Parliamentary Influence on Sanctions Policy in Canada, the US and the EU

U.S. Congress plays an increasing role in the American policy of economic sanctions. Although the President and the Administration retain a significant power in national foreign policy, including the use of sanctions, Congress affects political agenda, promotes its own design of sanctions and keeps an eye on their implementation and further upgrade. Emergence of sanctions in the pubic laws, initiated and passed by Congress, usually makes their revocation hardly possible and keeps them for a long term. Such an institutional role of Congress raises a number of research questions. What are the key target priorities for Congress in terms of sanctions policy? Do these priorities overlap with the ones of the Administration? Are there any partisan splits on sanctions or sanctions policy is rather a matter of bipartisan consensus? What instruments of sanctions does Congress prefer? What share of bills finally turns into public laws and what is a connection of bills success to partisan affiliation or priorities concerned? To deal with these questions, the article reflects an analysis of 539 Congressional bills on sanctions, introduced in the House of Representatives and the Senate in 2019-2023. The database of bills includes such variables as targets of sanctions, political triggers of proposed restrictions, list of measures proposed, partisan affiliation of sponsors and cosponsors, etc. Results demonstrate the overlapping of priorities of Congress and Administration, though Congress attempts to constrain Administration on a number of issues, such as Iranian Nuclear Deal. There are specific partisan priorities. Republicans are proactive on sanctioning China, Iran and Afghanistan. Democrats are exploring new areas of sanctions use, such as climate, ecology, minorities’ rights, etc. Still, most of the bills have a bipartisan composition of sponsors and cosponsors. Most of successful bills, which turned into laws, are of bipartisan nature. Congressional bills imply the use of universal instruments of targeted sanctions such as asset blocking, visa bans or trade restrictions. However, country-specific measures, like suspension of particular military cooperation programs, are also on the radars of Congress. China and Russia a key priorities for Congress in terms of sanctions.

Targeted financial sanctions have been playing a major role in the toolbox of European Union (EU) policy of sanctions since early 2000s. They have been targeting particular natural persons and entities, rather than states in general. Things have been changing dramatically since the outbreak of Russian military operation against Ukraine in February 2022. EU has already implemented massive bans on exports and imports of wide range of goods and services to and from Russia. Meanwhile, academic literature on sanctions still has a major gap in understanding of trade sanctions. The goal of the article is to fill this gap, taking into account contemporary trends of the EU trade sanctions against Russia. The major point implies that the EU policy of trade sanctions vis a vis Russia suffers from the imbalance between the quantity of sanctions and the quality of ways and means to enforce them. Unlike the United States, which enjoys well-developed instruments and practice of the use of secondary sanctions and enforcement, the EU has to implement sanctions and to develop enforcement in a simultaneous way. Brussels has already introduced mechanisms of de-facto secondary sanctions and is promoting the unification of enforcement legislation among the member-states. Current enforcement activity of member-states on the basis of domestic legislation compensates such an imbalance. The study of these trends purports the analysis of the EU normative documents as well as the ones, which reflect political and legal practice of their implementation.

Following the United States’ unilateral withdrawal from the agreement between the five permanent UN Security Council members, the European Union, Germany, and Iran, that intends to stop Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons, the United States has re-imposed and tightened its sanctions against Iran. The United States’ renunciation of the agreement, despite the agreement’s UN Security Council approval and verified Iranian compliance, arguably violated international law. Nevertheless, the United States is attempting to compel the other state parties (and others) to follow its policy on Iran by threatening those states’ companies and business executives with economic or even criminal sanctions to force them to cut commercial ties with Iran. Based on an in-depth discussion of the lawfulness of such secondary sanctions under public international law, this article concludes that secondary sanctions, as imposed by the United States more recently, are unlawful. The United States’ assertion of extraterritorial jurisdiction is not justified under any principle of jurisdiction recognized in customary international law. In fact, the international community explicitly rejects the United States’ claims to extraterritorial jurisdiction. Furthermore, the United States seeks to undermine third states’ foreign and trade policies by targeting their citizens and businesses. United States’ sanctions policy is thus an attempt to assert control over other states’ foreign policies. This coercion amounts to an unlawful intervention into those states’ internal affairs. Lastly, the use of the United States’ superior economic power to strong-arm other states into abandoning their own foreign policy is a violation of the sovereign equality principle.

