would spin off the early precedent set by the Turkish legal mobilization efforts. Kahraman argues that they ultimately pushed the ECtHR to recognize the basic trade union rights as fundamental human rights. Kahraman sheds light on the often hidden strategies behind international litigation. Activists litigate not just for the immediate impact on the current case they work on, but how they envision that all the cases they work on may shape norms and domestic structural reforms further in the future. Whether an institution is perceptive of claims lies in the eye of the beholder. Kahraman finds that besides targeting institutions with high compliance rates, they also take cases to institutions with low rates of compliance, especially “if these institutions have extensive judicial authority to create new international norms.” So, it is not the de jure protection set by an international courts, but rather how activists perceive the juridical responsiveness and judicial authority of courts—or, how judges adopt either an activist approach or restraint in response to incoming cases and how willing states are to implement cases of a court, respectively—that determines why activists select certain courts or quasi-judicial institutions (like the ILO). Kahraman gives us new tools to interpret how activists perceive authority and receptiveness and respond to opportunities. Rather than static external legal remedies, courts and quasi-judicial institutions are opportunity structures that are malleable to the strategic vision of the activist or litigant. The articles in this symposium together reveal a number of key overlapping insights. At the broadest level, they demonstrate that activists' behaviors and strategies influence international courts' jurisprudence, politics within states, and the human rights outcomes of everyday citizens—and these influences have often been hidden in our existing canon of research on international courts. In addition, all of these articles show that, while activists may face challenges in their efforts, often including significant backlash from their home state governments, they also continue to retain significant agency through their creative efforts to develop legal strategies and circumvent state repression. Activists perennially innovate: sparking the ideas that inspire donors who fund them; calculating how to continue their litigation work when government actors threaten them; and taking risks in litigation to push courts to expand how they define human rights. However, along with these uplifting conclusions, there are worrying patterns that demand future research. States are increasingly pushing back against the powers of international courts to bind them to costly measures, and as this symposium has shown, national governments often point to activists as contributors to this “problem” of invasive international human rights standards. A growing body of research has tracked how human rights defenders of all kinds globally are under threat from actors like governments and corporations who disagree with their contentious actions. We need more studies that gather comprehensive data and systematically track these threats, specifically with regard to activists who engage in international human rights litigation. We suspect that such activists are likely disproportionately targeted due to the international visibility of their complaints. We also desperately need research into possible innovative responses to these threats to activists—responses from activists, funders, governments of countries that support human rights, and international courts themselves. Freek van der Vet is a University Researcher at the Erik Castrén Institute of International Law and Human Rights, Faculty of Law, University of Helsinki and the principal investigator of the Toxic Crimes Project. Lisa McIntosh Sundstrom is Professor of Political Science at the University of British Columbia. She is the director of the ActinCourts network at UBC and conducts research on legal mobilization by Russian activists.

The article explores the main problems of the application by the national courts of the case law of the European Court of Human Rights as a source of law. Analyzing the rules of the law and examining the views of the Supreme Court have highlighted the problematic issues of the obligation to apply the case law of the European Court of Human Rights to national courts as a source of law. The researchers' positions on the obligation of national courts to apply the case law of the European Court of Human Rights in cases against other states are examined and the importance of the application of the case law of the European Court of Human Rights is highlighted. Analyzing the views of scholars and experts, we have proposed ways to address the issues of the binding application of the case law of the European Court of Human Rights by reviewing the plenary sessions of high courts. The problems of the application of the case law of the European Court of Human Rights by national courts, such as the selective application of the case law of the Court, references to general principles and interpretations, ignoring the conditions of their application, absolutization of the binding position of the Court, application of the decisions of the Court by analogy, reference to the practice Court in the presence of clear and consistent provisions of national law, etc. The following ways of solving these problems are proposed: 1) revising the concept and content of the Law of Ukraine "On the implementation of decisions and application of the practice of the European Court of Human Rights" and amending the legislation in order to bring it in line with the provisions of the new procedural legislation and modern ideas of theorists and practitioners about the legal nature of decisions The European Court of Human Rights; 2) preparing a resolution of the Plenum of the Supreme Court on the application of the Convention and the case-law of the Court, which should be based on a thorough analysis of the shortcomings and peculiarities of the case-law of the national courts. The problematic issues of the application of the case law of the European Court of Human Rights in the absence of official translations of the Court's decisions are examined. Analyzing the views of scholars and experts, we have proposed ways to solve these problems by creating a single electronic database that will contain official translations of Court decisions in the Ukrainian language that will ensure their accessibility and dissemination.

