Ownership Structure and Leverage as Precursors to Financial Distress in an Emerging Economy: A Mediating Model

PurposeThis study aims to investigate the possible implications of compliance with corporate governance (CG) provisions, including board composition and ownership structures, on the firm’s likelihood of falling into financial distress.Design/methodology/approachThe study applies a random-effects logistic regression model as a baseline analysis using a sample of 110 FTSE 350 manufacturing companies from 2014 to 2019. This technique is supported by conducting a two-stage Heckman regression model to overcome the potential existence of endogeneity problems.FindingsThe empirical evidence suggests that board composition and ownership structure are heterogeneously associated with financial distress probabilities in that they might have either reduced or increased the financial distress of the sampled firms. Specifically, board independence, board gender diversity, audit committee independence and institutional ownership negatively influence the likelihood of financial distress. In contrast, and consistent with the expectations, ownership concentration is positively attributed to financial distress, while the board size, audit committee size and managerial ownership have insignificant impacts on financial distress.Originality/valueThe study extends the existing body of knowledge by examining the collective effect of board characteristics and ownership structures on firms’ financial distress likelihood among a sample of manufacturing firms within the FTSE 350 index post the 2008 global financial crisis and following the recent CG reforms in the UK during the study period from 2014 to 2019.

Financial Distress is indicated as company’s financial decrease which can be caused by various circumstances. Identifying financial distress is important to do since financial distress that occurs continuously will lead to company failure. This research is useful to see the impact of Ownership Structure, Liquidity, Leverage, and Activity in predicting Financial Distress to the sector consumer goods companies listed in Indonesia Stock Exchange. The independent variable used is Ownership Structure, Current ratio, Debt ratio, and Activity (TATO). While the dependent variable used is Financial Distress. The sample in this research involve 27 companies was taken by Purposive Sampling technique by determining 3 criterias within a span of 5 years, so the amount of research data was obtained as many as 135. This study use quantitative research. The results of this research using multiple linear regression analysis concluded Ownership Structure, Liquidity, and Activity have positive impact on Financial Distress. While Leverage is the only variable whichhas no significant influence on Financial Distress.
 Keywords : Ownership Structure, Liquidity, Leverage, Activity, Financial Distress.

PurposeThe purpose of this paper is to explore the role of corporate governance proxies by ownership structure on the likelihood of firms’ financial distress for a sample of 146 Pakistani public-limited companies listed at the Karachi Stock Exchange over the period of 2003-2012.Design/methodology/approachThe dynamic generalized method of moments (GMM) estimator and panel logistic regression (PLR) are used to determine the impact of corporate governance on the financial distress. The ownership structure is used as a determinant of corporate governance, while the Altman Z-score is utilized as an indicator of financial distress, as it measures financial distress inversely. The smaller the values of the Z-score, the higher will be the risk of financial distress.FindingsThe authors find insignificant impact of ownership structure on firms’ likelihood of financial distress based on the dynamic GMM method. However, the PLR results indicate that foreign shareholdings have a significant negative association with firms’ likelihood of financial distress, in the case of Pakistan. An evidence of a negative and insignificant relationship between institutional ownership and financial distress was observed, which indicates the passive role of institutional investors in Pakistan. The results also reveal a positive and significant relationship between insider’s ownership and likelihood of financial distress. This finding is consistent with the entrenchment hypothesis which predicts that insiders are more aligned with their self-interest than outside shareholders’ interest when their shareholding increases in the business. Furthermore, the results also reveal insignificant association between government shareholdings and the probability of financial distress. The reason could be the social welfare objective of the government entities rather than profit maximization.Practical implicationsThe findings of this study provide more insight to corporate managers and investors about the association between the quality of corporate governance and the degree of financial distress, with respect to Pakistani firms. Furthermore, this study contributes to the existing literature by adding new evidence from developing countries like Pakistan which are helpful for regulatory bodies and policymakers in the formulation of long-term corporate governance strategies to manage the financial distress. It is well established that strengthening the quality of corporate governance practices enhances the efficiency of capital markets and reduces the probability of financial distress.Originality/valueThe study extends the body of existing literature on corporate governance and the likelihood of financial distress with reference to Pakistan. The results suggest that policymakers may pay special attention to the quality of corporate governance, specifically ownership structure, while predicting corporate financial distress.

