Own goal! When war becomes its own end—and society the means

This article seeks to explain the limits of critical discourses of `global war' and biopolitical framings of `global conflict' that have arisen in response to the globalization of security discourses in the post-Cold War era. The central theoretical insight offered is that `global war' should not be understood in the framework of contested struggles to reproduce and extend the power of regulatory control. `Global war' appears `unlimited' and unconstrained precisely because it lacks the instrumental, strategic framework of `war' understood as a political-military technique. For this reason, critical analytical framings of global conflict, which tend to rely on the `scaling up' of Michel Foucault's critique of biopolitics and upon Carl Schmitt's critique of universal claims to protect the `human', elide the specificity of the international today. Today's `wars of choice', fought under the banner of the `values' of humanitarian intervention or the `global war on terror', are distinguished precisely by the fact that they cannot be grasped as strategically framed political conflicts.

In the 21st century, the scope and the size of migration are more different than previous centuries. The reason behind this is that there are no more global wars or conflicts between states and the economic developments reached the highest levels for some of the countries. Moreover, states try to increase their industrial level. Hence, the conflicts and the economic development level shape migration routes and the destination country. In this context, I will utilize geopolitics and economic development levels to classify countries. As a result of the end of global conflicts and global war, economic conditions became main determinant for migrations in the globalized world in the 21st century. In the 20th century, the scope of migration was small compared to 21st century because of various reasons. Standardized education and high level industrialization are of two main reasons. In the 21st century, the industrialization hit the top level of the world history and education took standardized structure among particular countries. In this research, all countries will be examined in detail with respect to UN Data. Furthermore, the following questions are targeted to be answered: Does migration flow from less developed countries to developed countries? Do developed countries accommodate more immigrants in their borders?

In Chap. 3, we already analyzed the “Thucydides Trap” of dominant world powers, rising global challengers, and the tendencies for global warfare. In view of rising global tensions in the wake of the COVID-19 depression, this chapter revisits the dire predictions about the future of the international system, which were hotly debated by world systems research for decades now. We test these propositions with new and encompassing data right up to the year 2020, applying advanced time series techniques like spectral analysis, analysis of autocorrelation, and cross-correlation analysis. Is there a danger that the global economic depression, which we now face, will again lead to a global war, just like the Great Depression of the 1930s led up to Second World War? By re-analyzing the latest global conflict data from 1495 onwards and data about the growth of world industrial production from 1740 onwards, we re-investigate propositions from classical world systems analysis and find that instability, and not stability, characterizes the world system, and that there is an indented “W”-shaped pattern of global conflict since 1495, leading from one global war to the other and that this pattern did not end with the end of the Cold War. World hegemonies that characterize the workings of world capitalism arise and they also end. The belle epoque of globalization from the 1960s to the COVID-19 crisis did not bring about a more stable, egalitarian, and peaceful world. So, this chapter is a dire synthesis of the predictions and lessons to be drawn from the time series analysis of major power wars since 1495 and global economic cycles since 1740. Our chapter must be regarded as a reconfirmation of the kind of the most dismal world systems literature with advanced method of spectral analysis. Our analysis in particular confirms the existence of Kuznets cycles (22 years); Barro cycles (36 years); Kondratieff cycles (54 years); and Wallerstein cycles (140 years). Our readers should be also reminded of the fact that these results were achieved without any prior transformations of the data and without any omission of time periods to be considered between 1740 and 2020. In this chapter, also the quantitative, statistical global war cycle literature, initiated by Goldstein (Int Stud Q 29:411–444, 1985, Long cycles. Prosperity and war in the modern age. Yale University Press, London, 1988), is again confirmed, with a shorter 30-year war cycle and a longer 130-year war cycle as a result of our time series analysis. Cross-correlation analysis also confirms another world system research hypothesis, mainly a time-lag of about 4 years between a major global depression and global warfare. For the Gulf countries, this chapter thus implies a clear warning of an impending world political tsunami.

