Overlooked and forgotten: seeking a place for Africa in the Indo-Pacific

This chapter examines Nigeria’s role in African affairs from its independence in 1960 to the present time. It introduces readers to the dynamics of the country’s foreign policy toward Africa and relations with some African states. It reviews the Nigerian foreign policy shift from the cautious, conservative preoccupation of the 1960s to the bolder, more radical principles of the post-civil war period in the 1970s and 1980s. It examines Nigeria as a dominant power on the continent for much of its post-independence history, its role in West Africa’s subregion, and within the pan-African body, the Organization of African Unity (now African Union). Further, it examines Nigeria’s role in Africa’s struggle against European imperialism, especially its leadership of the liberation movement in Southern Africa. Finally, the chapter briefly examines Nigeria’s declining power in Africa in the contemporary period.

The European see-saw of hope and frustration. Part 1 of the study looks broadly at transatlantic relations during the first two years of the George W. Bush administration. It recalls how the concern about the likely foreign policy direction taken by Bush was confirmed by his stance on the Kyoto Protocol and the decision to push ahead with the missile defence project. Hopes that the 11 September attacks could be an opportunity to cajole the United States in a more multilateralist direction were soon frustrated by the increasingly hawkish line on Iraq, confirmed in the State of the Union address of January 2002. Signs of relative European unity rapidly disappeared as the showdown with Iraq moved closer. Analysing recent developments in Europe. Part 2 observes that responses from European states — both current and prospective EU members — to the imminent war with Iraq showed a re-emergence of the classic Europeanist-Atlanticist division on the shape of the transatlantic security architecture. Nonetheless, it also points out that on many non-military foreign policy issues, the EU is able to foster relatively united and effective positions. The nature of EU-US divisions. Part 3 engages with the notion that the future of EU-US relations is being determined by deep divisions in political values between Europe and the United States which help to shape their relative international power. At public opinion level, we find little evidence to back assertions of fundamentally different world-views, and much hostility aimed at the Bush administration rather than America or Americans in general. While at government level, there are major transatlantic divisions over how to achieve international objectives, the nature of those international objectives is not radically different. We further suggest that the measurement of power in terms of military strength is an inadequate way of gauging European potential on the international stage, as a number of recent European figures have pointed out. Recommendations. Our final recommendations centre less on immediate means to reduce transatlantic tensions — for example, the need for a calming in rhetoric on both sides — than on issues of longer- term institutional behaviour and the need for clearer strategic thinking and positioning: 1. The EU must as far as possible practice internally in Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) what it preaches externally about multilateral and collective decision-making. A more closely-defined series of EU foreign policy ambitions may facilitate this. 2. 2. Care must be taken in designing an institutional foreign policy framework that allows enough flexibility to avoid instances of uni- lateral action or action by small groups being seen as a failure for CFSP. 3. 3. In order to help the EU to define its ambitions and roles in the foreign policy domain, a high-level working group should be created with the aim of surveying views within the Union and con- sidering the possibility of an EU security plan.

The article addresses the essence of strategic thinking concept and its significance for national security policy-making in general and for foreign policy in particular. Academic literature analysis on strategy and business management, systemized and generalized, revealed two main views regarding strategic thinking concept: phenomenological, according to which strategic thinking is considered as a phenomenon or cognitive ability of the manager, which is characterized by specific attributes, and procedural, according to which strategic thinking is considered as a process. Based on the obtained data, the author’s definition of the multidimensional term «strategic thinking» was formulated and its essence was revealed, which provided an understanding of the strategic thinking process. At the same time, the concept is adapted to the context of security and foreign policy studies. Strategic thinking is determined to be the basis of the state strategic planning system, through which integrated national security policy is made. An attempt is made to outline the main characteristics of strategic thinking as a tool for conceptualizing the future and designing national security policy. An integrated scheme of strategic process (strategizing) is presented and its detailed description is provided. It is defined that strategic thinking is reflected in behavior and influences the national interest’s formulation, decision-making processes, goal setting and crisis response. That is, strategic thinking is the basis of the state strategic planning system, through which the state creates the main national security policy directions. At the same time, the sources of strategic thinking development are cultural and historical context and strategic knowledge. World politics history examples are given, demonstrating successful and erroneous use of strategic thinking in foreign policy making. The results of the study allowed making conclusions that emphasize the important role of strategic thinking in strategizing, national security policy-making and foreign policy. Perspective directions of further research, thus, can be connected with strategic thinking attributes specified list development as well as strategic thinking training process models development.

