Abstract

This article examines the interplay between gendered electoral financing (GEF) and other crucial factors in democratic elections worldwide to determine whether, how, and why these understudied mechanisms help achieve gender balance in national parliaments. Integrating qualitative comparative analysis and minimalist causal mechanism case studies, the sequential mixed methods study of GEF implementation in 31 elections in 17 countries shows that enhanced gender balance is achieved when GEF is combined with several conditions, providing a much-needed financial incentive—payments and penalties—for party gatekeepers and eligible women to change their behavior. In successful cases of top-down GEF implementation, gender quotas combine with a PR electoral system or a 15% minimum of women MPs, a measure developed for this study. Success in bottom-up GEF implementation is unexpected and complex and occurs without a quota. The article ends with a discussion of the research agenda, policy recommendations, and implications for the pursuit of democratic quality.

Highlights

  • Does money matter in the uphill battle for gender-balanced representation in politics? Men and the rich are overrepresented in national parliaments across the globe and progress toward gender balance has been arduous, uneven, and slow (Carnes 2018; Carnes and Lupu 2016; Celis and Lovenduski 2018; Giger, Rosset, and Bernauer 2012; Hughes, Krook, and Paxton 2015; Krook 2009; Murray 2014)

  • While TD mechanisms are more successful than BU, there is no single combination of conditions that leads to Success or Failure by approach; success paths occur in both approaches

  • The mixed methods analysis has paved the way for a fresh look at the struggle for gender-balanced representation through a focus on the potential efficacy of different financial policy instruments—gendered electoral financing

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Summary

Introduction

Does money matter in the uphill battle for gender-balanced representation in politics? Men and the rich are overrepresented in national parliaments across the globe and progress toward gender balance has been arduous, uneven, and slow (Carnes 2018; Carnes and Lupu 2016; Celis and Lovenduski 2018; Giger, Rosset, and Bernauer 2012; Hughes, Krook, and Paxton 2015; Krook 2009; Murray 2014). This study takes to heart the lessons learned from the rich comparative research on gender quotas worldwide—that they are not a standalone magic bullet and that there is a need to “go beyond quotas” (Krook and Norris 2014)—to consider other strategies, initiatives, and policies in combination with quotas that increase women’s representation. With this in mind, the research question examined here is whether, how, and why gendered electoral financing, in combination with other crucial factors like quotas, changes the behavior of party gatekeepers so that gender balance in national legislatures is enhanced

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