Patient as Citizen: Pluralism, Persuasion, and Liberal Politics

Lucia Coppolaro Theory, Trade and European Integration A Comment on Ludolf Herbst’s “Contemporary Theory and the Beginning of European Integration” Introduction When grading written exams, any professor of the history of European integration would be more than glad to read a definition of European integration as “the historical process whereby European nation-states have been willing to transfer, or more usually pool, their sovereign powers in a collective enterprise.”1 In fact, the definition is so accurate that the professor could only praise the student and award a positive grade for the answer. What the professor would tend to underestimate is that, as Ludolf Herbst’s article illustrates, “the term ‘integration’ was not particularly widespread” until the 1940s, and that, as a political concept, European integration was established only in the early 1950s, when “use expanded rapidly to include a much broader scope.” With the Schuman Declaration of May 9, 1950, European integration became both a catchword and a key-word for the post-war period, entering common usage and acquiring a precise meaning that we now take for granted. As Herbst notes, “the success of the term certainly has something to do with its ability to refer to the process of European unification in general, the current state of this development, and the goal of the overall process.”2 A similar story can be told about the word “globalization.” This word became a catchword at the end of the 1990s, but we tend to ignore its origins and meaning. We assume that the semantic meaning has never changed, and we tend to forget that when liberal economic theories and economists referred to globalization in the 1920s, “integration” was the word they used. Herbst’s article traces the origins of the word integration and looks at integration theories. It provides an analysis of “the history of the political reception of these ideas, taking into account those theories that took on political relevance.”3 Adopting this original perspective, the article enables us to gain a better under1 Mark Gilbert, European Integration. A Concise History, Lanham/MD et al. 2012, p. 1. 2 Ludolf Herbst, Contemporary Theory and the Beginning of European Integration, in this Yearbook , pp. 21–70; all quotes are from pp. 22–24. 3 Ibid., p. 23. 72 Lucia Coppolaro standing of the origins and development of European integration. It shows how policy-makers pursued concrete national interests – rather than a theory – and brings out the relevance of trade in the origins of the integration that occurred. By putting the word integration and the theories associated with it into historical perspective, Herbst’s article shows how the Marshall Plan (1947) and the European Coal and Steel Community (1951) were not the result of sudden choices made by US and European politicians, but responded to challenges that had been faced since at least the end of World War I. Thus, the article very usefully sheds light on the many misunderstandings that have come to surround European integration , above all that of seeing European integration as a process or journey inevitably leading to a United States of Europe. This perception of inevitability, curiously enough, again links the words integration and globalization, since both are often perceived as inexorable processes. European Integration: a New Solution to Old Problems Herbst’s article reconstructs the semantic origin and development of the word integration from Terence to the Enlightenment, and then examines its use in the 19th century. The article notes how economists and liberal theories at the end of the 19th century and in the first half of the 20th century referred to the integration (and its opposite, disintegration) of world markets as economic historians would now refer to economic globalization. Moreover, Herbst shows that the term integration was commonly used in law and economics both in the interwar period and during World War II. Conversely, the word was almost unknown in the political sphere, and there “remained the exception.” Tellingly, the movement seeking European unification used the word “federation” rather than integration to describe its goals.4 The situation changed gradually, but only after World War II, when the term became popularized through adoption by the US government, the establishment of the...