This paper focuses on the role of interest groups in US sanctions policy toward Iran from 2007 to 2016. The aim of this work is to explain what changed in regard to the role of interest groups in the most significant shift in US-Iranian relations under President Barack Obama before and after the vote on the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, which was intended to halt Iran’s non-peaceful nuclear program in return for an easing of sanctions by the US Congress. This study contributes to our knowledge about how structural variables, issue salience, and actor strategies work together to produce outcomes. In addition, it provides a better understanding of interest group influence by identifying conditions under which interest groups can be successful in changing the policy status quo. This research proposes that the once firm stands of the Democrat legislators on supporting Iran sanctions changed due to support of President Obama’s strategy of engagement by Pro-Diplomacy groups and the international community, which he used as legislative subsidy. In addition, favorable policy windows opened up opportunities that pushed for diplomacy instead of confrontation.

The increased sanctions efforts of European diplomacy in recent years have formed a new angle of view on the European Unionʼs external policy towards neighboring countries, since one of the criteria of the EUʼs sanctions policy effectiveness is the so-called “regional leadership” – third countriesʼ alignment with the EU sanctions regimes. The established academicdiscourse on the topic in Europe evaluates the effectiveness of the sanctions policy on this parameter extremely highly. However, what, in fact, is behind the facade of the postulated successes of regional leadership? In this paper, the author asks this question in relation to Iceland, a country that has increased vulnerability in the face of external challenges and which has incurred incomparably high costs from harmonizing its foreign policy with the EU anti-Russian sanctions regimes. Using the theoretical and methodological frameworks of the shelter theory, this study documents the negative political and economic consequences that Iceland has faced and shows that there are no such categories as consideration and leveling of possible costs for affiliated countries in the goal setting of the EU sanctions policy. In the Icelandic case, this, in turn, leadsto a reformatting and polarization of the existing ecosystem of relations in the Euro-Atlantic, since the costs Iceland incurs from harmonization with EU policy are mostly compensated by the United States, although traditionally the U.S. has been responsible for Icelandʼs military rather than economic protection. The international political situation in the conditions of sanctions sets the stage for possible tensions in Icelandʼs relations with the EU and a stronger U.S. direction in its multilateral foreign policy. Nevertheless, despite these tensions, Iceland will continue to synchronize with the EU sanctions regimes, as other options are either fraught with even greater costs (synchronization with the U.S. sanctions policy, which is substantially tougher than that of the EU) or unrealizable in the international realities after the start of the Special Military Operation(developing its own sanctions regime).

The aim of the study is to conduct a comprehensive analysis of discursive strategies for legitimizing the United States (U.S.) sanctions policy against Russia during the Biden Administration. The paper is based on a constructivist theory within the study of international relations and methodological innovations by T. van Dijk, T.J. van Leeuwen, R. Wodak. The research investigates the hypothesis that the absence of an international legal framework for anti-Russian sanctions creates an increased need for the United States to legitimize them. The work uses critical discourse analysis (CDA) to investigate discursive strategies of legitimization of U.S. sanctions against Russia (through 1) emotions; 2) hypothetical future; 3) procedures; 4) expert opinion; 5) altruism). The study shows that anti-Russian sanctions is a part of the hegemonic foreign policy of the United States. It is manifested, reproduced, and justified through the official narrative. Political discourses containing ideological attitudes are used by the United States to create, maintain and protect its identity, which is based on the binary opposition “ Self-Positive Representation - Other-Negative Representation” and has a projection on the country's foreign policy. The most convincing discursive strategies of legitimization are those that appeal to the fundamental pillars of American identity (strategies 1, 2, 5). Strategies that rely on more specific/ situational grounds and argumentation systems are the least convincing (strategies 3, 4).