The article discusses the impact of the European Convention on Human Rights (‘the Convention’)  and the  case law of the European Court of Human Rights on Estonian law. It gives historical background on the ratification of the Convention and its protocols by Estonia and describes the status of the Convention in the Estonian legal order. It then shows in more detail the impact of the case law of the Strasbourg Court on Estonia’s legislature, executive power, and judiciary and examines the case law pertaining in particular to the historical past, deprivation of liberty, prison conditions, fair trial and length of proceedings, retroactivity, and lack of foreseeability of criminal law, along with the case law on pluralism and civil rights, especially freedom of expression. In addition, the article focuses on the important issue of reopening of a case on national level once the European Court of Human Rights has found a violation and looks at the implementation of judgements of that court by Estonia in general. Additional remarks are made on the Supreme Court of Estonia’s application of the Convention and the case law of the European Court of Human Rights. Finally, the impact of the case law of the Strasbourg Court in relation to Estonia on the general development of precedents with that court is discussed. In conclusion, in relation to the case law of the European Court of Human Rights, it is important to understand that the Court finding a violation of the Convention in respect of Estonia is not so much a condemnation, ‘against’ the country, as a learning opportunity, in a sense, for Estonia’s democracy, rule of law, and human rights protection system. Furthermore, there could well be other difficulties in Estonia that the Court has for various reasons had no opportunity to address. This can be seen in areas wherein the Court has found a violation by another state but wherein a similar problem still exists in Estonia – e.g., in relation to prisoners’ voting rights. It is important to consider a more global picture of the human rights situation. It is unfortunate that in Estonia, especially in the media and for the wider public, little attention is paid still to the case law of the Court with respect to other states.  In general, European law has been well accepted in Estonia, especially the Convention and the case law of the Court. Working from the Estonian examples, one can confirm that the legislature; the executive power, even more so; and, above all, the judiciary of Estonia have recognised well that the Convention is an inseparable part of Estonia’s legal and democratic culture. Estonian courts need to feel that they also are human rights courts, especially in dealing with the facts and Estonian law, domains wherein the Court cannot and should not act as a fourth or first instance. At the same time, the Court should be able to speak not only to the Estonian courts as counterparts but also to the Estonian people. They as well need to understand European human rights law. All in all, Estonia is quite lucky: it does not have particularly worrying human rights problems; not many violations of the Convention are found in respect of Estonia by the Court. Estonian cases have been dealing with more or less the same issues every ordinary democratic country faces, even to a certain extent with problems of a modern, well-advanced society, such as freedom of expression and privacy rights on the Internet. Also the Court has been lucky to have Estonia as an exemplar: a country wherein the Convention system and the Court’s case law have been to a large extent respected and well complied with. But this mutual ‘happiness’, this quite nice two-way street, should not be taken for granted. The Court’s case law is a moving target. It is hoped that all future developments related to the Court will contribute to improvement of the protection of human rights, democracy, and the rule of law all over Europe. Neither Estonia nor any other European country can apply the generally recognised principles by choice ‘in its own way’.  Estonia’s trump in Europe and beyond could be to serve as a model in the protection of human rights. In consideration of its experience, geopolitical location, and size, alongside its investments in education and the historically rooted importance of nurturing intellectual and cultural values, Estonia could be in a very good position to achieve this ambitious goal.&#160