The objective of this empirical study is to analyze the effect of Managerial agency cost and Ownership Structure, either separately or simultaneously, on Financial distress in Manufactur Companies that listed on BEI at 2015-2017 . Range of period used in this study is three years, for 2015-2017.Population of the study is all manufacturing companies listed in BEI without delisting, relisting, or moving sector on 2015-2017 period. Method of sampling in this research is purposive sampling method. As the criteria established, there are 261 companies used as sampel. Type of data is secondary data secondary data which is retrieved from financial report manufacturing. In this research, multiple linear regression model is used to analyze data. Result shows that: partially (1) Managerial agency cost has an effect on Financial distress, and (2) Ownership Structure has an effect on Financial distress. Simultaneously Managerial agency cost and Ownership Structure has effect on Financial distress.

This research aimed to predict the financial distress through ownership structure and management agency cost. The ownership structure was tested by managerial ownership and institutional ownership. Meanwhile, the management agency cost was tested by administrative cost ratio. The population of this research were all companies listed in Indonesia Sharia Stock Index year 2016-2018 by using purposive sampling technique. Based on the criteria that have been determined, the total samples were 129 companies. The analysis of the data in this research used logistic regression analysis. The results showed that institutional ownership has a significant negative effect towards the financial distress. Despite, the managerial ownership and management agency cost have a insignificant negative effect toward the financial distress.

This research aims to examine the influence of operational capacity, sales growth, managerial agency costs, managerial ownership, and institutional ownership on financial distress. The research method used is both descriptive and verificative. The study's population comprises companies in the transportation and logistics sector listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange from 2017 to 2021. A total of 23 companies over five years, resulting in 115 data observations, were selected using purposive sampling. Hypothesis testing was conducted using panel data regression analysis. The research findings indicate that operational capacity and sales growth have a significant negative impact on financial distress. However, managerial agency costs and managerial ownership have a significant positive impact on financial distress. Meanwhile, institutional ownership also has a significant negative impact on financial distress. This study contributes to the corporate governance literature by predicting factors related to financial distress and providing empirical evidence for the use of the Springate Method in predicting financial distress. Keywords: Operating Capacity; Sales Growth; Managerial Agency Costs; Ownership Structure; Financial Distress Abstrak Penelitian ini bertujuan untuk menguji pengaruh kapasitas operasi, pertumbuhan penjualan, biaya keagenan manajerial, kepemilikan manajerial, dan kepemilikan institusional terhadap financial distress. Metode yang digunakan adalah deskriptif dan verifikatif. Populasi penelitian yaitu perusahaan sektor jasa transportasi dan logistik yang terdaftar di Bursa Efek Indonesia tahun 2017-2021. Jumlah sampel sebanyak 23 perusahaan selama 5 tahun atau 115 data observasi menggunakan teknik purposive sampling. Pengujian hipotesis menggunakan analisis regresi data panel. Temuan penelitian menunjukkan bahwa kapasitas operasi dan pertumbuhan penjualan berpengaruh negatif signifikan terhadap kesulitan keuangan. Namun biaya keagenan manajerial dan kepemilikan manajerial berpengaruh positif signifikan terhadap financial distress. Sementara itu, kepemilikan institusional juga berpengaruh negatif signifikan terhadap financial distress. Penelitian ini memberikan literatur mengenai peran mekanisme tata kelola perusahaan dalam memprediksi kesulitan keuangan dan memberikan bukti empiris penggunaan Metode Springate dalam memprediksi kesulitan keuangan. Kata Kunci: Kapasitas Operasional; Pertumbuhan Penjualan; Biaya Agensi Manajerial; Kepemilikan Manajerial; Kesulitan Keuangan

Social and economic activities, like religion, entertainment, education, research, and the production of other goods and services, are carried on by different types of organizations, for example, corporations, proprietorships, partnerships, mutuals and nonprofits. There is competition among organizational forms for survival. The form of organization that survives in an activity is the one that delivers the product demanded by customers at the lowest price while covering costs. The characteristics of residual claims are important both in distinguishing organizations from one another and in explaining the survival of organizational forms in specific activities. This paper develops a set of propositions that explaim the special features of the residual claims of different organizational forms as efficient approaches to controlling agency problems. © M. C. Jensen and E. F. Fama, 1983 Michael C. Jensen, Foundations of Organizational Strategy Chapter 6, Harvard University Press, 1998. Journal of Law & Economics, Vol XXVI (June 1983) This document is available on the Social Science Research Network (SSRN) Electronic Library at: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/paper.taf?ABSTRACT_ID=94032 AGENCY PROBLEMS AND RESIDUAL CLAIMS

