P-SIGMA : security aware paging in end-to-end mobility management scheme

Abstract

Mobile users need to maintain end-to-end connections when changing subnets. Handoff across networks often causes delay and loss of packets and make end users vulnerable to security threats that may lead to disruptions. In this paper, we design P-SIGMA , a delay and security-hardened, disruption-tolerant and signalling cost-effective end-to-end mobility management scheme by incorporating paging in SIGMA , an internet protocol diversity-based end-to-end transport layer mobility management scheme. P-SIGMA can detect and mitigate disruptions against two most common security threats: session hijacking and freeloading. We also propose a signalling cost analysis model for paging and a recovery-time model for attacks. To demonstrate performance improvement, we compare P-SIGMA with SIGMA and show the speed at which P-SIGMA can detect attacks (security breaches). We observe that P-SIGMA has lower signalling than SIGMA while maintaining all the benefits of a transport layer mobility management scheme. P-SIGMA can also detect paging related security threats with a small detection time without incurring any additional signalling.