The article deals with the ways of regarding the case law of the European Court of Human Rights as a source of criminal procedural law of Ukraine, which is relevant both in terms of the criminal procedure as a science and for the practice of law enforcement. The purpose of the article is to formulate the concept of the case law of the European Court of Human Rights as a source of criminal procedural law of Ukraine. The paper justifies the opinion that the case law of the European Court of Human Rights is developed and based on the decisions of the European Court of Human Rights and the European Commission of Human Rights, regardless of the country in which they were adopted (i. e. has a polyterritorial jurisdiction over states being the participants of the Convention). The article proves that the case law of the European Court of Human Rights is draws upon the decisions made by the European Court of Human Rights and the European Commission of Human Rights regardless of the time of adoption, i. e. it includes the decisions adopted before Ukraine ratified the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. The author points out the appropriateness of classifying decisions that have acquired the status of final as «case law of the European Court of Human Rights». It is also mentioned that there is a need to include final decisions in the case (as the matter of fact), which have a decisive nature and contain a legal position in this case, into the scope of the category «case law of the European Court of Human Rights». Moreover, the article substantiates the necessity to include the decisions adopted by the European Court of Human Rights in full, i. e. not only the set forth legal positions, into the category of «case law of the European Court of Human Rights». Following the results of the study, the case law of the European Court of Human Rights as a source of criminal procedural law of Ukraine is defined as a set of decisions adopted by the European Court of Human Rights and the European Commission of Human Rights, which have entered into force and contain legal policies which either clarify or specify the provisions of the Convention as for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and relate to human and citizen’s rights and freedoms.

The article presents a legal analysis of the peculiarities of using the decisions of the European Court of Human Rights as a source of law in Ukraine as one of the elements of the Anglo-Saxon law. The scientific article aims to determine the legal grounds for applying the decisions of the European Court of Human Rights as a source of law and, further, to identify exceptional cases of such application which are not directly disclosed by Ukrainian law. In particular, the regulation of the application of the European Court of Human Rights decisions, which were adopted before the ratification of the Convention by Ukraine, as a source of law at this stage. In the context of this issue, extending the principle of retroactive effect of the law to the European Court of Human Rights was also considered. The scientific article also aims to analyse specific issues and law situations in applying the case law of the European Court of Human Rights. The author analysed other case laws in Ukraine, including case laws of the Constitutional Court of Ukraine. The focus is on issues not regulated by the current legislation of Ukraine and the application or “twice application” of the case law of the European Court of Human Rights in the context of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (with protocols) of 04.11.1950 or separately. The author also draws attention to two essential features in the application of the case law of the European Court of Human Rights – the issue of determining the priority of this case over the case law of the national courts of Ukraine and the use of the European Court of Human Rights by the Constitutional Court of Ukraine. Attention is also paid to the provisions of the constitutional procedure of Ukraine. The scientific article is not limited to analysing exclusively normative material enshrined in the current legislation. However, to increase the relevance of this article, the legal positions of the Constitutional Court of Ukraine are also considered. In particular, the author emphasises the peculiarities and possibilities of applying the European Court of Human Rights case law in disputes related to other states in the national law of Ukraine.

The article examines some aspects of realization of the rule of law principle in the case law of the European Court of Human Rights. The author notes that the principle of the rule of law is a fundamental component of international legal acts regulating human rights and fundamental freedoms. It is emphasized that the Constitution of Ukraine proclaims that the principle of the rule of law is recognized and operates in Ukraine, but the concept of the rule of law itself is not fully disclosed in national legislation. The principle of the rule of law is actually the only effective means of ensuring the inviolability of democracy. The separate elements of this principle as its integral parts and mandatory prerequisites through which the European Court of Human Rights reveals the content of the rule of law was considered. The author provides examples of grouping certain requirements of the rule of law in the case law of the European Court of Human Rights. The author notes that there are no unified approaches to understanding the exact meaning of the rule of law principle either in theory or in practice. The author substantiates that the elements of the rule of law in the case law of the European Court of Human Rights are legality, legal certainty, fairness of a trial and priority of human rights. The main element of the rule of law in the case law of the European Court of Human Rights is legality. The requirement of legality has formal (procedural) and substantive aspects (requirements for the quality of the law). It is noted that the requirement to respect human rights and recognize their priority is key in the case law of the European Court of Human Rights. Cases of human rights restrictions must comply with the principle of proportionality. The provisions of the documents of the Venice Commission on the understanding of principle of the rule are analyzed, the activity of the European Court of Human Rights in ensuring the principle of the rule of law in the process of protection of human rights and freedoms is studied. The author concludes that the case law of the European Court of Human Rights is the basis for understanding the essence of the rule of law as a principle. The author emphasizes that the case law of the European Court of Human Rights has a positive impact on the indicators of strengthening the rule of law in the state, and contributes to the improvement of each individual element of this principle and all of them in aggregate.