This book should command the attention of all Cold War historians. It is a book of prodigious research and immense erudition. Lorenz Lüthi has visited archives in the United States, England, Russia, China, Australia, India, Germany, France, Switzerland, and Austria, among other places. His aim is noteworthy: to “de-center” the Cold War. He argues that, for the most part, developments in the Middle East, Asia, and Europe had roots not in the global Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union but in “structural” changes in each of these regions that presaged the Cold War's end. He rejects the triumphalist narrative of some U.S. writers, minimizes the role of President Ronald Reagan, and claims that Mikhail Gorbachev, the leader of the Soviet Union, did not want to end the Cold War and instead yearned to win that conflict. Overall, Lüthi stresses the agency of local actors and regional dynamics and claims that the capacity of Moscow and Washington to shape events was circumscribed by “decolonization, Asian-African Internationalism, pan-Arabism, pan-Islamism, Arab-Israeli hostility, and European economic developments” (p. 1).Despite the ambition and learning that inform every page of this tome, the book is beset with interpretive ambiguities and conceptual problems. Lüthi argues that the Cold War was not predetermined but was the collective result of “ideological clashes, unilateral decisions, political disagreements, and misperceptions” (p. 13). Its origins rest in the desires of the USSR to “overthrow the imperialist-capitalist world system and the establishment of a stateless and classless society across the globe” (p. 3). In contrast to Odd Arne Westad's The Cold War: A World History (New York; Basic Books, 2017), Lüthi pays scant attention to the economic contradictions within global capitalism in the late nineteenth century, the cyclical fluctuations of business cycles in the early twentieth century, the rise of the Left, the yearnings for structural change within capitalism, and the disillusionment spawned by two world wars and the Great Depression. Rather, Lüthi's focus is on imperial aspirations and ideological conflict. He elides geostrategic motivations, the underlying dynamics of global capitalism, and the legacy of World War II. He does not explain that controlling German power in Europe and harnessing Japanese power in Asia were key components of the global Cold War as well as the regional Cold Wars in Europe and Asia. He does not show how the perceived structural dynamics of global capitalism impelled policymakers in North American, Europe, and Japan to focus on integrating the core industrial areas of global capitalism with markets and raw materials in the “periphery”; that is, in the Middle East, Southeast Asia, and Africa. He does not illustrate how socioeconomic unrest and political turmoil stemming from the Great Depression and World War II created perceptions of threat and opportunity in Moscow and Washington that set the conditions for the Cold War.The great attribute of this volume is Lüthi's detailed description of developments in the Middle East, Asia, and Europe. Cold War historians will be surprised by his decision to place developments in the Middle East at the forefront of the volume (chapter two), even while he argues that the Cold War did not come to the Middle East until the Suez crisis (chapters 8–10). The Middle East commands initial attention because Lüthi focuses on the legacy of British imperialism and the desires of officials in London to remake their empire in the aftermath of World War II with the help of the Arab League. In this context, Lüthi luminously describes inter-Arab dynamics, Arab-Israeli hostilities, and the rise of pan-Islamism. He stresses Anwar el-Sadat's desire to expel Soviet influence from Egypt, the complex dynamics spawned by the Palestinian quest for statehood, and the repercussions of the Iranian revolution. By the early 1980s, he writes, “the Cold War ceased to be the critical structure that shaped the regional system in the Middle East” (p. 518). But it is not clear what he means by the “regional system,” or whether the Cold War had ever shaped it. It is also not clear what constituted the regional Cold War in the Middle East when so many of the wars were hot, not cold. The role of oil in shaping the local, regional, and international dynamics of the different versions of Cold War in the region goes totally unexamined.Lüthi's discussion of Asia is central to the overall thesis of his book. “Three countries,” he writes, “played major roles in Asia's Cold War. China, Vietnam, and India all were dynamic agents in the shaping of their own fates and not just passive battlegrounds in the global competition between the United States and the Soviet Union” (p. 115). Lüthi shows how the Sino-Soviet split, the Chinese rapprochement with the United States, the unification of revolutionary Vietnam, and “the collapse of communism as a unifying program for national liberation” (p. 537) reshaped the Asian Cold War during the 1970s. But here again it is not clear precisely what the Asian Cold War was, and why Japan is totally omitted from its discussion. Perhaps Lüthi would argue that Japan lacked agency, but even if that was the case the country was crucial to the trajectory of the Vietnam War and the U.S. role in it. Numerous historians—Howard Schonberger, Michael Schaller, Andrew Rotter, William Borden, and Robert Blum, among others—have shown in great detail how the goal of reconstructing and stabilizing Japan impelled U.S. officials to thwart Communist gains in Southeast Asia, create an independent South Vietnam, establish the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, and support the rightwing military coup, crackdown, and massacres in Indonesia. While ignoring these dimensions of the Asian Cold War, Lüthi presents fascinating chapters on China, Vietnam, and India, on Asian-African internationalism, and on nonalignment. He shows that the Asian Cold War had many manifestations and permutations. At different times, in different ways, these trajectories affected the U.S.-Soviet global conflict and were influenced by that conflict. But Lüthi also acknowledges that “the end of the global Cold War primarily required a strategic rethinking in Moscow which would only come in March 1985 with Mikhail S. Gorbachev's ascent to power” (p. 537).Strategic rethinking was necessitated by developments in Europe. Lüthi incisively describes the successful integrationist initiatives in Western Europe and the concomitant failures in the Soviet-imposed Council for Mutual Economic Assistance. He emphasizes the ability of Western economies to recalibrate, innovate, and adjust to changing economic and monetary conditions, and he highlights the failures of centrally managed systems to do so. He minimizes the role of the United States in the reconstruction of Western Europe, mentioning that it “provided a stable and supportive framework” (p. 380). Ultimately, the failure of Communist economies to compete and modernize contributed to the flagging popular support for Communist regimes in Eastern Europe and the end of the Cold War. But Lüthi does not make much of an effort to analyze the basic shortcomings in Communist systems, nor does he examine why and how liberal capitalist and social-democratic market economies were able to adapt successfully. For example, he describes the impact of declining oil prices in the 1980s and the constraints that imposed on Moscow's ability to subsidize the economies of its East European satellites, but he rarely makes an attempt to analyze the dysfunctionality of Soviet agricultural policies or the flawed operations of central planning. He stresses the resilience of West European economies but barely mentions the creation of social welfare states and the role of governments in providing minimal social provision and expanding educational opportunity, access to medical care, and support for basic research.This volume is a monumental attempt to de-center the Cold War and restore agency to middle-level powers and local actors. What it does is de-center international politics. It illuminates that much was going on in the latter half of the twentieth century that was not the product of the U.S.-Soviet Cold War but at times intersected with it and contributed to its denouement. Small powers had their own agendas, and regional dynamics had their own logic. In complicated ways, developments in one region influenced those in another. Thanks to the prodigious research of an author with staggering linguistic skills and breathtaking knowledge of multiple literatures, one comes away much better informed about the complexities of international politics but not equally enlightened about the Cold War itself.