Economic sanctions are an integral part of states’ foreign policy repertoire. Increasingly, major powers and international organizations rely on sanctions to address an incredibly diverse array of issues—from fighting corruption to the prevention of nuclear weapons. How policy makers employ economic sanctions evolved over time, especially over the past two decades. The recognition of the adverse humanitarian impact of economic sanctions in the late 1990s and the “War on Terrorism” following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks have led to major changes in the design and enforcement patterns of economic sanctions. Academics’ understanding of how these coercive tools work, when they are utilized, what consequences they create, and when they succeed are still heavily shaped by research findings based on observations from the latter half of the 20th century. Insights based on past sanctions episodes may not fully apply to how sanctions policies are being currently used. In the latter half of the 20th century, the majority of sanctions cases were initiated by the United States, targeted governments, and involved restrictions on international trade. In the last two decades, however, additional actors, such as the European Union, the United Nations, and China, have emerged as major senders. Modern sanctions now most commonly involve targeted and financial sanctions and are imposed against individuals, organizations, and firms. The changing nature of the senders, targets, stakeholders, and economic tools associated with sanctions policies have important implications for their enforcement, effectiveness, and consequences. The legal-regulatory and bureaucratic infrastructure needed to implement and enforce modern economic sanctions has also become far more robust. This evolution of modern sanctions has provided the scholarly community with plenty of opportunities to explore new questions about economic coercion and revisit old ones. The research agenda on economic sanctions must evolve to remain relevant in understanding why and how modern sanctions are used and what their consequences are.

The article provides an analysis of Russia’s role and place in President Biden’s U.S. foreign policy aims. Particularly, this paper explores clashing world order visions, issues pertaining to national sovereignty, post-Soviet space development, sanction policies, climate change issues, and global security. The following research reveals that the rivalry between the United States and Russia influences the system of international relations, because both parties promote substantially different concepts of the future world order. The Biden administration was unwilling to make the necessary concessions to accommodate Russia because 1) there is a huge gulf between the two country’s world views that even makes negotiations between the two almost impossible, and 2) because it does not take Russia seriously and views it as a declining power. As a result, the two sides were unable to come to some kind of negotiated agreement that would have addressed Russia’s concerns including the Ukraine issue. Instead, deterring Russia has become a priority for U.S. foreign policy in critical areas such as national sovereignty, the democratic development of post-Soviet countries, Russian-related human rights issues, and U.S. sanction policies against Russia. Comparing Trump’s presidency to the Biden administration’s first year in office, Biden has championed a more pragmatic narrative towards Russia. Most evidently, this is manifested in problems concerning universal global challenges such as strategic stability, cyber-security, and even aspects of climate change. Nevertheless, the possibility of concluding any serious negotiations between the parties on new world order parameters seems less realistic today than ever before.

Objective: to study the packages of anti-Russian sanctions, to analyze measures to counteract sanctions, and to formalize the current and future sanctions policy of Great Britain, the USA, and the EU.Methods: the author uses such techniques of abstract-logical method as analysis, synthesis, deduction, induction, analogy, formalization, and forecasting.Results: based on the analysis of scientific literature, as well as opinions of experts and officials, three main approaches to the assessment of Russia’s sanctions policy were identified: macroeconomic, sectoral and regional. The packages of anti-Russian sanctions and counter-sanctions by Russia in chronological order were assessed. The effectiveness of anti-Russian sanctions in terms of their impact on the Russian economy was assessed. Current trends in the sanctions policy of the UK, the US and the EU were revealed. The following questions were answered: who is the main objective of the sanctions (Russia or the EU); whether China will be drawn into the sanctions war; whether the official objectives of anti-Russian sanctions will be achieved; and whether the strengthening of sanctions will lead to a hot geopolitical conflict. The prerequisites and motives for the EU entry into the sanctions war were determined; the influence of the EU economic problems on the duration of the sanctions war was revealed. Scenarios for the development of the EU relations with Russia were constructed and the terms of the sanctions war unleashed by the United States were predicted.Scientific novelty: it was determined that the anti-Russian sanctions after their fifth package became in many respects demonstrative. The situational response of the Russian authorities to the sanctions was large-scale, corresponded to the current situation, was carried out thoughtfully and effectively. It was revealed that the focus of the UK and the US sanctions shifted to the EU, as well as the prerequisites of the EU-China conflict. It was found that if the sanctions policy intensity is maintained, the EU economy may significantly degrade in the next 10-15 years.Practical significance: the given data and conclusions may help in formalization and correction of sanctions and antisanctions economic policy of Russia.