The article is dedicated to a comprehensive analysis of the legal nature of the human right to a fair trial, the study of mechanisms for its normative and legal enforcement, and the effectiveness of its implementation through the lens of the case law of the European Court of Human Rights. Particular attention is paid to the systematic interpretation of this right in the context of international human rights standards and its correlation with the national legal systems of the states – parties to the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. The article conducts a doctrinal study of the right to a fair trial, defines its place in the hierarchy of fundamental human rights, and substantiates its absolute nature in the context of the modern concept of human rights. This right is one of the key elements of the rule of law, guaranteeing access to effective judicial protection and ensuring a balance between public and private interests in a legal state. Significant attention is given to analyzing the role of the judiciary as the primary guarantor of the realization of this right, while judicial protection is considered not only as an instrument for restoring violated rights but also as a structural element of the justice mechanism, which determines the democratic principles of the functioning of the state apparatus. The judicial system is obliged to ensure compliance with a set of procedural guarantees that prevent arbitrary restrictions on a person’s rights to access justice and to have their case reviewed objectively. The study identifies the main structural components of the right to a fair trial, including:the right to have a case heard by an independent, impartial, and competent court; the right to equality of arms and adversarial proceedings; the right to legal certainty in judicial decision-making; the right to the openness and publicity of the judicial process; the right to have a case considered within a reasonable time, as an essential element of effective justice. It is noted that access to justice is a prerequisite for the realization of the right to a fair trial. Access to justice is proposed to be understood as a real opportunity, guaranteed by the state and ensured by effective legal mechanisms, for a person to appeal to the court to protect their rights, freedoms, or legitimate interests. It is argued that the primary task of the European Court of Human Rights in every case is to assess the overall fairness of the proceedings. Compliance with the requirements of a fair trial should be considered in each case, taking into account the development of the entire proceedings, rather than based on the isolated examination of one specific aspect or a particular instance. The article also examines the issue of contradictions between national judicial systems and the standards of the European Court of Human Rights, which sometimes necessitate the revision of legal norms at the level of domestic legislation. The case law of the European Court of Human Rights demonstrates that a number of states face difficulties in implementing the Court’s decisions, which negatively affects public trust in the judiciary. It is important to emphasize that the institutional capacity of national judicial systems must correspond to European standards of justice, ensuring that citizens have a real opportunity for effective protection of their rights. Failure to meet such standards can lead to systemic problems in the field of justice and an increased number of appeals to the European Court of Human Rights. In the context of international law, the need for harmonization of national legislation with the requirements of the Convention is emphasized, which would contribute to increasing the effectiveness of the realization of the right to a fair trial. This issue is particularly relevant for countries undergoing judicial system reforms and striving to strengthen its independence. The conclusions of the article emphasize that the human rights protection role of the European Court of Human Rights is a key factor in ensuring legal certainty in judicial practice. The enforcement of its decisions is mandatory for the member states of the Convention, and their disregard may have negative consequences for a country’s international legal reputation. Keywords: effectiveness, legal mechanisms, European court of human rights, fair trial, justice, judicial practice, convention, human rights, access to justice, judiciary, judicial independence, impartiality, equality of arms, adversarial proceedings, legal certainty.