Religious values and norms often clash with the hedonistic consumer when the global market economy frees itself from prior constraints, religious limitations included, in favor of rules of supply and demand. Accordingly, the advent of the global economy and consumer are powerful secularizers of the public sphere that seem to erode the hold of religion on economic life and, possibly, on social and political life. Shopping, as Benjamin Barber notes, little tolerance for blue laws, whether dictated by pubclosing British paternalism, Sabbath-observing Jewish Orthodox, or no-Sunday liquorsale Massachusetts Puritanism.1 Secularism is often associated with the process of modernization and with the modus vivendi entailed in the separation of church and state that underscores liberal values and democracy. However, while practices associated with consumer are secularizing the public sphere, these practices may be separate from a comprehensive and principled secularism and from embedded liberal values. Specifically, the relation between secular practices, underscored by economic incentives, and deeper secular commitments associated with struggles for church-state separation and with liberal values could be rather weak. Consequently, the rise of secularism based on practices of everyday life may be dissociated from the rise of a secular society with liberal values such as religious freedom, tolerance towards minorities, and commitment to equality. The term culture war has been used to describe renewed religious-secular struggles in various countries over different spheres of contemporary life politics, economy, family, education, media, arts, and law. Yet this description, as elaborated below, falls short of capturing the complexities of religious-secular struggles, the secularizing impact of a globalizing market economy, and, most important, the implications for liberal values and democracy at large. The global market economy and consumer culture, argues Barber, has little patience for religious demands but also a limited commitment to democratic values.2

Catholic Social Thought, Political Liberalism, and the Idea of Human Rights

In 14 studies, we tested whether political conservatives' stronger free will beliefs were linked to stronger and broader tendencies to moralize and, thus, a greater motivation to assign blame. In Study 1 (meta-analysis of 5 studies, n = 308,499) we show that conservatives have stronger tendencies to moralize than liberals, even for moralization measures containing zero political content (e.g., moral badness ratings of faces and personality traits). In Study 2, we show that conservatives report higher free will belief, and this is statistically mediated by the belief that people should be held morally responsible for their bad behavior (n = 14,707). In Study 3, we show that political conservatism is associated with higher attributions of free will for specific events. Turning to experimental manipulations to test our hypotheses, we show the following: when conservatives and liberals see an action as equally wrong there is no difference in free will attributions (Study 4); when conservatives see an action as less wrong than liberals, they attribute less free will (Study 5); and specific perceptions of wrongness account for the relation between political ideology and free will attributions (Study 6a and 6b). Finally, we show that political conservatives and liberals even differentially attribute free will for the same action depending on who performed it (Studies 7a-d). These results are consistent with our theory that political differences in free will belief are at least partly explicable by conservatives' tendency to moralize, which strengthens motivation to justify blame with stronger belief in free will and personal accountability. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2021 APA, all rights reserved).

This chapter develops the idea of moving ‘beyond dichotomy’ to focus on feminist critiques of the conventional distinction between the public sphere (the sphere of politics and paid employment) and the private sphere (the sphere of the family and personal life). In revealing the interconnections that blur the public/private distinction, these critiques reveal both the domestic bases of men's privileges in the public sphere and the economic and civic importance of many community and domestic activities. The chapter argues that feminist politics should not only expose and challenge the current distribution of paid work, unpaid work, and free time, but should also insist that unpaid work, particularly time spent caring for others, must be properly valued and rewarded as a key contribution to the welfare of society.

The view that there existed a ‘progressive alliance’ between radical liberalism, labourism and socialism (and between the Liberal and Labour parties) during the Edwardian period has become a landmark of modern British historiography. However, the reconstruction of the ideas which cemented the alliance has focused on how radical liberalism became more concerned with social and economic issues during the period, and, in the guise of the ‘new liberalism’, shifted towards the core concern of socialists: the positive role of the state. Reconstructions of the progressive alliance, though certainly convincing, have ignored the importance of an ‘old’ discourse, which I term ‘radical constitutionalism’, the main object of which was democratic constitutional reform. This article attempts to go some way towards remedying this deficiency. The concept of the ‘progressive alliance’ must be broadened, to acknowledge the role of ‘radical constitutionalism’ in determining its nature. Focusing on the background to the House of Lords’ rejection of the Liberal government's ‘People's Budget’ in 1909, I reinterpret this in the context of a broad, ‘anti‐Lords alliance’, which existed among radicals, labourists and socialists. In their public political discourse these groups identified the object of their oppression in remarkably similar ways, through constructing a collection of shared meanings in the multiple and overlapping public spheres of Edwardian oppositional politics.