More and more new restrictions are being introduced against the Russian Federation – sectoral and financial sanctions, personal restrictions, new packages of sanctions are being prepared. The article attempts to show the hidden goals of the sanctions policy through a political and economic analysis of the states that initiated the sanctions policy. The analysis proves that the purpose of the sanctions is not only to weaken the Russian Federation economically, but also to poor the allies of the United States, as the initiator of the sanctions, in full accordance with the sanctions paradox of D. Drezner. Protectionism as an economic policy has become entrenched in the actions of the American administration, which can be observed in the processes of deindustrialization of Germany and the weakening of the economy of the European Union countries as a whole. It is important to note that the debt strategy adopted by the American authorities as an element of economic policy has deep historical roots and was proposed by J. M. Keynes to overcome the economic consequences of the war. The inability or unwillingness to abandon the debt strategy, as well as the rapid reduction in the possibilities of using internal sources of economic growth, dictates to the United States the need to ensure external sources of economic growth, where the forceful elimination of a competitor (the Russian Federation) from the European markets of energy products, fertilizers, agricultural raw materials and metals becomes the tip of the iceberg of the ­US sanctions policy, however, the underwater part of the iceberg remained hidden. This article is devoted to its exposure. The theoretical significance of the research is the description of the interdependence of sanctions policy and protectionism policy.

Since 2014, the EU and the United States have been running an extensive sanctions policy against Russia. However, sanctions have had little significant effect on Russian foreign policy on Ukraine and other issues. This raises a number of research questions. Why have the sanctions against Russia turned out to be ineffective? What is the specific role of the EU in sanctions pressure on Russia? Is EU policy of particular note, or does the EU just follow the United States? How much damage have the sanctions brought to the Russian and EU economies? And, finally, what are the scenarios for the further development of sanctions pressure on Russia? Two explanatory factors are taken into account. First, differences between the United States and EU approaches in terms of the intensity of sanctions: the United States is actively escalating sanctions, while the EU remains primarily within the ‘Ukrainian package’; this may reduce the cumulative effect of restrictive measures. Second, the limited damage of sanctions to the Russian economy, which has suffered losses but also adapted. Further adaptation may decrease the initiators’ chances of success. On this basis, alternative scenarios for the further imposition of sanctions are outlined.

Between 1996 and 2012, cooperation between the United States (US) and the European Union (EU) on Iran sanctions underwent a dramatic shift from open disagreement to almost unanimous consensus. Whereas the US preferred negative sanctions throughout this period, the EU opted at first for using economic incentives and dialogue. The EU’s diverging approach exemplified the overall preference for multilateralism and engagement strategies over unilateral coercive measures. Beginning in 2005, however, European sanction policy towards Iran converged with that of the US. In this article, I argue that the convergence of transatlantic sanction policy against Iran cannot be understood without the pressure employed by Washington. The US pressure campaign consisted of secondary sanctions against European companies. As necessary condition, US pressure has been a key external factor that complemented the EU’s internal developments fostering a more coercive approach towards Tehran after the revelation of the Iranian nuclear programme in 2002 and the breakdown of the E3 (Great Britain, France and Germany) negotiations in 2005.

