Abstract
In a homogeneous good Cournot duopoly, a firm owns a cost-reducing technology and has a non-controlling share over its rival. We show that partial passive ownership holdings (PPOs) may induce licensing via a fixed fee and increase consumer surplus and social welfare. We thus identify a novel pro-competitive effect of PPOs.
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