This paper examines the relation between a borrowing firm's ownership structure and its choice of debt source using a novel, hand-collected data set on corporate ownership, control and debt structures for 9,831 firms in 20 countries from 2001 to 2010. We find that the divergence between control rights and cash-flow rights of a borrowing firm's largest ultimate owner has a significant impact on the firm's choice between bank debt and public debt. A one-standard-deviation increase in the divergence reduces the borrowing firm's reliance on bank debt financing as measured by the ratio of bank debt to total debt by approximately 23% and increases its reliance on public debt financing as measured by the ratio of public debt to total debt by approximately 18%. The effect of the control-ownership divergence on borrowing firms' debt choice is more pronounced for firms with high financial distress risk, firms that are informationally opaque, and firms that are family-controlled. Moreover, this effect is weakened by the presence of multiple large owners and in countries with strong shareholder rights. Overall, our results are consistent with the hypothesis that firms controlled by large shareholders with excess control rights choose public debt financing over bank debt as a way of avoiding scrutiny and insulating themselves from bank monitoring.

The research objective is to identify ownership structure, audit committee characteristics, and internet financial reporting impact on banking financial distress. Populations of this study are the banking sector which is registered in Indonesia Stock Exchange 2010-2018. This study use logistic regression method, which is done twice for the period 2010-2018 and the period 2018. Dependent variable in this study is financial distress (FD). Independent variables in this study are state ownership (SO), ownership concentration (OC), blockholder ownership (BO), management ownership (MO), director ownership (DO), audit committee structure (ACS), audit committee composition (ACC), audit committee meeting frequency (ACMF), audit committee financial literacy (ACFL), dan internet financial reporting (IFR). Control variables in this study are firm age (AGE), firm size (SIZE), dan Audit Quality (AQ). The result shows a positive significant impact on audit committee financial literacy in is financial distress. The state ownership has a negative significant impact on financial distress for 2010-2018 data. This result is not supported by 2018 data, due to changes in government priority. Firm size as control variable has negative significant impact on financial distress. This research emphasizes that good corporate governance and internet financial reporting roles need to be evaluated in banking sector.Keywords: Ownership Structure, Audit Committee Characteristic, Internet Financial Reporting, Financial Distress, Good Corporate Governance

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to investigate the degree of corporate financial distress (DOFD) and relationship between ownership structure and the DOFD in China. Design/methodology/approach – The authors estimate the DOFD across a sample of 378 Chinese-listed companies that got into financial distress between 2000 and 2008. The DOFD reflects long-term solvency capability, short-term liquidity capability, development capability, risk level, profitability capability, operating capacity, and cash flow capability. The authors analyze the relationship between ownership structure and the DOFD in these companies, using the panel data analysis method. Findings – The authors find that a concentrated ownership structure is negatively related to the DOFD. Further, the results indicate that a state-owned status helps firms in decreasing their DOFD and that the separation of cash-flow rights and control rights is positively related to the DOFD. The authors also found that the Chinese special treatment (ST) system needs further improvement. The reason is that ST firms can be classified into “value” ST firms and “garbage” ST firms. They have different DOFD and change trend, so they should not be treated equally. Originality/value – This paper find that Chinese ST system and previous research are not helpful for risk-seeking investor to distinguish and evaluate “value” ST firms and “garbage” ST firms. It is unfair to warn and punish this two kinds of firms equally, so ST system should be improved. The authors also suggest that risk-seeking investor can choose ST firms that have a concentrated ownership structure and are controlled by the state or local government. These findings are not observed in previous studies.