Gender inequality is a persistent issue experienced by women worldwide, often intertwined with their limited participation in political spheres. This study examines the political involvement of women in the parliaments of Indonesia and the United States of America (USA) through the lens of liberal feminism theory. Employing qualitative decryption approaches with a comparative study design, data collected from both the Indonesian Parliament and the USA Parliament were understood, recorded, phrased, compared and analyzed within the framework of liberal feminism theory, focusing on the "Right in Public Life and Politics". The results of the study revealed that while the Government of Indonesia has enacted legislation mandating a minimum of 30% female representation in political parties, both the Indonesian and US parliaments exhibit disproportionately low levels of female members compared to their male counterparts. A notable distinction between the two lies in the parliamentary leadership, with Indonesia being led by a woman and the USA by men. To enhance women's political participation, it is imperative for both governments to rigorously enforce regulations and sanctions against political parties. Additionally, efforts to dismantle the prevailing masculine culture in various societies are crucial in order to foster gender equality and justice, thereby realizing gender democracy.

The Evolution of a Meme Cluster: A Personal Account of a Countercultural Odyssey through <em>The Age of Aquarius</em>

Then. The way I see it, Māori Performance Research as it is coming to be practiced now started in the late 1990s at the University of Canterbury. Te Rita Papesch and I had been thrown together there as its only two female heads of school – she in Māori Studies, I in Theatre and Film Studies. Bonded by gendered necessity in a male-dominated academic environment, our chat ran along the lines of ‘You show me your research, and I’ll show you mine’. She started talking about Kapa Haka, I started talking about Performance Studies, and twenty years on (although we’ve moved on from Canterbury), we’re still talking. After all, not only is the personal political, it is also simultaneously academic and performative. This then is a personal account, my own version of the story of how we have come to be here now in this room discussing a field of study that I will, today, call Māori Performance Research: research focused on Māori performance, performance research from a Māori perspective, performance research by and for Māori academics and artists. These are not the same thing, but an evolving mix of old and new ways both of knowing about performance and of performing that knowledge.

Feminist values refer to the basic principles that underlie the feminist movement and thought. These values emphasize gender equality, justice, and women's empowerment in various aspects of life. This qualitative study analyzes Okky Madasari's novel "Mata dan Nyala Api Purba" (Eyes and Ancient Flames). Data were obtained through text content analysis using a purposive sampling technique. Document analysis was used for data collection, while validity was maintained through triangulation of sources and methods. The analysis was conducted interactively to gain a deeper understanding of the liberal feminist values within the work. The analysis shows that the values of equal rights and opportunities are the most dominant aspect in the novel, with a frequency of 32%. This is reflected in the representation of female characters who have equal access and opportunities to men, both in private and public spaces. The value of individual independence is also prominent (25%), depicting women as figures capable of making decisions and acting independently. Furthermore, individual freedom and life choices are recorded at 21%, demonstrating the space for female characters to determine their own direction. Public participation reaches 14%, demonstrating women's involvement in the social and political spheres. Meanwhile, rejection of traditional gender roles emerged at 7%, demonstrating resistance to stereotypes that limit women's roles in society. Overall, the five components of liberal feminist values in this novel demonstrate that Mata dan Nyala Api Purba (The Eyes and the Ancient Flame) is imbued with the spirit of emancipation and gender equality. Therefore, this literary work can be used as a learning resource to enrich understanding of feminist values within the context of Indonesian culture.