A decade has elapsed since the People's Republic of China first appeared on the African scene.' During this period, Africa increasingly assumed an important place in Chinese foreign policy. An intensive drive to win friends and gain influence ensued. Utilizing a vast variety of foreign policy instruments, China initiated a major program to penetrate the African states. One index of the overt success of this massive campaign was that by 1965 eighteen of the thirty-six independent African states had recognized the People's Republic of China. The abortive second Asian-African Conference of 1965, however, represented a major landmark in Chinese-African relations. International and internal developments involving Africa have since been strongly unfavorable to the Chinese cause. The indefinite postponement of the Algiers Conference constituted a major setback. Subsequently, two African states (the Central African Republic and Dahomey) broke diplomatic relations with China, while China's relations with previously friendly African states (e.g., Ghana and Kenya) have become seriously strained.2 It should be emphasized, however, that though the drive to gain influence has undoubtedly suffered setbacks, China can neither be excluded from the contemporary African scene (in 1966 fifteen African states continued to recognize the People's Republic of China) nor has Peking given signs of abandoning the African sphere. On the contrary, Chou En-lai's scheduled but postponed visit to Cairo early in 1966 and Lin Piao's well publicized comments of 1965 on the role of Africa as part of the world countryside against the world cities of North America and Western Europe are indicative of China's continued interest in this vast continent.3 Despite China's long-term interest in Africa, the recent setbacks raise major questions concerning contemporary and future Chinese-African relations. One basic question, of course, is: What factors contributed to China's failures and what implications do these adversities have upon China's African policy? There have been indications that Peking has been asking

its actual substantial assistance to corrupt and repressive regimes. In the same vein, the lack of special focus on U.S. economic interests as a motivating factor of foreign policy in Africa, particularly as regards South Africa, tends to diminish the significance of this volume. NA TO, the Warsaw Pact and Africa not only offers a 'study of NATO's involvement in Africa from the date of its inception', but also attempts to 'lay to rest some of the more doubtful claims of NATO collusion with South Africa', as well as to 'highlight what many African states have identified as a quite different challenge from the Warsaw pact' (p. xi). Christopher Coker first of all identifies the basic events and processes that have shaped western strategic thinking and planning in Africa since I 949, and traces N.A.T.O.'s concerns to the perception in the West that Soviet expansionism must be opposed. He discusses the differences in approach and policy among the western powers, as well as the problems engendered by decolonisation in Africa which have rendered their strategic planning and activities ever more elusive and uncertain. In addition, Coker examines the Warsaw Pact involvement in Africa since 1959, and focuses on attempts to gain and maintain a foothold in Southern Africa. He discusses the economic importance of Africa to Eastern Europe, as well as the problems and uncertainties faced in trying to maintain stable client-states which could facilitate long-term trade arrangements for the export of raw materials to the member-states of the Warsaw Pact. Finally, the author examines the activities of the Western Alliance and the Soviet challenge to its influence in postindependence Africa. This book is a welcome addition to the growing body of literature on western and eastern foreign policies in Africa, and should prove useful to all those who are interested in a critical understanding of the roots and current status of East-West competition in the continent. Particularly important is Coker's critical analysis of the mechanisms employed by the Soviet Union and its allies to maintain an uninterrupted flow of raw materials from client-states in Africa. One major shortcoming, however, appears to be the author's inability to use the wealth of data and analysis to examine the long-term implications of such competing foreign policies. Those who read this serious study may wonder if Africa will forever remain a victim in the East-West struggle for strategic dominance and economic exploitation.