The main objective of our research is to examine the effects of financial distress on ownership structure and to elaborate on the factors that influence change of ownership in companies that have adopted a reorganisation plan in the Republic of Serbia. Of the 63 sample companies reorganised in bankruptcy proceedings between 2009 and 2015, the ownership structure remained unchanged in 49 companies, while in 35, the existing owners or their family members remained in charge of key management positions. Using binary logistic regression, we observed that two factors influenced the change in ownership structure: the length of time it takes to resolve the insolvency process and whether the owners were involved in the running of the distressed company before it filed for bankruptcy. The obtained results indicate that corporate governance mechanisms in distressed Serbian companies are not efficient.

This paper does the empirical research on the relevance of ownership structure and financial distress in listed companies based on the data of ST corporations because of abnormal financial positions in year 2005–2009 and the paired corporations. The ownership structure is described by the nature of controlling shareholder, ownership centralization, ownership balancing and managements' holding percentage. The result shows that the possibility of financial distress is significantly lower in stated-owned firms than in private firms, while other factors of ownership structure don't have significant impact on financial distress occurrence. It also suggests that the model based on financial ratios and ownership structure variables can predict a corporation's financial distress very well.

Ownership diversity is defined as the distribution of ownership and control among various categories of shareholders. Many organizations' ownership structures have become increasingly diversified in terms of race, nationality, gender, and socioeconomic level in recent years. Globally, there's little consensus on how ownership diversity affects financial distress. Using the agency theory and entrenchment hypothesis, this study investigates how the diversity of ownership affects the financial distress of business firms. This research makes a contribution to the empirical literature by applying panel data analysis on 181 non-financial companies from 2012 to 2019 on the Colombo Stock Exchange of Sri Lanka. The study uses Herfindahl-Hirschman Index to measure ownership diversity. In contrast, Altman Z Score Analysis, Emerging Market Score, and Interest Coverage Ratio measure financial distress. The results of the logistic regression models demonstrate that ownership diversity significantly and positively affects financial distress. This signifies that the diversified ownership structure raises the agency cost as it incurs high monitoring costs to monitor diverse shareholders, leading to financial distress within business firms.

PurposeThis study examines how financial distress affects the capital structure of Egyptian firms following the 2016 currency flotation, examining the moderating roles of board characteristics and ownership structure.Design/methodology/approachUtilizing data from non-financial companies listed on the Egyptian Stock Exchange from 2017 to 2022, we apply two-stage least squares (2SLS) and propensity score matching (PSM) to address endogeneity and selection bias.FindingsOur findings indicate that financially distressed firms tend to increase their debt burden, but robust governance mechanisms, such as higher board independence, larger boards and strong blockholder and institutional ownership, significantly mitigate this effect. Managerial ownership shows a stabilizing influence during distress, while chief executive officer duality does not significantly impact leverage decisions. These findings underscore how robust corporate governance promotes more conservative capital structure decisions during economic volatility.Research limitations/implicationsOur study focus, country and period could limit the generalizability of our findings to other regions or sectors.Practical implicationsInvestors and policymakers are advised to focus on firms with effective governance structures to mitigate distress-induced leverage increases. Governance reforms that enhance board effectiveness and ownership structure, e.g. increasing board independence requirements and promoting greater institutional investor participation, can further stabilize capital structure during downturns. Managers, in turn, should diversify financing and adopt prudent debt strategies to reduce overreliance on leverage.Originality/valueIn contrast to most studies, this research reverses the lens by exploring how financial distress shapes capital structure decisions in an emerging market context, specifically post-Egypt’s 2016 currency flotation. Employing both 2SLS and PSM to address endogeneity and selection bias, the study highlights the mitigating role of governance mechanisms, which can buffer firms against heightened debt reliance under economic volatility.

This study aims to determine the effect of audit committee characteristics and ownership structure on financial distress. Audit committee characteristics used in this study is the independence of the audit committee, audit committee expertise, audit committee size and the frequency of audit committee meetings while the ownership structure used this study is institutional ownership and managerial ownership.The population of non-financial companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange in 2010-2011. Based on purposive , there are 364 samples consist of 294 financially distressed firms and 70 financially distressed firms. Criteria of financial distress in this study viewed from a negative net profit two years in a row. While non-financial criteria of distress seen positive net profit two years in a row and for more than one year of dividend payments . Data analysis using logistic regression with SPPS 16 .The analysis showed that the expertise of the audit committee and audit committee meeting frequency is significantly negative effect on financial distress.