This article discusses the widening of the First World War from a European war to a global war and what that meant for the participants. Today's politicians, who talk (albeit tautologically) of an ‘increasingly globalized world’, forget how already ‘globalized’ the world seemed in 1914, especially if you happened to live in London. The fact that the First World War was a global war was itself the product of a global order, shaped by the European great powers and held together by an embryonic economic system. The title ‘the world war’ was a statement about its importance, not a statement about its geographical scale. And yet the French and British official histories, unlike the German, did not use ‘world war’ in their titles, any more than they had used the phrase during the war itself. They preferred the title ‘the Great War’, and in English the war only became widely known as the First World War after 1945, in other words after there had been a Second World War. The article explores the implications of the title ‘the Great War’ and the idea that the war of 1914–1918 was a great European war (a name also used in Britain, especially during the war itself). The article also examines the role of finances in the widening of the war and the global economy during a worldwide conflict. It also discusses the role of empires in the expanding war. However, the financial situation of participants, including those who entered the war at a later date, and the desire for empire were not the only factors in the creation of a global conflict. Decisions made in the interest of individual nations also had an effect on the widening of the war from a regional dispute. The corollary of the article's argument, that the First World War was in some respects an aggregation of regional conflicts, was that the war would not simply end when the European war ended. All that was agreed on 11 November 1918 was the surrender of Germany, largely on terms which reflected the situation within Europe and specifically on the western front. Only here did the guns fell silent at 11am on that day. However, so imperative were the immediate demands of the conflict that there was scant consideration of their long-term effects. Some of the consequences of the fact that the First World War was waged as a global war remained with Europe throughout the Cold War, and others remain in the Middle East to this day.