its actual substantial assistance to corrupt and repressive regimes. In the same vein, the lack of special focus on U.S. economic interests as a motivating factor of foreign policy in Africa, particularly as regards South Africa, tends to diminish the significance of this volume. NA TO, the Warsaw Pact and Africa not only offers a 'study of NATO's involvement in Africa from the date of its inception', but also attempts to 'lay to rest some of the more doubtful claims of NATO collusion with South Africa', as well as to 'highlight what many African states have identified as a quite different challenge from the Warsaw pact' (p. xi). Christopher Coker first of all identifies the basic events and processes that have shaped western strategic thinking and planning in Africa since I 949, and traces N.A.T.O.'s concerns to the perception in the West that Soviet expansionism must be opposed. He discusses the differences in approach and policy among the western powers, as well as the problems engendered by decolonisation in Africa which have rendered their strategic planning and activities ever more elusive and uncertain. In addition, Coker examines the Warsaw Pact involvement in Africa since 1959, and focuses on attempts to gain and maintain a foothold in Southern Africa. He discusses the economic importance of Africa to Eastern Europe, as well as the problems and uncertainties faced in trying to maintain stable client-states which could facilitate long-term trade arrangements for the export of raw materials to the member-states of the Warsaw Pact. Finally, the author examines the activities of the Western Alliance and the Soviet challenge to its influence in postindependence Africa. This book is a welcome addition to the growing body of literature on western and eastern foreign policies in Africa, and should prove useful to all those who are interested in a critical understanding of the roots and current status of East-West competition in the continent. Particularly important is Coker's critical analysis of the mechanisms employed by the Soviet Union and its allies to maintain an uninterrupted flow of raw materials from client-states in Africa. One major shortcoming, however, appears to be the author's inability to use the wealth of data and analysis to examine the long-term implications of such competing foreign policies. Those who read this serious study may wonder if Africa will forever remain a victim in the East-West struggle for strategic dominance and economic exploitation.

The article examines the system of factors influencing Ukraine's cooperation with African States. The study is motivated by the importance of assessing the obstacles that affect the global support for our country in the fight against the external aggression of Russia and its allies. Although Ukraine is trying to accelerate its cooperation with the states of the Global South in the face of security challenges, relations with many of them, including African States, remain ad hoc and unsystematic. The process of rapprochement with African States is slowing down for a number of reasons that need to be addressed. The purpose of the study is to systematise the factors influencing the intensification of Ukraine's relations with African States. The tasks are as follows: 1) to identify the internal factors that slow down the intensification of Ukraine's cooperation with African States; 2) to identify the external factors that influence the constructive development of Ukraine's relations with African States. It is noted that today Ukraine's position in the Global South, in particular in Africa, is still quite weak. Adoption of appropriate strategies, opening of new diplomatic missions, and official visits will not change the situation quickly and dramatically, but the start of these processes is certainly important. It is emphasised that a complex of factors hinders rapid changes in the nature of Ukraine's cooperation with African States, including the peculiarities of Ukraine's policy towards Africa since independence, the interests of large non-democratic states (Russia, China, etc.), the position of the political elites of African States, etc. The main problems for establishing sustainable cooperation between Ukraine and African States are as follows: 1) the lack of a tradition of sustainable cooperation between Ukraine and African States, which is manifested in the lack of understanding of each other's problems and needs; 2) Ukraine has problems with a sufficient number of professional staff for effective cooperation with African States; 3) limited funding for the development of a network of diplomatic and consular institutions, a network of foreign broadcasting; 4) passivity, lack of interest of some African States in intensifying their diplomatic representation in Ukraine; 5) frequent internal political changes in many African States; 6) lack of quality communication, resulting in misconceptions and stereotypes that do not contribute to dialogue; 7) differences in political regimes, political culture and political and legal values between Ukraine and African States; 8) stagnation of democratic processes and strengthening of pro-Russian propaganda narratives in African States. It is emphasised that Ukraine faces a difficult task to overcome many obstacles to cooperation with African States and to change their neutral or politically ambivalent position to a pro-Ukrainian one. Since the policies of many African States are driven by pragmatic rather than value-based considerations, an effective tactic for Ukraine is to demonstrate to African States the new opportunities of cooperation. Keywords: African States, Global South, African vector of Ukraine's foreign policy, geopolitics, Russian war in Ukraine.