This chapter analyses the legal protection available to vulnerable groups and their members under the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), and in particular the vulnerability paradigm of the European Court of Human Rights. It traces the development of the concept of ‘vulnerable groups’ and its use in the case law of the Court and identifies the main groups of persons systematically considered by the Court as vulnerable.When discussing the case law of the European Court of Human Rights, two groups of cases are covered. First, the chapter identifies key cases with respect to specific vulnerable groups, and secondly the most recent cases are analysed to reveal the latest trends. For this purpose, to establish how often ‘vulnerable groups’ appear on the agenda of the European Court of Human Rights, case law research was performed. The time frame chosen was the last five years starting from 1 January 2016 and ending 31 December 2020. After identification of all the cases, 37 most relevant cases were chosen and scrutinised in more detail. In this way, the chapter seeks to offer the reader a contextual analysis of the notion of vulnerable groups in European human rights law and sets out the framework for further chapters of the book.KeywordsVulnerable groupsVulnerabilityConcept of ‘vulnerable groups’Vulnerable groups in the European Court of Human Rights case lawVulnerability in ECHR

The study aimed to analyse how the Ukrainian legal system implements the decisions of the European Court of Human Rights, as well as to identify problems and prospects for improving this process. The article used methods of legal analysis of the decisions of the European Court of Human Rights, comparison of national legislation with the European Convention on Human Rights, analysis of the statistics of the European Court of Human Rights, research on the implementation of European Court of Human Rights decisions at the national level, hermeneutics to identify terminological gaps, analysis of the implementation of European standards in the national legal system, and deduction to identify key issues in cases against Ukraine. An analysis of the decisions of the European Court of Human Rights revealed numerous systemic human rights violations in Ukraine, particularly in the areas of conditions of detention, unlawful arrests and lengthy court proceedings. Problems with non-enforcement of court decisions and violations of the rights to liberty and dignity have been confirmed by numerous cases, such as Gongadze v. Ukraine and Kharchenko v. Ukraine. Amendments to the Criminal Code of Ukraine following the decisions of the European Court of Human Rights, in particular the limitation of the term of pre-trial detention, have reduced the number of cases of prolonged detention The study aimed to analyse how the Ukrainian legal system implements the decisions of the European Court of Human Rights, as well as to identify problems and prospects for improving this process. The article used methods of legal analysis of the decisions of the European Court of Human Rights, comparison of national legislation with the European Convention on Human Rights, analysis of the statistics of the European Court of Human Rights, research on the implementation of European Court of Human Rights decisions at the national level, hermeneutics to identify terminological gaps, analysis of the implementation of European standards in the national legal system, and deduction to identify key issues in cases against Ukraine. An analysis of the decisions of the European Court of Human Rights revealed numerous systemic human rights violations in Ukraine, particularly in the areas of conditions of detention, unlawful arrests and lengthy court proceedings. Problems with non-enforcement of court decisions and violations of the rights to liberty and dignity have been confirmed by numerous cases, such as Gongadze v. Ukraine and Kharchenko v. Ukraine. Amendments to the Criminal Code of Ukraine following the decisions of the European Court of Human Rights, in particular the limitation of the term of pre-trial detention, have reduced the number of cases of prolonged detention

The article examines the content, legal nature, and significance of the principle of judicial impartiality, which is an essential component of the right to a fair trial guaranteed by Article 6 §1 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, with a particular focus on the criminal procedural aspect. The authors provide a detailed analysis of the approaches developed by the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) regarding the interpretation of judicial impartiality, highlighting its specific application through the lens of subjective and objective criteria. Particular attention is paid to the relevant case law of the ECHR: the authors compare cases where the Court found a violation of judicial impartiality with those where no violations were established. This allowed identifying typical factors indicating judicial bias and clarifying the permissible limits of judges’ behavior under the Convention. Furthermore, the authors thoroughly examine the national aspect of implementing the principle of judicial impartiality in Ukraine, including the analysis of the legal framework and practical application of the institution of judicial disqualification provided by Ukrainian criminal procedural law. Based on an analysis of the Supreme Court’s decisions, the article demonstrates the level of compliance of national judicial practice with standards developed by the ECHR and highlights key practical problems arising during the implementation of procedural guarantees of impartiality. In conclusion, the authors provide specific recommendations for improving legislation and judicial practice in Ukraine to ensure more effective safeguarding of the right to an impartial tribunal in criminal proceedings, consistent with international human rights standards. The authors further emphasize the importance of a systematic approach to improving the institution of judicial impartiality in Ukraine, in particular, the need to improve legislative initiatives that ensure maximum transparency and independence of judicial bodies. At the same time, developing national practice, the experience of the ECHR should be taken into account, which will allow creating a clearer and more effective system of mechanisms for protecting against bias of judges in criminal cases. Further improvement of law enforcement mechanisms and expansion of judicial responsibility can be important steps to strengthen citizens’ trust in the judicial system of Ukraine and increase its compliance with international human rights standards.