Reviewed by: Colonial Captivity during the First World War: Internment and the Fall of the German Empire, 1914–1919 by Mahon Murphy Martin Kalb Colonial Captivity during the First World War: Internment and the Fall of the German Empire, 1914–1919. By Mahon Murphy. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2016. Pp. x + 245. Cloth $99.99. ISBN 978-1108418072. World War I was a truly global war, fought on the fields of Flanders and in the Alps. New Zealanders participated in the Gallipoli Campaign, and Senegalese found themselves in the trenches on the western front. Battles also took place in overseas colonies: in Kiachow and German Southwest Africa, while in German East Africa General Paul von Lettow-Vorbeck, with the help of local askari, kept British troops occupied even after the armistice in November 1918. This is the wide-angle lens that frames Mahon Murphy's Colonial Captivity during the First World War: Internment and the Fall of the German Empire, 1914–1919, in which he argues that "the colonial theatres of the war, where previously racial roles and hierarchies had been more rigidly defined than in Europe, were characterized by social transformation influenced through the expansion of the European Great War into a global conflict" (2). Mahon's focus is on the British internment of German soldiers (something the book's title does not make entirely clear), and he emphasizes links between "the extra-European and European theatres" through a variety of international negotiations related to prisoners (3). In the process he highlights the centralization of camp management, encounters of Germans with other inhabitants of the British empire, shifting identities, mobility and modernity, and the vital role played by the colonies in World War I (4–6). This ambitious monograph is divided into three main parts, beginning with an exhaustive historiographical overview that might have found a better home in the introduction. A discussion of "the geography of internment" (35) follows, meant to establish and partially compare the situation in Togo, Cameroon, German Southwest [End Page 412] Africa, German East Africa, New Guinea, Samoa, and Kiaochow. Murphy then highlights broader themes, including health and internment, as well as mobility. He concludes part one by noting that "these transnational cross-border meetings must surely have cemented a common cause between the Germans overseas" that were further strengthened after their return to Germany (66). The experience of prisoners is the theme of part 2. Murphy first addresses the subject of violence, asking "who or what placed restraint on the uses of violence and how did reactions to violence within the British Empire show the cohesion or lack of cohesion, between Britain and the Dominions?" (70). Examples from specific camps concerning the roles of alcohol, riots, and reprisals illustrate some of Murphy's points, although more would have been welcome. Particularly revealing is an episode in which "Germans had to suffer the humiliation of being led to the docks for repatriation under black guards and watched by those who until recently had been their colonial inferiors" (81–82), a situation best described as "colonial role reversal" (91). Murphy then explores identity formations, emasculation, and the role of social class, referring not only to Michelle Moyd's deconstruction of the myth of the "loyal askari," but also describing how German prisoners came to feel more German through the process of internment. Another chapter is devoted to the propaganda of internment: whereas the British wished to be seen as acting in a "civilized" manner, the Germans meant to portray themselves "as the victims of empires that did not have the common European civilizing mission at heart" (125). As Murphy puts it, "The German colonies were, in propaganda terms, Germany's Belgium" (146), a narrative widely exploited later on. The final part of Colonial Captivity during the First World War sheds light on global connections more broadly. Murphy introduces other players within the camp network, mainly France and Japan. In his view, Germans appreciated the British more than the French, an argument in need of greater contextualization given the broad anti-French sentiments east of the Rhine. The discussion of Japan is enlightening, and Murphy skillfully shows how the Japanese sought to prove that they...

The chapter focuses on the development from the Global Cold War and anticolonial struggle to the global conflicts of the post–Cold War period. It first provides an overview of the complex features of a period that starts in the immediate aftermath of the Second World War with the challenges of the aftermath of the conflict and a post war reordering of economies, societies and national and international politics, and continues with the rise of the Global Cold War and the spread of the Wars of Decolonization in Asia and Africa that led to the decline of European empires. Then it explores the consequences of the collapse of communism, the end of the Global Cold War, and the proliferation of Wars of Globalization along with new forms of humanitarianism and peacekeeping. In the last section, it discusses the research by gender scholars from different disciplines on the Global Cold War and the Wars of Globalization and their attempts to rewrite mainstream narratives.

The war in Iraq, Afghanistan, continual conflict in the Middle East, and the global war on terrorism, are all intertwined in a greater battle of global conflict: World War III. However, the fogs that have been created to hide these conflicts from public opinion are obstructing a clear view of reality. Fogs prevent the public from accurately seeing this war unfold and from taking action in the government to help prevent, this now, inevitable conflict. This work unveils that the media and government are two thickening fogs that continue to obscure the reality of what is occurring. Media does little to help develop an in-depth understanding of the world. In turn this creates limited interest in reporting of foreign affairs among the market sectors they strive to reach. The government has focused on winning the hearts and minds of the American people in order to drive the cause of the war on terrorism. Yet, this war has unleashed greater struggles, which citizens have covertly been blinded to. While these global conflicts are seemingly isolated, the authors illustrate that they are, in fact, closely linked with similar underlying causes. The fogs of war and peace need to lessen so the American people can be accurately informed and global leaders are able to strive for better policies in order to bring World War III to an end. Seemingly unrelated conflicts raging in Iraq, Afghanistan, the Middle East, and other global areas, are in fact, closely linked, as part of a greater battle, World War III. In the midst of conflict, this work delves into factors of World War III, and claims that we have already begun this new war. However, in an age where the average American citizen is uninformed on international foreign policy and conflict, the two fogs of government and media, are only contributing to this miseducation. These fogs have never been thicker in obscuring the reality of what is occurring. The fog that is media, explains what is occurring in cryptic sound bites by funneling certain information to the American people. Government, the second fog, affects citizens by either withholding or distorting information and opponents, and expands a great effort to deceive and distort current events. In turn it tries to win the hearts of the people by explaining that this is the only way to obtain the idea of peace. This work explains that through the distorted reality of the fogs, we are now in a stage of disinformation, misinformation, and noninformation, which block the view of citizens from what is truly happening and how to deal with it. It is the first analytical model that clearly examines the fogs of war and peace and how new perspectives must been found. The authors offer a model to help inform readers to better understand World War III, while illuminating the causes, nature, and dynamics of the global concern. In turn, they offer new policy directions for political leaders in America, Israel, and Europe and hope to bring to light these fogs of destruction.