The article is dedicated to a comprehensive study of the life path and professional activity of Mykola Petrovych Makaryevych, one of Ukraine’s prominent diplomats, whose career became an important element in the formation of the foreign policy of independent Ukraine. The article focuses on analyzing his biography, covering his early years, education, and the gradual development of his role as a statesman and diplomat, who played an active part in the early years following Ukraine’s declaration of independence in 1991. The authors thoroughly examines key stages of his professional career, particularly his work in key positions within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, where Makaryevych contributed to shaping the foundations of the diplomatic service of the young state. Special attention is given to Makaryevych’s contribution to the development of Ukraine’s bilateral relations with other countries, which became critically important at a time when the country sought international recognition and the establishment of strong partnerships. The article emphasizes his role in strengthening Ukraine’s position on the international stage, particularly through his participation in negotiations, signing agreements, and advancing national interests in the complex geopolitical conditions of the post-Soviet space. His influence on the institutional development of Ukrainian diplomacy is also highlighted; including efforts in training personnel and improving the structures of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs during a time when resources were limited and challenges were unprecedented. The authors analyzes Makaryevych’s work as an example of combining professionalism, strategic thinking, and dedication to state principles, which allowed him to effectively navigate uncertainty and transformations. The article underscores that his efforts contributed to establishing Ukraine as a subject of international relations rather than merely an object of external influence, having a long-term impact on the country’s foreign policy direction. The challenges Makaryevych faced are also discussed, particularly the need to balance internal constraints with external pressures, which added complexity to his diplomatic mission. The article emphasizes the importance of preserving the historical memory of figures like Mykola Makaryevych, whose work became a cornerstone of modern Ukrainian diplomacy. The authors argues that thorough academic research into his life and contributions is necessary not only to honor the past but also to reflect on lessons that can be applied to Ukraine’s current foreign policy challenges. In the context of contemporary global and regional threats, such as aggression from Russia and Ukraine’s integration into European structures, Makaryevych’s legacy becomes especially relevant, serving as an inspiration for the new generation of diplomats. Thus, the article highlights the necessity of further study of his work as part of the broader history of Ukraine’s state-building and its place in the world.

France's relations with its former colonies remain close after 26 years of independence, and France has tried hard in the last decade to expand its sphere of influence beyond the ex-colonial core. This article examines French economic and security interests in Africa, as well as the role of Africa in France's foreign policy. It also considers some of the contradictions in French policy, the problems encountered by the Socialist government between May 1981 and March 1986, and the longer-term trend toward greater discretion and discrimination in dealing with African states. Finally, it discusses the analytic problems raised by the peculiar postcolonial relationship between France and French-speaking Africa.

There is no doubt that Nigeria’s foreign policy is indeed outdated. This is evidenced in the fact that we now live in different times. Though Nigeria’s role in Africa still remains significant, however, the time “Africa” was made the centre piece of Nigeria’s foreign policy, was a time when many countries in the continent were struggling to throw off the yolk of colonialism. And the adoption of such a policy was to stand in solidarity with those nations that were struggling to achieve or gain independence. And today, no single country in the continent is under foreign rule or direct control, and the times now call for a review of Nigeria’s foreign policy to reflect the nations current circumstances and realities among the committee of states across the globe. And there is no time than under the present administration of President Muhammadu Buhari. The Buhari administration must look critically and make an assessment of how and which way to direct Nigeria’s foreign policy. The responsibility appears to be binding on President Buhari’s administration having been neglected or not given the required attention by many previous regimes and administrations. The confidence of Nigerians in President Buhari’s vision, promises and commitment to change and general progress/ greatness of Nigeria seems to justify such expectations in the area of foreign relations and policy. There is need for Nigeria to be more involved in world affairs and to seek observer status in certain supranational institutions including the E.U, NATO and the SCO (Shanghai Cooperation Organisation) in this era of globalisation, and the accompanying system of interdependence. This paper tries to provide a guide with regards to the review of the foreign policy of Nigeria by President Buhari to reflect the realities and challenges of the times in which we are living. The paper argues that Nigeria must be a global player despite being a regional power in consideration of its pottentials and position in the scheme of things, drawing lessons based on Realist theories in international affairs and conduct as well as the experiences of certain states like Japan as models for foreign policy development.

The end of the Cold War and the demise of the Soviet Union brought an end to the ideology driven special relationship between Russia and various African states.However, after ten years these relations were resuscitated due to major changes on both sides.Under Vladimir Putin's presidency and the economic recovery that followed, Russia made efforts to reclaim a leading role in global politics, while various African states grew politically more stable and economically more successful.This time around, relations were focussed dominantly on economics and trade, rather than on ideology as during the Cold War period.Attracted by Africa's abundant resources, particularly energy and minerals, a small number of mega Russian companies started to do business with the continent at the turn of the century.This reengagement with Africa came somewhat belatedly, after major players, particularly China, the United States and the European Union, had intensified their engagement.At the same time, Russia and Africa found common cause in international political relations, as witnessed by similar policies in multilateral organisations, particularly aimed against Western hegemony in world finance and economy.And as pointed out in this article, Russia needs to embark on a more integrated, userfriendly, transparent and competitive engagement strategy to become a Strategic Review for Southern Africa, Vol 37, No 2 Gerrit Olivier and Dmitry Suchkov 147 major role player in doing business with Africa.Russia and Africa need also familiarise themselves better with each other, particularly how to do business with one another.As yet, one cannot really speak of a visible Russian pivot towards Africa in its overall international relations.However, if conditions remain favourable, this may develop over time.