The circle of the most acute problems facing the Chinese leadership remains unchanged: relations with the United States, domestic political stability, economic growth, etc. However, by the beginning of 2020, the priority structure of these topics had changed. Prospects for completing the so-called “first stage” of the bilateral trade deal between China and the United States and signing the corresponding agreement were outlined. Trade deal was done on January 15, 2020. The decrease in trade tensions highlighted the growing Sino-American confrontation on other topics: military construction in China, the human rights situation in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous region and the struggle for control of the world’s 5G space, which appears to be of long-term strategic importance. Against the background of some easing of trade relations between the P.R.C. and the U.S. by the beginning of 2020, the topic of Hong Kong is gaining new urgency. In Hong Kong the Chinese leadership continues to face a dilemma: go for a military action or use peaceful mechanisms. By the beginning of 2020, it seems that the “non-forceful approach” is still steadily prevailing. At the end of 2019, the United States took a number of steps to put legal pressure on Beijing on the Hong Kong issue. The U. S. laws S. 1838 “On Human Rights and Democracy in Hong Kong” and H.R. 4270 “On Restrictions on the Export of Tear Gas and Crowd Control Technologies to Hong Kong” should be considered from the viewpoint of the global political and economic rivalry between the United States and China. In general, these laws are primarily aimed at improving the effectiveness of the U.S. tariff and sanctions policy against China. The topic of economic growth becomes a priority for the Chinese leadership. GDP growth in 2019 slowed slightly to 6.1%, but was in the “planned fork” of 6.0–6.5%. In this context, discussions about “optimal rates” of economic growth are beginning to intensify again in the PRC. One part of economists continues to argue that China should keep economic growth at the 6% mark “at all costs”. Opponents of this approach speak of the so-called “new normality”, in the sense that it is important to focus not so much on the pace as on the quality of economic development indicators. From December 10 to 12, 2019, the Central Meeting on Economic Work was held in Beijing, during which clear requirements were put forward in relation to the economic development of China in 2020. The main leitmotif is stability and quality of growth. By the beginning of 2020, Russian-Chinese relations have established trends that are likely to determine the direction of bilateral relations in the short term. Beijing and Moscow will demonstrate the strengthening of their strategic partnership in every possible way. On the other hand, Russia and China will try to muffle existing differences and contradictions. In strategic cooperation, Beijing does not agree to establish a military alliance with Moscow and refuses to participate in multilateral negotiations on nuclear missile issues, including the issue of medium- and short-range missiles.

The article examines the relevant aspects of development and implementation of the mechanisms for granting authorizations for actions prohibited by sanctions. It is proved that an efficiently established system of permit administration is a key element of a balanced sanctions regime, as it helps to achieve a balance between ensuring sanctions pressure and normal functioning of the economy, minimizes the risks of human rights violations, and increases the overall effectiveness of the state's sanctions policy. The author highlights the features of such a mechanism in the sanctions policy systems of the United States and the United Kingdom. The author demonstrates the effectiveness of the combination of general and special permits, a clear procedure for their issuance and transparent grounds for refusal or termination of an already issued permit by using the example of administering the permit system through the activities of the authorized bodies, namely OFAC and OFSI. It is determined that general permits are issued mainly to resolve basic economic, social and humanitarian issues, while special permits are issued when a particular transaction requires individual approval or involves specific restrictive measures. The author emphasizes that in the context of a significant expansion of the list of sanctioned entities, the planned criminalization of sanctions violations, and Ukraine's desire to improve its sanctions policy, the introduction of a permit system is of particular relevance. The author emphasizes the importance of taking into account the experience of the United States and the United Kingdom in granting permits for actions prohibited by sanctions, in particular, the availability of detailed rules for submitting applications, decision-making criteria, and mechanisms for monitoring the proper use of issued permits. This will help to minimize abuse and corruption risks when introducing similar mechanisms in Ukraine and, at the same time, guarantee a balanced application of sanctions pressure

Economic sanctions are coercive policies capable of inflicting social, political, and humanitarian suffering that go far beyond their economic effects alone. The United States employs economic sanctions more than any other government in the world. In this study, we analyze how US sanctions policies can inflict misery upon the states they target. Our contributions to the literature are two-fold. First, we introduce a new, consolidated measure called the Freedom from Misery index to capture the disparate, adverse effects of sanctions on socioeconomic and political conditions within target states. Second, we offer the first empirical analysis of the extent to which sanctions imposed by the United States increase the misery gap between the United States and targets of US sanctions. We theorize that high-cost sanctions and, counterintuitively, human rights sanctions will inflict significant amounts of misery on the states they target. Using data from 1971 to 2015 for over 145 countries, we conduct quantitative analyses to evaluate the degree that US sanctions, including those involving the United Nations, contribute to miserable living conditions in their targets. We find that US sanctions, particularly those inflicting major costs on targeted economies and those imposed for human rights reasons, immiserate their targets’ populations. Extensions of our main analysis further show that US sanctions widen the misery gap between the United States and target states, contributing to greater international inequality.