In the recent period of Ukrainian history, scholars pay attention to the discussion of the relationship between Ukrainian constitutional law and the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and the place of rulings and decisions of the European Court of Human Rights in the legal system of Ukraine. The analysis of the provisions of the European Convention on Human Rights and current Ukrainian legislation is made in the article. It is made in order to determine the impact of this act of the Council of Europe on the constitutional law of Ukraine. It is noted that the Convention plays an important role in the process of protection of human rights and freedoms in Ukraine and has an impact on the implementation of the rule of law, which relate to individual’s constitutional status. It is noted that the European Convention significantly increases the level of the effectiveness of constitutional human rights legislation. The role of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and the European Court of Human Rights in the formation and activity of the Constitutional Court of Ukraine has been determined. The thesis that within the ratio of the Convention and Ukrainian law, the supremacy of the latter within the national legal system does not eliminate the need to comply with international obligations is substantiated in the article. The grounds for restricting human and civil rights and freedoms in accordance with the requirements of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and the constitutional legislation of Ukraine are considered in the article. In order to ensure national security, the restriction of human and civil rights and freedoms in a state of martial law and emergency is analyzed. By introducing martial law and a state of emergency, it is possible to concentrate temporarily all the levers of control over the individual’s status by coercive means within the framework of official power. The conclusion that the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and the case law of the European Court of Human Rights have had a significant impact on the formation and development of human and civil rights and freedoms as basic, value priorities of the constitutional law of Ukraine is substantiated in the article. Key words: constitutional law, sources of law, Council of Europe, Constitution of Ukraine, Constitutional Court of Ukraine, Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, European Court of Human Rights.

The article aims to identify the rules governing the mutual relationships among the European Court of Human Rights, the Court of Justice, the constitutional courts of EU’s Member States, and the EFTA Court. Its second goal is to determine to what extent their decisions and interpretive conclusions mutually bind these courts. The third goal is to present the approach taken by the Czech Constitutional Court towards the European Court of Human Rights and Court of Justice, and their decisions, on the one hand, and that of the Court of Justice to rulings made by the European Court of Human Rights and the EFTA Court, on the other hand. To find an answer to these questions, the article first analysis the normative settings and the links among individual legal systems and also among these courts. The second part of the article focuses on the case-law of these courts and thus on the reality of their “mutual” decision-making. The author concludes that there is a significant difference between the decisions of the Court of Justice and the European Court of Human Rights. While the former has the power to determine the binding and, therefore correct interpretation of EU law, the latter does not have comparable competence when it comes to the European Convention. Therefore, European Court of Human Rights decisions are only de facto binding. However, in the case law of the Constitutional Court, the exact opposite is the reality. The European Court of Human Rights judgments are unquestioningly respected and followed, while the approach to the Court of Justice’s decisions oscillates between two extremes. Some of its decisions are fully reflected, while others are silently ignored. Similarly, the Court of Justice works differently with the European Court of Human Rights decisions and the EFTA Court. The Czech Constitutional Court and the Court of Justice also have in common that they treat decisions of the European Court of Human Rights (Czech Constitutional Court) and the EFTA Court (Court of Justice) basically like their own.