The relevance of this study is due to, first, the strengthening of cooperation between the Russian Federation and African states against the background of the deterioration of Russia’s relations with European and North American states; second, the change in the foreign policy of the Russian Federation since the collapse of the USSR towards African states; third, the increased interest of leading states (PRC, France, United Kingdom, USA) in the African continent due to certain factors: rapid population growth in Africa, rare-earth natural resources, good geographical location. The object of this study is the bilateral relations between Russia and Madagascar.The subject of this study is the Republic of Madagascar in the context of the foreign policy interests of the Russian Federation on the African continent. The main purpose of the study is to determine the place of the Republic of Madagascar in the foreign policy of the Russian Federation. This scientific article is based on the theory of political realism, which implies that states are fighting for their own national interests. During the research the author used the following scientific methods: content analysis, mediametry analysis, chronological, statistical. The scientific novelty of the study is due to the the identification of features of transformation of foreign policy course of the Russian Federation in relation to African states since the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Moreover, the author notes the peripherality of the Republic of Madagascar in the current foreign policy course of the Russian Federation towards African States. The main conclusions of the study conducted are the determination of a significant gap between the level of economic cooperation and political and cultural-humanitarian; characterization of changes in the foreign policy of Russia towards African states since 1993; the non-priority status of Madagascar in the foreign policy of Russia.

The purpose of the study is to identify the problems of implementing the African vector of Ukraine’s foreign policy, which became evident in 2022-2025. The time frame of the study is determined by the intensification of Ukraine’s cooperation policy with African states. Based on the assessment of the results of bilateral and multilateral cooperation, the factors that slow down Ukrainian-African interaction are revealed. The study is grounded in the methodology of neo-institutionalism. The negative consequences of Ukraine’s recent lack of a strategy for cooperation with African states and the Global South as a whole are noted. It is emphasized that Ukraine has intensified contacts with several African states. However, the development of relations with many of them and the implementation of specific projects are frequently slowed down by internal and external factors. It is stated that initiatives to intensify relations mainly originate from Ukraine, while African states often take a passive, contemplative, wait-and-see attitude. It is argued that qualitative changes in Ukraine’s cooperation with African states are hindered by: the peculiarities of Ukraine’s policy towards Africa in previous years; the interests of non-democratic states (Russia, China, etc.); the position of political elites of African states regarding neutrality, pragmatism in choosing partners for cooperation, etc. The problems for sustainable cooperation are identified as follows: lack of a tradition of interaction, insufficient understanding of each other’s problems and needs; differences in political regimes, nature of political culture, and political and legal values; passivity or even disinterest of individual African states in relations with Ukraine; lack of quality communication at various levels, etc.

China's relations with African states have undergone significant changes in recent years. China has projected its relationship with Africa as one of equality and ‘mutual help’. Such perceptions of foreign policy stem from the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence and the shared experience of imperialist domination and economic underdevelopment. Moreover, various public statements by China's elites suggest that China is expected to play a much more prominent, even exceptional role in Africa. This purportedly entails moving beyond the hegemonic West's interventionist aid or security policies, and is also implicitly designed to highlight the West's shortcomings in promoting African economic growth or peace. Yet where does this perception of exceptionalism come from? Why does Beijing feel that it has to play a leading role in Africa's development? How can Beijing distinguish itself from the nations of the West, who are regularly criticised for being paternalistic?

The image of Africa in the United Nations in the first twelve years of the life of that organization was an image of Trust Territories and colonially dominated areas. This was drastically altered by the emergence of African states to independence and membership in the world community. As they have gained increased membership in the United Nations, the African states have sought to co-ordinate their efforts on issues of self-determination, the independence of colonial areas, the elimination of racial discrimination policies. To this end, caucusing groups have developed. There is presently dis cernible a tendency toward unity even on non-African issues. Within the United Nations itself, the African states are con cerned with obtaining seats on the Security Council, the Eco nomic and Social Council, and on other committees that include less than the full membership of the United Nations. On sub stantive issues, they are concerned with eliminating Portuguese domination in Angola and Mozambique, with achieving inde pendence for South West Africa, and with ending apartheid in South Africa, with priorities assigned in that order for reasons of strategy. The impact of Africa in the United Nations has been to shift emphasis from East-West to North-South differ ences, with particular stress on moral-political issues, basic so cial and economic problems. Over-all, African states have conducted themselves in a politically responsible manner and can be expected to continue to do so.—Ed.