Part 1 Introduction - preliminary demarcation of a type of Bourgeois Public Sphere: the initial question remarks on the type representative publicness on the genesis of the Bourgois Public Sphere. Part 2 Social structures of the Public Sphere: the basic blueprint institutions of the public sphere the Bourgois family and the institutionalization of a privateness oriented to an audience the public sphere in the world of letters in relation to the public sphere in the political realm. Part 3 Political functions of the public sphere: the model case of British development the continental variants civil society as the sphere of private autonomy: private law and a liberalized market the contradictory institutionalization of the public sphere in the Bourgeois constitutional state. Part 4 The bourgeois public sphere - idea and ideology: publicity as the bridging principle between politics and morality, Kant on the dialectic of the public sphere, Hegel and Marx the ambivalent view of the public sphere in the theory of liberalism, John Stuart Mill and Alexis de Tocqueville. Part 5 The social-structural transformation of the public sphere: the tendency toward a mutual infiltration of public and private spheres the polarization of the social sphere and the intimate sphere from a culture-debating (kulturrasonierend) public to a culture-consuming public the blurred blueprint - developmental pathways in the disintegration of the bourgeois public sphere. Part 6 the transformation of the public sphere's political function: from the journalism of private men of letters to the public consumer services of the mass media - the public sphere as a platform for advertising the transmitted function of the principle of publicity manufactured publicity and nonpublic opinions - the voting behaviour of the population the political public sphere and the transformation of the liberal constitutional state into a social-welfare state. Part 7 On the concept of public opinion: public opinion as a fiction of constitutional law-and the social-psychological liquidation of the concept a sociological attempt at clarification.

The theory of a deliberative, democratic state posited by Jurgen Habermas fills the gaps in the concepts of democracy proper to liberalism and republicanism. Habermas’ theory intermediates between the liberal and the republican models, avoiding the one-sidedness to which they tend. A deliberative state ruled by law is based on a discursive forming of the will (active participation in the political, social and cultural sphere), the essence of which is communicative rationality, setting out the framework of a democratic procedure legitimising the rightfully made law and a law-abiding state. Communicative rationality guarantees that all the important interests will be accounted for. In this model, the public space, in turn, is perceived and understood as a possibility whereby all the stakeholders are able to create procedures. In his theory of liberalism, Habermas refers to a higher level of intersubjectivity where the communication processes occurs, which leads on the one hand to the institutionalising of deliberations, in the form of political bodies, and on the another hand, to the establishing of an informal network of linkages in the public sphere. Contrary to the liberal and republican model, the deliberative model of a democratic, law-governed state is focussed on the discursive legitimisation of the law, while politics here is understood as a public activity being played out in the interpersonal sphere. In such politics, the attention is displaced from the fi nal act of voting to the process of agreeing the rules and arriving at an agreement.

What is moral sanctity? Sanctity in the moral worldviews of U.S. political liberals

From the Texas textbook debate to the March for Science, visible displays of activism illuminate how deeply politicized the science‐religion interface has become. However, little is known about the extent to which scientists’ attitudes about science and religion are politicized. Using original survey data from 1,989 U.S. academic biologists and physicists, we examine the degree to which political views shape how scientists perceive the relationship between religion and science, religious authority, their personal religious identity, and views on dominant scientific theories. Findings suggest that, indeed, the science‐religion interface holds political meaning for scientists, but in different ways across the political spectrum. Specifically, for politically liberal scientists, atheism and the conflict narrative are particularly politicized belief structures, while politically conservative scientists emphasize religious identity to distinguish themselves from political liberals. Findings point to the critical role of politics in shaping scientists’ attitudes and identities, which may have implications for the scientific enterprise, both at the lab bench and in the political sphere.

In modern liberal democracies, the gendered division of labor is partially the result of men and women making different choices about work and family life, even if such choices stem from social norms about gender. The choices that women make relative to men’s disadvantage them in various ways: such choices lead them to earn less, enjoy less power and prestige in the labor market, be less able to participate in the political sphere on an equal basis, make them to some degree financially dependent on others, and leave them at a bargaining disadvantage and vulnerable in certain personal relationships. This chapter considers if and when the state should intervene to address women’s disadvantage and inequalities that are the result of gender specialization. It is argued that political liberals can and sometimes must intervene in the gendered division of labor when persons’ interests as free and equal citizens are frustrated.