This article analyses the Indian, Persian, and Algerian–Tunisian independence committees and their place in Germany’s ‘programme for revolution’, Berlin’s attempt to instigate insurrection across the British, French, and Russian empires during the First World War. The agency of Asian and North African activists in this programme remains largely unknown, and their wartime collaboration in Germany is an under-researched topic in the histories of anti-colonial activism. This article explores the collaboration between the three committees, highlighting their strategic relationships with German officials and with each other. Criticizing the Eurocentric framings still present in studies of wartime strategy, it contributes to a growing historiography on the war as a global conflict. It argues that the independence committees were central actors in Germany’s programme, that the transnationalism of the pre-1914 anti-colonial movements both imprinted Germany’s programme and was furthered by it, and that only a comparative perspective exploring the interactions of its anti-colonial activists fully grasps the global scope of this topic.

This chapter explores how the cultural experience of Britain’s war interacted with dynamics on the home and battle fronts to influence a range of changes in society. It places the personal alongside, and in the context of, the great complex events of the 1940s. It shows that the Second World War, a truly global war, was fought, perhaps ironically, on a very local, parochial scale. Young men and women tasked with defending their homelands wanted their sacrifice to mean something, not only for the state but for themselves. A core argument is that the failure of the British government to embrace radical social change during the Second World War had profound implications for the geopolitical and sociopolitical future of the country. The Second World War was a “revolutionary” war, yet Britain fought it in a manner that emphasized and prioritized continuity rather than change, with important consequences discussed throughout the chapter.

From October 2017 to May 2018 the Imperial War Museum London presented ‘the UK’s first major exhibition of artists’ responses to war and conflict since 9/11’, Age of Terror: Art s ince 9/11. Drawing together 50 works of art by over 40 international artists into four themed sections (‘9/11’, ‘State Control’, ‘Weapons’, and ‘Home’) the exhibition met with mixed responses from critics, as well as mixed reviews by members of the public. Curatorial practices are, however, fraught by virtue of the necessity – an essential part of a creative practice – to leave certain things out. Paying attention to these ‘missing figures’ in Age of Terror in relation to the wider politics and power of the Global War on Terror as it has evolved and been studied offers insight into the everyday cultures of war that go unquestioned. More specifically, we can examine Age of Terror’s encounters with three missing figures of the war: the missing dead of 9/11 and missing information, which are curated as an ‘absent presence’ in this exhibition; the missing figure of the war fighter as opposed to the war casualty, which are only tangentially referenced; and the missing figure of the everyday practices of war cultures, as opposed to the cultures which represent war as spectacular. Collectively these missing figures, under-examined within the exhibition, are part of the forces that help to continue to make the Global War on Terror make sense almost 20 years on.

In a constantly changing world, any production activity, including transport, requires scientific support, which, in turn, involves the active participation of scientists, as well as the possibility of exchanging views between theorists and practitioners. One of the most effective formats for this is a scientific conference, which allows discussing long-term trends in the development of the industry and ways of early adaptation to them. In the railway sector, scientific conferences have become a regular and effective tool for discussing promising trends in the industry.President of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin declared 2021 the Year of Science and Technology. In this regard, it is symbolic that on August 26–27, 2021, the 1st International Scientific and Practical Conference “Science 1520 VNIIZHT: Look Beyond the Horizons” was held on the territory of Test Loop of the JSC “VNIIZHT”. The JSC Railway Research Institute, a leader in the development, creation, testing and implementation of railway equipment and technologies in the 1520 mm track space organized the conference. At the conference, reports were presented both by practitioners and acting managers, and by theoretical scientists. The conference was organized in the form of parallel working sections, the main results of which were discussed at a panel discussion. According to the presentation of the heads of the thematic sections, the best speakers were awarded with diplomas, including many young scientists. According to the assessments of managers and employees of railway enterprises and suppliers, the conference was a useful and longawaited international event in railway science and practice.