The case law of the European Court of Human Rights, which is recognized by the Ukrainian legislator as a source of land law, has not been sufficiently studied in the context of understanding the content of the concepts fundamental to this topic. The article analyzes various approaches to interpreting the category of “source of law,” including the formal legal, historical, ideological, and other approaches. It also examines the category of “source of land law” in the context of the ECtHR’s case law. Within the article, a source of land law is considered in its formal legal sense as an official form of external expression of generally binding rules of conduct that regulate land relations (relations concerning the possession, use, disposal, and protection of land) in Ukraine. An analysis of theoretical studies by Ukrainian scholars in the field of land law (including textbooks) was conducted to determine how they interpret the concept of “case law of the European Court of Human Rights.” It was found that most land law textbooks either examine the ECtHR’s case law as a source of land law indirectly, without analyzing or defining the relevant concepts, or do not consider it a source of land law at all. It was revealed that in many cases scholars understand the sources of land law primarily as normative legal acts such as the Constitution of Ukraine, laws, resolutions and decisions of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, decrees of the President of Ukraine, and so on, and do not regard the Court’s case law as a source of land law. The study also identified a lack of scientific consensus regarding the content of the category “ECtHR case law” among civil law scholars as well. In addition, the legislation itself was analyzed, and it also does not clearly define the concept of “ECtHR case law.” Based on the results of the analysis, a definition of the case law of the European Court of Human Rights is proposed as all judgments and decisions of the Court, regardless of whether they were delivered in cases against Ukraine or against other states. It is also proposed not to include advisory opinions of the European Court of Human Rights within the scope of the “ECtHR case law” concept, considering their legal nature and the current number of such opinions.

The author determines that the imperative instruction of the Criminal Procedure Code of Ukraine provided for in Part 2 of Article 8 and Part 5 of Article 9 relating to the application of the case law of the European Court of Human Rights, in certain cases, has necessitated a rethinking of the understanding of certain principles of criminal proceedings both individually and in their interconnection with each other, as well as in the compilation with the Court’s case law. This is due not only to the use of autonomous definitions by the European Court of Human Rights, but also to the differences in criminal procedural systems, the peculiarities of professional translation of judgments and many other factors. In this article, the author analyzed the current criminal procedure legislation, decisions of the European Court of Human Rights and scientific articles. Based on the analysis, the author concludes that the main feature of the implementation of the principle of competitiveness of the parts and freedom to present their evidence to the court and to prove their convincing nature in the case law of the European Court of Human Rights is that it is considered a fundamental right in the concept of a fair trial, and equality of the parties is distinguished as a principle (basis) for the implementation of such a right. It is determined that this somewhat does not coincide with the legal regulation of such principles of criminal proceedings as equality before the law and the court and the competitiveness of the parties and the freedom to present their evidence to the court and to prove their convincing nature in the criminal procedure legislation of Ukraine. After all, equality before the law is seen as a prohibition of discrimination, and equality before the court can be seen as a prohibition of discrimination by the court, and as equal opportunities in procedural rights, which is a component of competition. With regard to competitiveness, the case law of the European Court of Human Rights identifies the following features of its implementation: it consists in providing an opportunity to familiarize oneself with the comments and evidence provided by the other party and respond to them; aimed at effective participation in criminal proceedings; equal opportunities should be compensated by judicial procedures in cases where equal opportunities have not been provided earlier.

У статті досліджено окремі аспекти застосування практики Європейського Суду з прав людин и під час здійснення правосуддя в кримінальних провадженнях щодо корупційних злочинів. Проаналізовано сучасні думки науковців щодо застосування практики Європейського Суду з прав людини під час здійснення правосуддя в кримінальних провадженнях щодо корупційних злочинів. Досліджено авторські наукові підходи, які обґрунтовують висновок про те, що використання практики ЄСПЛ у кримінальному су-дочинстві України є обов’язковим. Визначено, що застосування практики Європейського Суду з прав людини під час здійснення правосуддя в кримінальних провадженнях щодо корупційних злочинів прямо передбачено ч. 2 ст. 8 КПК України. Також доведено, що використання практики ЄСПЛ вітчизняними судами під час здійснення правосуддя в кримінальних провадженнях щодо корупційних злочинів як мотивація виправдувальних вироків не завжди пов’язана з урахуванням практики ЄСПЛ щодо провокації вчинення злочину, а також засновується на використанні доктрини «плодів отруйного дерева» та «розумного сумніву».