Book Review| September 01 2021 Nigeria and World War II: Colonialism, Empire, and Global Conflict Nigeria and World War II: Colonialism, Empire, and Global Conflict. CHIMA J. KORIEH. Judith A. Byfield Judith A. Byfield Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google Journal of West African History (2021) 7 (2): 144–146. https://doi.org/10.2307/48642065 Cite Icon Cite Share Icon Share Facebook Twitter LinkedIn MailTo Permissions Search Site Citation Judith A. Byfield; Nigeria and World War II: Colonialism, Empire, and Global Conflict. Journal of West African History 1 September 2021; 7 (2): 144–146. doi: https://doi.org/10.2307/48642065 Download citation file: Zotero Reference Manager EasyBib Bookends Mendeley Papers EndNote RefWorks BibTex toolbar search Search Dropdown Menu toolbar search search input Search input auto suggest filter your search All Scholarly Publishing CollectiveMichigan State University PressJournal of West African History Search Advanced Search The text of this article is only available as a PDF. Copyright © 2021 Michigan State University2021 Article PDF first page preview Close Modal You do not currently have access to this content.

Global wars, conflicts and displacement have created conditions that increase the risk of opportunistic skin infections. Of the 70.8 million displaced people worldwide, 25.9 million are refugees, 41.3 million are internally displaced persons (IDPs) and 3.5 million are asylum seekers. During crises, access to dermatological care declines compared with peace time. The humanitarian crisis in Gaza has internally displaced 1.5 million people. Sixteen of Gaza’s 36 hospitals are partially operational, and 20 have closed, leaving 1822 beds. Consequently, this has resulted in poor sanitation increasing exposure to pests and waste. Of 31 000 people screened for skin diseases, over 4000 were positive. Within a month of the conflict’s onset in October 2023, 8944 cases of scabies and lice, 1005 cases of varicella zoster and 12 635 cases of skin rashes were reported. Dermatology provision is limited, but the Palestine Children’s Relief Fund has previously supported Dr Patricia Senet, a dermatologist, on a medical mission to Gaza. Psychodermatology data is scarce, but exposure to war can lead to post-traumatic stress disorder in up to 50% of adults, with similar data on depression and anxiety, which can exacerbate skin conditions. Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) have provided over 8800 psychosocial support sessions. Cutaneous leishmaniasis is a neglected tropical disease in occupied Palestinian territory, with no data on prevalence in Gaza. Teledermatology may be a solution, but its feasibility is hindered by the destruction of 50% of the telecommunications infrastructure, damage to 75%, and the deaths of 1057 healthcare workers. Refugee health similarly suffers. Sudan has suffered from internal wars: in rural Sudan, 88.8% of people from orphanages and refugee camps had a skin condition, with fungal infections the most common (32.6%). In Cox’s Bazar, Bangladesh, where Rohingya refugees live, there is a scabies endemic: 730 000 cases were treated in 2021, accounting for 90% of all skin diseases at MSF clinics. An analysis of skin disease and needs among 380 Rohingya refugees found that fungal, particularly dermatophyte, infections were the most common (n = 215), particularly in women of reproductive age. There is scope for point-of-care testing and initiatives to improve the training of healthcare workers, as well as patient education. Globally, there is a rise in recalcitrant and recurrent tinea associated with dermatophyte resistance. Dermatologists have a central role in the promotion of global health. Efforts to help displaced populations are constrained by diagnostic and therapeutic resources, as well as specialist expertise. Telemedicine offers a solution but is constrained by telecom infrastructure and workforce shortages.

This study explores the scarcity of water within two populous states of the world, World has challenge of water war owing the water conflict between the two thirsty nations of the world that might transfer into global war. Qualitative as well as quantitative research methodology was used. Ramification of the study is founded under the current diplomatic and bilateral scenario of the two states, upper riparian states of the region including China and India wanted to divert river water flow to avoid water scarcity in future that might damage agriculture and industry of lower riparian states. It is also recommended that United Nation and other International Organizations should play their part and introduce agreed law and policy of water distribution for the protection of global water conflict.